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This paper undertakes an examination of the existing protections available within the United Kingdom for the 
protection of privacy and aspects of an individual's persona. The paper where necessary gives a brief history 
of the cause of actions to facilitate discussion as to whether the actions still maintain their original purposes 
or have  developed over time in order to cope with the different requirements of a increasingly media 
influenced society. With the actions of breach of confidence and passing off the paper uses short case 
studies of the Douglas and Irvine cases in order to exemplify the changes the law has undertaken. 
In order to provide a comparative analysis the paper examines three other common law countries to show 
the different protections which are available. Firstly, the paper undertakes a detailed examination of the laws 
of the United States ("US"), and will show how the US have developed specific rights to privacy and 
publicity. Australia is used to show how a very similar legal system to the United Kingdom ("UK") has been 
more willing to adapt more quickly to the requirements of personalities seeking to protect against 
appropriation of their personality. The final common law system examined is Canada, this part of the paper 
shows the result of taking a different approach from the UK and the US. The Canadian section shows how it 
is possible for a legal system to have been influenced by aspects of both the UK and US legal systems, 
which has resulted in the creation of a specialised tort of appropriation of personality. 
The following chapter looks at the protections available within three civil law countries, namely France, 
Germany and Italy. This section enables a cross comparison with the approach taken by European civil law 
countries and the effect of the European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR") on their privacy laws. In 
addition the civil law section examines and analyses the systems in place within the various countries in 
response to the question of protecting privacy and publicity, for e.g. a right to publicity in Italy. 
The paper undertakes a brief examination and comparative analysis of the various systems in use in 
different jurisdictions in comparison with UK. The paper throughout examines both historical and existing 
academic commentary to show the influences and reaction to the development of the law. 
Throughout the paper the concept of an individual's persona or personality is used and this terminology was 
defined by Frazer as the "indicia of identity".1 Consisting, at its narrowest interpretation, of the name, 
likeness and voice of a natural person.2 The "personality right" allows celebrities to protect their "indicia of 
identity" by providing "the right to control and profit from the commercial use of one's name, image, likeness, 
etc., and prevent unauthorised appropriation of the same for commercial purposes".3 Individual's rights are 
broken down into the right of privacy and right to publicity.4 
The protections available concerning privacy and/or publicity are examined throughout the paper. The 
privacy rights discussed below seek to protect the human or dignitary rights, namely the right to exclude 
others, whereas the publicity or personality rights that are examined look at economic or property rights in an 
individual. It has been argued that publicity rights cannot exist without effective privacy rights, however the 
reality is that publicity rights seek to protect the value attached with the recognition value of the individual not 
the value of giving up their privacy. The right of publicity also encompasses where protection for an 
individual who chooses not to 'exploit' their persona for commercial gain. A more detailed examination of the 
                                                   
1 Frazer, ‘Appropriation of Personality-A New Tort’, (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 281 
2 S. Bains, ‘Personality rights: should the UK grant celebrities a proprietary right in the personality? Part 1’ 
2007 Ent L.R. 164 
3 Azmul Haque, India: Face Value: Personality Rights and Celebrity Endorsements, September 2, 2003. 
Available at, www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=22487. 
4 T. Lauterbach, ‘US-style ‘personality’ right in the UK--en route from Strasbourg?’, 20th BILETA 
Conference: Over-commoditised; Over-Centralised; Over-Observed: The New Digital Legal World? April 
2005, Queen's University of Belfast. 
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academic thinking behind the essence of a right to privacy and publicity is undertaken in the US section of 
chapter 2 below. The legal development of the actions has often centred on the initial reluctance of the 
courts to grant wide protections for exploitation of the property rights in an individual's persona and being 
more willing to protect the individual. 
It is paramount to show that despite protection for both being present within some actions each has been 
created through and raised different academic and legal debates. For example within breach of confidence, 
examined in detail below, it is possible and indeed well known to claim an action which covers both privacy 
and publicity aspects. A well known case that exemplifies this was Douglas v Hello! Ltd, where there were 
two claims one for privacy and the second brought for commercialisation of personality. 
As the paper shows below the requirements of different causes of actions, to establish protection for privacy 
and/or publicity, has resulted in the extension of actions away from their initial scope and intention. The 




1 Protections available within the United Kingdom 
1.1 Introduction 
"That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common 
law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such 
protection."5 
Frazer defined the concept of an individual's personality or persona as the "indicia of identity."6 Consisting, 
at its narrowest interpretation, of the name, likeness and voice of a natural person.7 The "personality right" 
allows celebrities to protect their "indicia of identity" by providing "the right to control and profit from the 
commercial use of one's name, image, likeness, etc., and prevent unauthorised appropriation of the same 
for commercial purposes".8 Individual's rights are broken down into the right of privacy and right to publicity.9 
The current domestic position is that the laws protecting privacy and publicity rights relies upon piecemeal 
protections e.g. breach of confidence, Human Rights Act 1998 ("HRA"), passing off, defamation, trademarks 
and copyright, many of which have been forced to develop from their intended scope. 
Privacy rights within the UK are traditionally protected within a breach of confidence action and seeking to 
protect the dignity and personal invasion of an individual. The scope of the action as shown below, has been 
widened both before and since the enactment of the HRA. 
Breach of confidence can also be used in order to protect against the misappropriation of private 
information, which has a commercial value as shown with OK! Magazines successful claim in the Douglas 
litigation cases. More traditionally though claimants have sought to protect the commercial value of their 
persona through alternative actions such as passing off, trade mark and copyright. Although there has been 
some academic commentary in relation to the push for a specific publicity right no such law current exists 
within the UK. This has resulted in existing actions being made to develop to offer much wider protection 
than they were designed for. 
                                                   
5 S. Warren and L. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193 
6 Frazer, ‘above n.1 
7 S. Bains, above n.2 
8 A. Haque, above n.3 
9 T. Lauterbach, above n.4 
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1.2 Breach of Confidence 
(a) History and Development of Breach of Confidence 
Laws J stated:10 
"If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance with no authority a picture of another 
engaged in some private act, the subsequent disclosure of the photograph would surely amount to a breach 
of confidence…In such a case the law should protect what might reasonably be called a right to privacy, 
although the name accorded to the cause of action would be breach of confidence." 
The breach of confidence action is based upon a proposition of good faith that can protect ideas both 
valuable and mundane.11 This idea protected beyond the confidential relationship that was previously 
required,12 this creeping development of the law of confidence occurred both before and post the HRA 
enactment.13 The use of the action has increased due to litigants using it to enforce their 'Article 8' rights 
against individuals and the state.14 Patten J. said the English law does not recognise a general tort or action 
for invasion of privacy,15 however a breach of confidence action could potentially provide a horizontal 
remedy where the claimants 'Article 8' rights were infringed.16 
The significant recent decision of Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers (2004)17 has not established a new 
right to privacy tort law, but the case is a small but definite step in tackling the misuse of private information. 
Phillipson18 argues that the lack of a clear legal remedy in respect of the non-consensual disclosure of 
personal information is one of the most serious lacunae in English law. His view was subsequently 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal, and this was pronounced "a glaring inadequacy" by the Law 
Commission.19 Lord Nicholls remarked that "the continuing and widespread concern at the apparent failure 
of the law" in this area.20 Phillipson21 proposes that the doctrine of confidence can afford far more protection 
                                                   
10 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804 
11 H. Carty, ‘The common law and the quest for the IP effect.’ I.P.Q. (2007) 237 
12 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] R.P.C. 41 per Megarry. J. 
13 Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444; Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 6) 
[2005] EWCA Civ 595 [2006] Q.B. 125; Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430; Campbell 
v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 [2004] 2 AC 457; Douglas v Hello! Ltd sub nom OBG Ltd v 
Allan [2007] UKHL 21 [2007] 2 WLR 920. 
14 B. Pillans ‘Thus far and no further’, Comms, L. (2007) 213 
15 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406 
16 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) [2001] QB 967, 1003 per Sedley LJ. 
17 Campbell above n.13 
18 G. Phillipson & H. Fenwick ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’, 
M.L.R. 63(5), 2000, 660 
19 Breach of Confidence (Law Com. No. 110), Para 5.5.: ‘the confidentiality of information improperly 
obtained…may be unprotected’. 
20 R v Khan [1997] AC 558 at 582 
21 Above n.18 
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in this area than generally recognised22 but sufficient judicial labour is required to flesh out and give 
definition to the action, which presently lacks clear legal profile. Although a law that enables protection from 
unwanted publication of personal information is bound to become a "legal porcupine, which bristles with 
difficulties".23 
The law took its modern form in the mid nineteenth century, in Prince Albert v Strange (1849),24 which was 
brought by the husband of Queen Victoria. The case involved unauthorised copies of private drawings by 
the professional printer for display in a public exhibition. Cottenham LC, said that in addition to the drawings 
proprietary rights an action would also have been sustainable on grounds of equity, confidence and contract 
law.25 
Cases during the twentieth century have tried to utilise to use breach of contract as a basis of breach of 
confidence, both where there were express and implied contract term.26 In a pre HRA era the action was 
being developed as shown in Spycatcher27 where an obligation of confidence was found to arise 
independent of a contractual relationship. Lord Keith stated "[the obligation] may exist independently of any 
contract on the basis of an independent equitable principle of confidence."28 
Coco v A.N. Clark Engineers Ltd (1969),29 created the test for confidence, Coco dealt with the break down in 
a moped engine venture, where the defendant was unsuccessfully accused of using confidential information. 
Megarry J. stated he was dealing with the 'pure equitable doctrine of confidence unaffected by contract'.30 
The test consisted of three parts:31 
1 the information itself must have the necessary quality of confidence about it; 
2 the information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and 
3 there must have been an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it. 
The introduction of the HRA, on the 2nd October 2000, has had significant changes to the breach of 
confidence action. These changes include covering information when it is 'private' rather than 'confidential. 
                                                   
22 See D. Feldman, ‘Privacy Related Rights and their Social Value’ in R Birks (ed) Privacy and Loyalty 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) 47; Hellewell above n.10 at 807 and Earl Spencer and Countess Spencer v The 
United Kingdom (1998) 25 EHRR CD 105 
23 R v Inner London Education authority ex p Westminster City Council [1986] 1 WLR 28 
24 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G. 25 
25 Ibid at 32 
26 Vokes v Heather (1945) 62 RPC 135 
27 A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No2) [1990] 1 AC 109, [1988] 3 All ER 545 
28 Ibid at 255 
29 Coco above n.12 
30 Ibid at 46 
31 Ibid at 47 
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(b) Human Rights Act 1998 
(i) Introduction 
The introduction of the Act has brought forth a body of case law under which the right to privacy, as 
protected under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”).32 
The extent to which the confidence has changed33 post HRA is difficult to identify as new case law appears 
to increase the protections available.34 Vaver,35 stated the HRA has not or is unlikely to create a new privacy 
tort but has utilised confidence to become privacy's action of choice in the UK,36 which was re-emphasised 
by Buxton L.J.37 In developing the right to protect private information, including the implementation of ECHR 
Arts 8 and 10, the courts have proceeded through the tort of breach of confidence, into which the 
jurisprudence of Arts 8 and 10 has to be "shoehorned".38 
The journalistic invasions of privacy cases involved personal, not public-political affairs of its subjects. These 
are commonly driven by purely commercial considerations thus do not engage the press's right under art.10 
to impart 'information on matters of serious public concern'39 or values such as the furtherance of a 
democratic society. In order to allow an analysis this paper will briefly outline arts.8, 10 of the ECHR and 
art.12 of the HRA. 
Warbrick stated, echoing a strongly-worded Resolution of the Council of Europe that the obligation of the 
state to respect private life by controlling the activities of its agents in collecting personal information ought 
to extend also to similar operations by private persons such as…newspapers.40 
Tulkens,41 suggested a ban on publishing an image may be considered a justifiable interference with the 
right of freedom of expression so long as it satisfies the criteria of art.10(2).42 The court has also found it 
unnecessary or possible to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of 'private life.'43 
                                                   
32 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, November 
1950); TS 71 (1953); Cmd.8969 
33 T. Aplin, ‘The Development of the action for breach of confidence in a post-HRA era’, I.P.Q 2007 at 19 
34 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714; HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] 
EWHC 522; Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 202 (QB)  
35  D.Vaver, ‘Advertising using an individual’s image: a comparative note’, L.Q.R. (2006) 362 
36 HRH Prince of Wales above n.34 
37 Wainwright above n.15 at [28] to [35]; Campbell above n.13 per Lords Nicholls and Hoffmann and 
Baroness Hale at [11], [43] and [133] respectively. 
38 Douglas above n.13 at [53]. See A.McLean and C. Mackey, ‘Is there a law of privacy in the UK? A 
consideration of recent legal developments’, E.I.P.R. (2007) 389 at 390 
39 Bladet Tromso v Norway (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 125 
40 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London: Butterworths, 
1995) 310. Resolution 428 (1970) of the Council of Europe states that the right to privacy under Article 8 
should extend to ‘interference by private persons including the mass media.’ Such resolutions may be taken 
into account by the European Court of Human Rights as a source of ‘soft law’: A Clapham, Human Rights in 
the Private Sphere (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 102-103. 
41 Tulkens. J at the European Court of Human Rights at Council of Europe’s Strasbourg Conference 
“Freedom of Expression and the Right to Privacy.” 
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art.8 rights must be examined in conjunction with the other articles, particularly for the purpose of this thesis, 
art.10 the right of freedom of expression. Therefore before it is possible to determine the extent to which an 
individual has the right to privacy, it is necessary to examine the individual facts of the case. For example, 
where a newspaper printed a picture of Naomi Campbell leaving a drug rehabilitation clinic, along with a 
story saying that she lied concerning her use of narcotics questions regarding the “public interest” in the 
subject were raised. As Pinto44 discusses not all confidential information is private and art. 8 is only 
applicable where the right to a person's private or family life, home or correspondence is involved. 
HRA s.12 relates to providing relief where the case may interfere with art.10 of the ECHR.45 Section 12(3) 
provides that: 'no…relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied 
that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed'. This requires the court to 
undertake a substantial balancing test at the interim stage; subsection (4) confirms this, by instructing that 
when they are dealing with, inter alia, journalistic material, they must consider the extent to which 'it is in the 
public interest for the material to be published.'46 It’s clear that the State's duties under art.10 are engaged 
under court orders, particularly injunctions amounting to prior restraint and those which infringe free speech. 
The defamation cases including Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom (1995)47 and Bladet Tromso v 
Norway (1999)48 establish that this is the case, regardless that both parties are private persons.49 
(ii) Confidential to Private 
The introduction of the Act has brought forth a body of case law under which the right to privacy, as 
protected under art.8 ECHR.50 The chosen action to use the additional protection within the UK is breach of 
confidence. There is a balancing act between arts.8 and 10 of the ECHR, between the right to private life 
and the freedom of expression. The courts take a case by case review to ensure that an individual's 
protections are not withheld with due reason. 
(iii) Articles 8 and 10 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR provides that "everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence." The scope of the article is not confined to protecting individuals from state 
interference as was shown in Marckx v. Belgium (1979)51 and in Y v. The Netherlands (1985)52 the court 
                                                                                                                                                                        
42 Article 10(2) – The exercise of these Freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation of 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary 
43 Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 E.H.R.R 97 
44 T. Pinto, ‘Tiptoeing along the catwalk between Articles 8 and 10’, Ent L.R. 20004, 15(7), 199 
45 It applies, per s.12(1): ‘if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect 
the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression’. 
46 Human Rights Act 1998, section 12(4) 
47 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v United Kingdom (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 442 
48 Bladet Tromso above n.39 
49 X and Y v The Netherlands [1985] 8 E.H.R.R 235 
50 ECHR above n.32 
51 Marckx v Belgium [1979] 2 E.H.R.R 330 
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stated that "these obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private 
life even in the sphere of the relations between individuals themselves". Warbrick agrees with this viewpoint 
and believes that companies such as newspapers and private individuals should both be included with the 
article's scope. 53 
The scope of 'private life' covered under Article 8 is broad and is not susceptible to exhaustive definition, 
Starmer proposes54 that the courts are not prepared to exclude activities of a business and professional 
nature as people develop relationships requiring protection during their working lives. The court's refusal "to 
accept that the public take the celebrities names on goods as a genuine endorsement can change when the 
personality misappropriation interferes with privacy.55 
For there to be protection through a breach of confidence action under article 8 there must be a 'quality of 
confidence.' In determining whether this threshold has been achieved the courts have asked whether the 
information is identifiable and original,56 not already in the public domain,57 not trivial tittle-tattle and is not 
immoral. The post HRA era has seen the courts applying similar criteria but moving the focus from whether 
the information is "confidential" to is the information "private." This shift was shown in A v B & C (2002),58 
where Lord Woolf set out guidelines to assist in determining interlocutory applications in breach of 
confidence cases: 
"… in the majority of cases the question of whether there is an interest capable of being the subject of a 
claim for privacy should not be allowed to be the subject of detailed argument. There must be some interest 
of a private nature which the claimant wishes to protect, but usually the answer to the question whether 
there exists a private interest worthy of protection will be obvious."59 
Lord Nicholls in Campbell overturned the decision of Morland. J and discussed the relevance of art 8, stating 
that "the touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy."60 Baroness Hale firmly believed that is was this reasonable expectation 
of privacy test, followed in Douglas (No.3),61 which finely balances arts.8 & 10 by placing careful 
consideration of the claimant's interests in keeping the information private against the defendant's interest in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
52 X and Y above n.49 
53 Harris and A Clapham above n.40 
54 K. Starmer, ‘European Human Rights Law: The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on 
Human Rights,’ (Legal Action Group, 1999) Pg 125 
55  C. Griffiths, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 – The implications,’ [2000] 5 I.P Law 18 at 19; protection would 
also be of assistance where the celebrity has a trade mark but the use does not constitute trademark use 
such as decorative use on a t-shirt  
56 Fraser v Thames TV [1984] 1 Q.B. 44 (Hirst J.) at 65-66, followed in De Maudsley v Palumbo [1996] 
F.S.R. 447 at 456 
 
57 Coco above n.12 at 47; Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch. 449, Ch D 
58 A v B & C [2002] E.M.L.R. 7 (Jack J.); [2003] Q.B. 195, CA 
59 Ibid at 206 
60 Campbell above n.13 at 466  
61 Douglas (No.3) above n.13 at 119. 
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disclosing it.62 This has now been established as the definitive test in preference to the "obviously private 
test," set out by Lord Woolf C.J. in A v B & C.63 
Fenwick and Phillipson however believe that the Lord Woolf test is "structured by reference to art.8 case 
law,"64 and thus is more unlikely to be prone to uncertainty than the reasonable expectation test. Moreham 
conversely prefers65 the reasonable expectation test, but suggests developments for it, as it reflects the 
subjective nature of the privacy interest, whilst including an objective check on the scope of the action by 
requiring the expectation of privacy to be "reasonable". 
Article 8 rights must be examined in conjunction with the other articles and particularly for the purpose of this 
thesis, art.10 the right of freedom of expression. Therefore before ascertaining the extent to which an 
individual has the right to privacy it is necessary to examine the individual facts of the case such as the 
public interest, which is discussed in greater detail below. As discussed above not all confidential 
information is deemed to be private nor all information assumed to be confidential until otherwise shown, 
and art. 8 is only applicable where the right to a person's private or family life, home or correspondence is 
involved. 
(iv) Public interest defence 
Breach of confidence has always recognised a public interest defence, but it was only used in a handful of 
cases.66 Prior to the HRA, public interest was available as a defence,67 that extended to disclosing 
information of civil, criminal wrongs and other "just cause or excuses"68 for breaking confidences. The 
defence was intentionally narrowly constructed and any disclosure needs to be justified as "one who has a 
proper interest to receive the information." Thus not merely what is of interest to the public but in the public 
interest.69 
However, post HRA the defence has been used as one of a number legal arguments available under art.10. 
Case law has created a more liberal interpretation of the public interest defence, as seen in Theakston, 
where Ouseley J. commented that there was "a real element of public interest" in publishing his attendance 
at the brothel.70 Although he interpreted "public interest" broadly, he felt that the disclosure needs to be 
proportionate to the public interest served, thus he believed the pictures accompanying the article did not fall 
under the interest.71 Ouseley J. believed that the justification for this extended approach to the public interest 
defence as privacy had extended under art. 8 therefore: 
                                                   
62 Campbell above n.13 at 496 
63 A v B & C above n.58 
64 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP, Oxford, 2006), p.764. 
 
65 N. Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’, L.Q.R. 2005, 121, 628 
at pp.647-648 argues for certain developments to the test. 
66 Jockey Club v Buffham [2003] Q.B. 462; London Regional Transport v Mayor of London [2003] E.M.L.R. 
4; Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans [1985] Q.B. 526; Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84; Fraser v Evans 
[1969] 1 Q.B. 349; Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 Q.B. 396 
67 Lion Laboratories ibid;  W v Edgell [1990] 1 Ch. 359 at 389-394 per Scott J.  
68 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 W.L.R. 760, Lion above n.66;  
69 Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers [1984] 2 All E.R. 408 at 413 
70 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] E.M.L.R 22 at 42 
 
71 Ibid at 43, Ouseley J. commented that the public interest in publishing details of his sexual activity were 
less weighty and held at 44 that there was no public interest in publishing the photographs of the claimant 
inside the brothel; G Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of 
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"… the resolution of the conflict between arts.10 and 8 cannot be dependent on narrowly defined exceptions 
to the law of confidentiality appropriate for a more restricted concept and inept for so greatly extended a 
protection."72 
This extended view of public interest can was also applied in A v B & C,73 where Lord Woolf C.J. accepted 
that public figures although entitled to a private life had to expect close scrutiny by the media, even where 
the issue may involve trivial facts. The level to which the media could pry depended upon their position in 
society.74 However, in the light of the Theakston,75 Mosley76 and A v B & C77 judgments, the courts have 
moved from this broader view of public interest and in the context of privacy claims, have treated "public 
interest" as being central to an art.10 claim. Thus the courts do not treat freedom of expression as a 
"monolithic, context-less value". However, there still remains some uncertainty about the interrelation of 
established principles concerning the public interest defence and art.10. 
In the aftermath of McKennitt78 the pre HRA principles of public interest defence are reiterated but updated 
post HRA jurisprudence, in particular Campbell. It is now the established position that matters need to be in 
the public interest and not just of interest to the public,79 although it is in the public interest to correct 
deliberate misrepresentation concerning serious behaviour. 
Phillipson interestingly argues that using a 'role model' test for public interest relies on an assumption that 
the individual's actions influence the public, in reality it is unclear how true this is. The assumption, that 
incorrect impression are harmful to societies public interest, undermines "the very notion of the right to 
informational autonomy, or selective disclosure, which most commentators see as lying at the heart of the 
right to privacy".80 The right to correct misconceptions created by individual's is a strong justification of the 
rights contained in art.10, such as in Campbell where the newspaper article sought to correct the false 
impression that Ms Campbell did not take drugs. 
It is a fine line between what is in the public's interest and what is in the interest of the public and the case 
law of Campbell, Theakston, A v B & C and Mosley shows that the courts are prepared to grant a relatively 
wide justification under art.10 for printing articles, although less so with pictures, portraying well known 
individual's in private situations both legal and illegal. These journalistic invasions of privacy cases involved 
personal, not public-political affairs of its subjects, and are commonly driven by purely commercial 
considerations thus do not engage the press's right under art.10 to impart 'information on matters of serious 
public concern'81 or values such as the furtherance of a democratic society. However the courts have been 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Privacy under the Human Rights Act’, M.L.R. 2003, 66, 726 at pp.753-754, however, has argued that 
Ouseley J. “showed no recognition that what he was doing was part of a proportionality enquiry he was 
bound to undertake, and no real understanding of the argument that greater detail in reporting amounts to a 
graver intrusion into privacy which must be justified.” 
72 Ibid 
 
73 A v B & C above n.58 
 
74 Ibid. 
75 Theakston above n.70 
76 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) 
77 A v B & C above n.58 
78 McKennitt, above n.34  
 
79 Douglas above n.13;  
80 G. Phillipson, above n.82 at p.70. 
81 Bladet Tromso above n.39 
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prepared to set aside the individual's art.8 rights where the subject has been engaged in an immoral act, for 
example in Campbell this was lying about drug taking. 
The courts have been more willing to grant protection where the protection of family values were deemed to 
be at stake such as shown in Murray v Big Picture (2008),82  where the case involved long lens photographs 
taken of J.K. Rowling's child. The Court of Appeal found for the Murray's even though the photograph only 
showed what would have been seen by a passer by as the dissemination of the photograph to wide number 
of people might lead to further intrusions of privacy. 
(v) Requirements for a breach of confidence action 
Pre HRA a perceived limitation of using breach of confidence to protect privacy was the Coco test which 
required that confidential information was imparted in circumstances, which imported an obligation of 
confidence.83 Third parties were restrained from disclosing information once they had notice of the attached 
obligation of confidence of the information, which was breached when the information disclosed to them.84 
Post HRA there has been an erosion of the relationship of confidence necessity, which no longer applies to 
personal information.85 This began with Venables, where Dame Butler-Sloss held86 that s.12(4). of the HRA 
required her to regard art.10, under art.10(2), the right to confidence is a recognised exception to the 
freedom of expression. She believed that a duty of confidence can arise in equity even where no relationship 
existed between the parties. Citing Lord Goff's dicta in A-G v Guardian,87 saying that a stranger can be 
restrained from disclosing certain information where it is known to be confidential.88 
The second limb of the Coco test has now been dispensed with in relation to personal information, as shown 
in Campbell and the Court of Appeal decision in Douglas. Lord Nicholls in Campbell explicitly rejects the 
                                                   
82 Murray v Big Picture (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446 
83 See Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, Cm 1102 (1990), para.8.7; WB v H Bauer 
Publishing Ltd [2002] E.M.L.R. 8 at 30. 
 
84 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch. 344 at 361 per Megarry V.C.; and A-G above n.27 
at 255 per Lord Keith. 
85 B. Markesinis, C. O’Cinnedie, J. Fedkte and M. Hunter-Henin, ‘Concerns and Ideas about Developing the 
English Law of Privacy’, (2004) 52 Am. J. Comp L.133 at .143 welcomes this development; H. Delany, 
‘Breach of Confidence or Breach of Privacy: The Way Forward’ (2005) 27 Dublin University Law Journal 151 
at pp.154-157 and, more recently, Fenwick above n.64 at pp.728-740.  
86 Venables, above n.13 at 42-44, 77 & 79. Dame Butler-Sloss at 77, emphasised that the exceptions must 
be construed narrowly and that Arts 2 and 3 of the Convention were also relevant. 
87 A-G. above n.27 at 281 per Lord Goff: “I realise that, in the vast majority of cases, in particular those 
concerned with trade secrets, the duty of confidence will arise from a transaction or relationship between the 
parties, often a contract, in which event the duty may arise by reason of either an express or an implied term 
of that contract. It is in such cases as these that the expressions ‘confider’ and ‘confidant’ are perhaps most 
aptly employed. But it is well-settled that a duty of confidence may arise in equity independently of such 
cases; and I have expressed the circumstances in which the duty arises in broad terms, not merely to 
embrace those cases where a third party receives information from a person who is under a duty of 
confidence in respect of it, knowing that it has been disclosed by that person to him in breach of his duty of 
confidence, but also to include certain situations, beloved of law teachers, where an obviously confidential 
document is wafted by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded street, or when an obviously 
confidential document, such as a private diary, is dropped in a public place, and is then picked up by a 
passer-by. I also have in mind the situations where secrets of importance to national security come into the 
possession of members of the public” (emphasis supplied). 
88 Venables, above n.13 at 1065 
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need of confidential relationship by stating that "this cause of action has now firmly shaken off the limiting 
constraint of the need for an initial confidential relationship, in doing so it has changed its nature."89 He 
believed that this was recognised by Lord Goff in A-G v Guardian. Lord Goff stated by "now the law imposes 
a 'duty of confidence' whenever a person receives information he knows or ought to know is fairly and 
reasonably to be regarded as confidential". However, Nicholls believes that it is not ideal to use the phrase 
"duty of confidence" but rather it should describe the information as "confidential".90 
Where personal information is at issue the courts no longer apply the Coco91 test but rather examine the 
question of whether the information is both private and that an obligation of confidence arises from it. If this 
is established the courts will then examine the merits of both arts. 8 & 10. Lord Hoffmann believed that there 
has been "a shift in the centre of gravity of the action for breach of confidence when it is used as a remedy 
for the unjustified publication of personal information".92 
In situations where the press have obtained information about individuals through interviewing friends of the 
claimant in whom they have confided93 the obligation of confidence may be imposed upon the newspaper as 
they should have known that they had received the results of a broken confidence.94 The alternative option 
is to impose an obligation on the newspaper directly, on the ground that the reasonable man would have 
realised that the information received should be kept confidential, due to its clearly private character.95 
Sir Anthony Clarke M.R. undertook a two stage approach to breach of confidence, by examining whether the 
information was protected by art.8 and if so would art.10 be more persuasive. He treated both "business" 
and "personal" information with the same reasonable expectation of privacy test,96 believing that the nature 
of a pre-existing relationship is of strong importance in assessing whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy could be inferred in respect of the disclosed information.97 
(vi) Range 
The courts have continued to have a wide view of the information content that could be classified as 
"confidential" or "private" since the HRA was enacted. Medical information is still recognised as before, 
however in Campbell the House of Lords interpreted the definition of medical information broadly to include 
information related to her drug addiction and therapy.98 Information such as people's physical appearance, 
                                                   
89 Campbell, above n.13 at 464 
90 Ibid at 465 
91 H. Beverley-Smith, A. Ohly and A. Lucas-Schloetter, Privacy, Property and Personality; Civil Law 
Perspectives on Commercial Appropriation (CUP, 2005), p.87. 
92 Campbell, above n.13 at 473, See also HRH The Prince of Wales, above n.34 
93 Barrymore v News Group Newspapers [1997] F.S.R. 600 (a friend with whom Barrymore allegedly had a 
homosexual affair passed the details to a newspaper); Stephens, above n.57 
94 A-G above n.27 at 562; and Breach of Confidence above n.19 at para.4.11 
95 Ibid at para.5.9 that the doctrine can give no remedy to the ‘owner’ of personal information where the 
promise of confidentiality is given to another; see also the doubts of Wacks on this point: Privacy and Press 
Freedom (London: Blackstones, 1995) pg 56. 
96 Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 202 (QB). at 36; McKennitt above n.34; X & Y v 
Persons Unknown [2006] EWHC 278 (QB); 
97 A. Mclean above n.38 at 393; CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB); HRH Prince of Wales, above n.34 




whereabouts, people's home address,99 new identities and place of incarceration also qualify where the 
safety of the claimant would be at serious risk without protection.100 
A common and problematic issue that has arisen post HRA is whether details of sexual relationships fall 
under the umbrella of confidential information. This is exemplified in the case of Theakston v Mirror Group 
Newspapers Ltd (2002),101 where the claimant was a television personality who without permission was 
photographed whilst engaging in sexual activities at a brothel. This information was then sold to The Sunday 
People Newspaper, who planned to publish them, Theakston sort an injunction to restrain publication on 
grounds of invasion of privacy and breach of confidence. Ouseley J. held that was "impossible to invest with 
the protection of confidentiality all acts of physical intimacy regardless of the circumstances".102 
The confidentiality of the sexual activity would depend upon the nature of the relationship, nature of the 
activity and the other circumstances in which the activity takes place. The judge found the engagement of 
sexual acts at a brothel was not confidential, due to the brief nature of relationship, the brothel was not a 
private place and the prostitutes did not regard the information as confidential, the nature of relationship did 
not inherently make the information confidential and the absence of any express stipulation of confidentiality. 
Ouseley J. also rejected that the details of the claimant's sexual activities were confidential; however, the 
photographs were different as they are regarded as a particularly embarrassing and humiliating intrusion into 
the claimant's personal life.103 
The judgment of Theakston was cited with approval in A v B & C, with Lord Woolf C.J. criticising the first 
instance judge for treating an affair as the same as marriage.104 Both Theakston and A v B & C have been 
criticised for the method in which the test of confidential information was applied, confusing the requirement 
of confidentiality with that of an obligation of confidence. The fact the information was known to people within 
the brothel does not necessarily destroy the obligation of confidence. It is additionally argued that Theakston 
and the Court of Appeal in A v B & C were also wrong decided according to a test of "private" information.105 
The cases dealt with information that should fall under the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, 
regardless of the length of the sexual relationship.106 This decision has been re-emphasised in Mosley,107 
where pictures of the claimant involved in sado-masochistic activities were published in the News of the 
World. Eady J. awarded damages of £60,000 and said that there was an expectation of privacy where there 
was consensual activities even where unconventional. 
Phillipson argues that the contradictions in judicial reasoning arise from courts' "failure to resolve decisively 
the extent to which principles deriving from privacy substitute themselves for the traditional ingredients of the 
                                                   
99 Green Corns Ltd v Claverly Group Ltd [2005] E.M.L.R. 31 at 47, even where known to people in the 
surrounding area 
100 Venables above n.13 
101 Theakston above n.70 
102 Ibid at 76 
103 Ibid at 77-78, Ouseley J. refused to grant an injunction against publication of the first and second type of 
information, but granted one in respect of the third type of information. 
104 A v B & C above n.58 at 216 
105 It is relevant to note that in Douglas (No.3), above n.13, Lord Phillips M.R. referred to Theakston above 
n.70 at 73:“that to date the English courts appear to have taken a less generous view of the protection that 
the individual can reasonably expect in respect of his or her sexual activities than has the Strasbourg Court.” 
106 Phillipson above n.71 at p.747-8. 
107 Mosley above n.76 
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action in confidence."108 However, post Campbell, it's likely that this indecisiveness will disappear and the 
courts will become more willing to apply the "private information" test which does not include considerations 
particular to confidentiality.109 
(vii) Form of information 
Prior to the HRA, there was authority that confidentiality might apply to information in a form such as a 
record album cover photograph as occurred in Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
(1997).110 Lloyd J. stated that although there were spectators who had seen the spectacle and could relate it 
verbally or even by sketch but "It is the photographic record of the scene, the result of the shoot in fact, that 
was to be confidential."111 Thus, Lloyd J. distinguished between information in oral form or drawings and 
information in photographic form. While the former was not treated as confidential and could apparently be 
disclosed, the latter was considered confidential and to disclose information in this form was a breach of 
confidence. Creation Records established that it was the manifestation of information itself that was subject 
to protection rather than the individual information elements that make up the overall exhibition of the 
information. 
However, in Hello! Lord Walker cast doubt over the correctness of the ruling in Creation Records,112 stating 
that the claimant is only deserving when the information has been kept secret,113 with some considerable 
degree of independent effort from the claimant.114 The security arrangements in Hello! alone would not grant 
the necessary quality of confidence. In relation to the image in Creation Records and whether it should merit 
protection as a commercial secret, he felt that photographs of a white Rolls Royce could be thought as a 
"fairly trivial trade secret," and the defendants did not rely upon Lord Goff's trivia proviso.115 
The court in Douglas recognised the special nature of photographs and how information in other forms could 
be qualitatively different: by saying, "nor is it right to treat a photograph simply as a means of conveying 
factual information. It is quite wrong to suppose that a person who authorises publication of selected 
                                                   
108 Phillipson above n.71 at p.748; M. Waterfield, ‘Now You See It, Now You Don't: The Case For A Tort Of 
Infringement of Privacy in New Zealand’, (2004) 10 The Canterbury Law Review 182 at pp.202-203. 
109 T. Aplin above n.33 at 26 
110 Creation Records above n.13 
111 Ibid at 455 
112 Although he seems happy to agree with the result in Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994] 
E.M.L.R. 134, noting that it involved a serious film with a $40m budget and a sustained effort to keep an 
essential element of the film secret so as to maintain the interest of the public, Douglas, above n.13 at 289. 
Moreover, he notes that in this case (as in the case of Gilbert v Star Newspaper Co Ltd (1894) 11 T.L.R. 4 to 
which he also refers), the injunction only applied until the release of the work. 
113 Coco above n.12 at 47 
114 Douglas above n.13 at 293. It may be therefore that he would not have found the Douglas’s' claim in 
commercial confidentiality made out. Apart from trade secrets that “something more” that Lord Walker 
requires (in relation to unauthorised photographs) might be genuinely embarrassing photographs or 
photographs the publication of which involves a misuse of official powers. 
 
115 Carty above n.12 at 237, Douglas above n.13 at 291. And of course within that limiting principle can also 
be included “vague aspirations or concepts”, at least in the entertainment field, as Hirst J. asserted in Fraser 
above n.56 at 65, “the content of the idea [must be] clearly identifiable, original, of potential attractiveness 
and capable of being realised in actuality”. 
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personal photographs taken on a private occasion, will not reasonably feel distress at the publication of 
unauthorised photographs taken on the same occasion."116 
The difference of photographs from written information was re-emphasised in Campbell.117 The text that 
accompanied the photographs made clear that the photographs were not ordinary photographs of her in a 
public place, but arriving or leaving from the Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Baroness Hale stated: 
"A picture is 'worth a thousand words' because it adds to the impact of the words; but also adds to the 
information given in those words. In context, it also added to the potential harm, by making her think that she 
was being followed or betrayed, and deterring her from going back to the same place again."118 
(viii) Public domain 
The requirement for information to be secret or inaccessible to the public119 is not an absolute 
requirement.120 Thus the fact that some parties have knowledge of the information does not necessarily 
destroy the confidentiality.121 The consequences of information becoming common knowledge or entering 
the public domain was considered in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No.2) (1990).122 The 
case concerned a book (Spycatcher) previously published123 and was readily imported into the UK. It was 
the reporting of the unsuccessful litigation in Australia by The Guardian and Observer newspapers and the 
beginning of the serialisation by The Sunday Times that brought the case.  An injunction was denied to the 
Attorney General and the appeal to House of Lords dismissed as Lord Keith stated "all possible damage to 
                                                   
116 Douglas (No.3) above n.13 at 106 per Lord Phillips M.R. See also Douglas (No.1) above n.16 at 165 per 
Keene L.J. 
117 In D v L [2004] E.M.L.R. 1, CA, Waller L.J. at 24 recognised that information in the form of a sound 
recording also may be qualitatively different: “Just as a photograph can make a greater impact than an 
account of the matter depicted by that photograph, so the recorded details of the very words of a private 
conversation can make more impact, and cause greater embarrassment and distress, than a mere account 
of the conversation in question”. 
118 Campbell above n.13 at 155. 
119 Saltman Engineering v Campbell Engineering (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203 at 215 per Lord Greene M.R: “The 
information, to be confidential, must, I apprehend, apart from contract, have the necessary quality of 
confidence about it, namely, it must not be something which is public property and public knowledge.” This 
was followed in Coco above n.12, at 47 per Megarry J. See also A-G  above n.27, at 268 per Lord Griffiths 
and at 282 per Lord Goff. 
120 Fenwick above n.64 at pp.678-679; and A. Tettenborn, ‘Breach of Confidence, Secrecy and the Public 
Domain’ (1982) 11 Anglo-American Law Review 273 
 
121 See Prince Albert above n.24, where an injunction was granted even though the confidential information, 
in the form of etchings, had been circulated amongst friends of the claimant. See also Exchange Telegraph 
Co Ltd v Central News, Ltd [1897] 2 Ch. 48, where Stirling J. rejected the argument that race information 
was no longer protected because it had become public to those present at the racecourse. He stated at 
53:“But the information was not made known to the whole world; it was no doubt known to a large number of 
persons, but a great many more were ignorant of it.” See also G v Day [1982] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 24, where 
Yeldham J. held that disclosure of the claimant's identity during two television reports were transitory and 
brief and, as such, information regarding his identity was still confidential. Contrast Mustard & Son v Dosen 
and Allcock [1963] R.P.C. 41, where it was held that by obtaining a patent the appellants had disclosed the 
confidential information to the world and the information was no longer secret, but common knowledge. 
122 A-G above n.27 
123 In Australia, United States and Republic of Ireland 
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the interest of the Crown has already been done by the publication of Spycatcher abroad and the ready 
availability of copies in this country."124 
Lord Goff refused the injunction as he recognised that the obligation of confidence  applies only to 
information that is confidential, he stated "in particular, once it has entered what is usually called the public 
domain125  then, as a general rule, the principle of confidentiality can have no application to it."126 
Whereas in Spycatcher the fact the information was in the public domain was a significant factor behind the 
injunction refusal, Lord Keith accepted that circumstances such as personal secrets could be protected even 
where wide scale publication occurred if further publication could cause increased harm.127 This was re-
enforced by Lord Goff who spoke of information being so "generally accessible" that it no longer qualified as 
being confidential, which allows limited circulation before confidentiality being lost.128 
Support for this approach is found in the Law Commission's Report on Breach of Confidence, which 
recommends that a broad definition for information entering the 'public domain' and that the courts take the 
lead on deciding if information is "available to the public" and "relatively secret".129 Recent case law has 
supported this theory, particularly Ashworth Security Hospital v MGN Ltd (2002) 130 and WB v H Bauer 
Publishing Ltd (2002).131 
The Douglas cases, raised the issue as to the extent that publicity of information can undermine a claim of 
"privacy" or "confidentiality." Lord Phillips M.R. stated "once intimate personal information about a celebrity's 
private life has been widely published it may serve no useful purpose to prohibit further publication."132 
However a different opinion occurs in relation to photographs as he stated:133 
"In so far as a photograph does more than convey information and intrudes on privacy by enabling the 
viewer to focus on intimate personal detail, there will be a fresh intrusion of privacy when each additional 
viewer sees the photograph and even when one who has seen a previous publication of the photograph, is 
confronted by a fresh publication of it. There is thus a further important potential distinction between the law 
relating to private information and that relating to other types of confidential information." 
The court stated the fact that the couple intended, and agreed to publish wedding photographs did not 
weaken their privacy claim, but is relevant when accessing the damages through the amount of distress or 
                                                   
124 A-G above n.27 at 260. See also Lord Keith at 259 
125 Which means no more than that the information in question is so generally accessible that, in all the 
circumstances, it cannot be regarded as confidential 
126 A-G above n.27 per Lord Goff at 282, 285 and 286 per Lord Goff. 
127 See also R. Dean, ‘Twists and Turns on the Road to Privacy’ (2004) no 58 Intellectual Property Forum 10 
at p.18 on the absolute nature of secrecy for trade secrets, but not for personal information; and above 
n.131. 
128 Both Lord Keith and Lord Goff's statements on this point were cited with approval in Mills v Newspaper 
Groups Ltd, [2001] E.M.L.R. 41., at 968, [25]. 
129 Breach of Confidence above n.19 at para.6.69. 
130 Ashworth Security Hospital v MGN Ltd [2001] F.S.R. 33 at 573 
 
131 WB above n.83 




harm suffered.134 Douglas appears to have set a precedent that no publication appears to undermine the 
privacy claim as long as the information is a photograph and of a private nature.135 
Protection of an injunction under both strands of the action requires that the information is not part of the 
public domain as once 'the public' has access and knowledge of the information it will no longer maintain its 
confidentiality warranting an injunction. Whether the information has entered the public domain is not just 
about considering its availability and accessibility, but rather the additional harm that could be caused by 
additional circulation or republication.136 Pre HRA the courts did not allow personal information to enter the 
public domain as readily as alternative types of information. Post HRA there has been a differential 
treatment of personal information to be more entrenched.137 
The fact an act or photograph is taken in a public place does not mean the information is in the public 
domain. Phillipson stated that Theakston is "open to serious doubt"138 because it is inconsistent with 
precedent establishing that confidentiality is not lost by virtue of the information being accessible to some. 
This was re-enforced with subsequent European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) jurisprudence, most 
notably Peck v UK (2003),139 Von Hannover v Germany (2005)140 and Murray141 which all re-affirmed that 
even though the photographs or video occurred in a public location this does not preclude protection under 
art.8. 
In Attard v General Manchester Newspapers (2001),142 Bennett J. held that Gracie, a conjoined twin, had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy on the public steps of a hospital and that the unauthorised photographs 
taken of her infringed that right. As such, the only newspapers that were permitted to publish photographs of 
Gracie were those who had contracted to do so.143 
The courts have shifted to a position which accepts the photographs of persons in public places can be 
"private."144 As exemplified by the House of Lords ruling in Campbell, decided after Peck and Von Hannover. 
Campbell145 showed a significant shift from the "confidential information" test to one of "private information" 
has occurred, which is in line with ECtHR jurisprudence.146 
                                                   
134 Ibid at 163 
135 Above n.42 at 38 
136 Green Corns Ltd v Claverly Group Ltd [2005] E.M.L.R. 31 at 47 
137 T. Aplin above n.33 at 38; McKennitt above n.34 at 64 per Eady J: “Courts would be less ready, however, 
in the case of personal private information (as opposed to commercial secrets) to assume that protection 
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Where the information is already in the public domain an injunction is not a remedy available to the court 
and therefore the main remedy sought by claimants is damages, which are discussed in greater detail 
below. 
(ix) Conclusion 
The extent to which the confidence has changed147 post HRA is difficult to identify as new case law appears 
to increase the protections available.148 Vaver,149 stated the HRA has not or is unlikely to create a new 
privacy tort but has utilised confidence to become privacy's action of choice in the UK,150 which was re-
emphasised by Buxton L.J.151 In developing the right to protect private information, including the 
implementation of ECHR arts.8 and 10, the courts have proceeded through the tort of breach of confidence, 
into which the jurisprudence of arts.8 and 10 has to be "shoehorned".152 There is an increasingly level of 
post HRA case law to establish a better understanding of the courts attitude towards the balancing act 
undertaken between arts.8 and 10. 
(c) Hello Case Study 
(i) Facts and rulings 153 
The Douglas v Hello154 cases were based upon the unauthorised taking and publishing of photographs of 
Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones' wedding reception in 2000. The original claimants were the 
celebrity couple and OK! magazine who had agreed to purchase authorised photographs of the wedding. 
The Douglas' were seeking to bring an action to protect the privacy aspects of the photographs, whereas 
OK! brought an action to protect the appropriation of the potential commercial aspects of the photograph. 
The parties sought an injunction and each sought damages for the breach of confidence but under the 
separate strands of the action. 
Part of the agreement was that the wedding was to be a private occasion and the couple would undertake 
and enforce an express prohibition on any guest or other media outlet taking photographs of the wedding. In 
addition to the actions of breach of confidence, the parties sought protections based upon privacy and 
malicious falsehood.  OK! Also sought to rely upon the economic tort of unlawful interference with trade on 
the basis that their exclusive deal was undermined by the actions taken by Hello!. 
The final ruling came on the 2nd May 2007, the House of Lords delivered its opinion. However, in order to 
fully understand the case it is important to examine the earlier court decisions. The initial injunction was 
granted by Buckley J. on 20th November 2000. 
The appeal from Hello! was allowed by Brooke, Sedley and Keene L.JJ. The appeal was allowed as the 
balance of convenience would have favoured the defendants who would have lost an entire issue if the 
injunction had been continued. 
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The trial was heard by Lindsay J. in early 2003, he found that the photographs had the necessary quality of 
confidence about them, and found that the defendants were liable to for breach of confidence, but declined 
the claim that there was an existing law of privacy that was available to the claimants. 
The claim for interference with business by unlawful means was rejected as there was no intention to injure 
the claimants nor were the Douglas' in breach of their contract with OK!. The judge granted a perpetual 
injunction despite the photographs having been published in a national magazine, observing that the item 
had passed into the public domain it must remain there for confidentiality to have been lost. 
Hello! appealed to the Court of Appeal,  where Lord Phillips M.R. and Clarke and Neuberger L.JJ. dismissed 
the appeal in relation to the Douglas's' personally. This was because the courts believed that the test of 
whether the defendant knew or ought to have known that the couple had a reasonable expectation that the 
information would remain private was decided against the defendant. 
The appeal against OK! was successful as the confidentiality rights belonged to the couple and not the 
magazine who merely had an exclusive right to exploit the couple's right for a limited period. The court ruled 
that OK! had no right to commercial confidence in relation to the wedding photographs. OK! magazine's 
cross claim on the economic tort claim was also dismissed as Hello! had not aimed or directed its conduct at 
OK! and did not have the necessary intention to cause harm. 
OK! appealed to the House of Lords on both that the publication of Hello! magazine was in breach of its 
equitable right to confidence in the wedding photographs, and that Hello! was liable for unlawful interference 
with its contractual relationship. The Douglas's' who had been successful in both the Court of First Instance 
and the Court of Appeal were not a party to the House of Lords appeal. 
In the House of Lord's decision the court found for OK! and awarded £1 million in damages for the Hello's 
misappropriation of commercial information. The court re-emphasised the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test and said that the knowledge of the guests that no-one except the professional photographer was to take 
photographs of the events. This imposed an obligation of confidence for OK! as well as the Douglas', the 
photographs were commercially valuable and the Douglas's had exercised sufficient control to impose an 
obligation of confidence.155 
(ii) Conclusion upon the effects upon the law 
Carty156 believed that the Douglas's had a hidden agenda in their case searching for the creation of a UK 
image right. Indeed in the ruling Phillips M.R. even hinted at such an emerging publicity right,  although this 
theory was roundly and wholeheartedly rejected in the House of Lords. Lord Walker noted that "under 
English law it is not possible for a celebrity to claim a monopoly in his or her image, as if it were a trade mark 
or brand,"157 nor has it developed into "any other unorthodox form of intellectual property".158 
Although the Lords rejected the "image or publicity right" the majority of the Lords159 accepted that as 
exclusive licensee the action of breach of confidence did cover the photographs and that the court was 
sympathetic to the misappropriation element that accompanied OK!'s claim. Lord Nicholls touched upon the 
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fact that the UK and the US system are different stating that the unauthorised publication was not "improper 
exploitation" of the Douglas's as it could be under US law.160 
The case illustrates that the form of information protected through a breach of confidence action include 
photographs of a non intimate or medical nature. Lord Nicholls stated "breach of confidence or misuse of 
confidential information now covers two distinct causes of action, protecting two different interests: privacy 
and secret ('confidential') information".161 
The House of Lords held that confidentiality encompassed all the wedding photographs under the term of 
"generic class of information." The quality of confidence was in part due to the precautions taken by the 
Douglas's, they controlled the information and thus could impose an obligation of confidence,162 which 
extended to OK! since "everyone knew that the obligation of confidence was imposed for the benefit of OK! 
as well as the Douglas's"163 and "they paid … for the benefit of the obligation of confidence imposed on all 
those present".164 Although the duty was applied to the generic class of photographs the confidence was in 
for each individual photograph as "the point of the transaction was that each picture should be treated as a 
separate piece of information which OK! would have the exclusive right to publish".165 
The Court of Appeal said that a claim for breach of confidence is not a tort but a restitutionary claim for 
unjust enrichment.166 The information was capable of commercial exploitation, which is only protected by law 
of confidence, is not to be treated as an 'ownable' and 'tradable' property.167 The licence granted to OK! 
passed no proprietary interest nor a right to claim in any confidential information available to the 
Douglas's.168 The licence merely enables lawful actions that otherwise would have been unlawful.169 
The majority of the House of Lords, dissented from this view and held that OK! were entitled to sue for 
breach of confidence itself. Disappointingly, according to Michalos, they offer little analysis of the finding and 
no reasoning for why the Court of Appeal decision was incorrect.170 
Lord Walker discussed the fact that the interest of OK! was wholly commercial and relied on a right to a short 
term confidentiality over a trade secret,171 the law of confidence can only be invoked if the information in 
question meets the law's requirements for the protection of 'confidential' information.172 He concluded that 
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confidentiality of any information should depend on its nature rather than market value and that 
confidentiality law continued to not afford the protection of exclusivity in a spectacle.173 
In conclusion the Douglas litigation was the first real test of the effects of the HRA on breach of confidence 
actions within the UK. The rulings led many to believe that the it was the first step towards a new tort of 
privacy. Despite the House of Lords rejecting this idea, the case clearly broke new ground and has opened 
up the action for developmental change to adopt the requirements of art.8 of the ECHR. 
(d) Remedies 
(i) Interim 
Prior to the HRA, interim relief could be obtained by establishing an arguable case for confidentiality,174 this 
would need to outweigh the public interest defence assuming the evidence supported the defence, which 
requires credible chance of success at trial.175 Interim injunctions have been governed by the approach in 
American Cyanamid v Ethicon (1975).176 
Post HRA the rules governing the courts grants for interim injunction have changed. art.12 of the HRA 
applies when courts are in the process of considering granting relief that may effect art.10 of the ECHR. 
Article 12(3) provides no relief is to be granted "unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to 
establish that publication should not be allowed." Its been argued that if the story were published, the 
information loses its confidential character, and thus nothing to have a final trial about bar damages.177 
The meaning of "likely to establish," was settled in the House of Lords in Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee 
(2005).178 Lord Nicholls concluded that the s.12(3) approach meant the applicant must establish that they 
were "more likely than not" to succeed at trial.179 However, "there will be cases where it is necessary for a 
court to depart from this general approach and a lesser degree of likelihood will suffice as a prerequisite."180 
(ii) Monetary 
The most common remedy sought is an injunction,181 as the confider has brought an action under breach of 
confidence, wanting to keep personal information from entering the public domain. However, claimants can 
seek, either in place of or in addition to an injunction, damages for mental distress or injured feelings.182 
Post HRA the courts have granted damages for both strands of breach of confidence, privacy and 
misappropriation of commercial information, as highlighted in the Douglas litigation, often with little or no 
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explanation of the rationale or reasoning for the valuations. In Douglas, the award for the couple was 
£14,600, which is considerably lower than similar awards within the US, as discussed below. Campbell183 is 
another example where limited damages of £3,500 were awarded by Morland J. specifically £2,500 in 
compensatory damages for the distress and injury to feelings for the details of her therapy, and £1,000 for 
aggravated damages for additional distress created by the follow up article.184 The apparent ease under 
which courts now seem to be awarding damages for mental distress is exemplified in Archer v Williams 
(2003),185 Douglas186 and McKennitt.187 
The post HRA case law has handled the damages for mental distress in an unsatisfactory way,188 as shown 
in the decision in Cornelius. Aplin believes that the basis for awarding damages has long been 
contentious189 and left largely undiscussed by the courts. The recognition of this award of damages may 
suggest a shift in the action away from an equitable action towards a tortuous one.190 
The largest award for damages so far in the UK under breach of confidence for the privacy rather than 
commercial appropriation strand of the action is £60,000 award to Max Mosley for a Sunday newspaper 
article. The deterrent of such an award would need to weighed against the freedom of the presses and the 
benefits received by the defendant, for example the courts have yet to award damages based upon an 
account of profits and a compensatory damages award. 
There continues to be a debate over the adequacy of damages available under a breach of confidence 
action as the awards given by the courts so far appear to be more a measure of compensation than a 
deterrent, such as the award to OK! which was substantially made up of a repayment of their fee to the 
Douglas's. The availability of damages for post loss of privacy and appropriation of commercial information 
is however likely to increase the frequency of use and usefulness to an individual seeking to gain adequate 
protection for private information. 
(e) Call for an explicit right to privacy 
The action of breach of confidence has developed considerably since its inception both pre and post the 
HRA to an extent that there has been academic commentary191 concerning the practicalities of using the 
action to protect privacy. There has been increasing suggestions that a specific right of privacy should be 
created to protect privacy with seven main justifications raised by Schreiber192 namely: 
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1 breach of confidence is jurisprudentially inappropriate to protect the right to privacy; 
2 privacy is quasi-constitutional, whereas confidence is normal common law; 
3 applying confidence to protect privacy has resulted in the distortion of the action; 
4 confidence is best applied to commercial information, and privacy is best suited to personal 
information; 
5 confidence may be inadequate in protecting privacy at common law; 
6 confidence is inadequate to protect privacy as required under ECHR and HRA; and 
7 for socio-educational reasons privacy should be independently protected. 
These arguments work on the theory that the existing use of breach of confidence is not suitable to protect 
privacy as it requires a relationship based right to protect a human right.193 Privacy is a right valid against the 
world, subsists in every person independently and is a right to self determination. Bezanson,194 states the 
original scope of privacy suggested by Warren and Brandeis195 has no longer the same application and thus 
the law should emphasis protection towards the individual's control of information.196 By using art.6 HRA197 
to apply the ECHR to private individuals a constitutional right would grant greater protection and certainty.198 
The distortion of breach of confidence action199 is founded in the belief that the action is over extended by 
filling the gaps in privacy protection.200 this has resulted in a diluted and less certain action particularly post 
HRA.201 As exemplified in Lord Nicholls in Campbell202 who effectively stated that first two tests from Coco 
no longer apply in privacy cases.203 
The action has expanded away from the focus to protect relationships rather than information, it now 
appears as though information has become the focus.204 The action is also unable to protect information 
which is neither confidential or private.205 
The commercial and personal application is the simplest of the arguments raised. By separating privacy and 
confidence to apply to private and commercial information respectively, this separation would enable the 
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actions to evolve to best adapt to new requirements of the law. Separate actions would ensure each action 
was focused on the legal principle which had created the specific rights and protections that the action was 
designed to protect. This would ensure that the action was not stretched to a level where there is legal 
uncertainty within the actions. 
Sedley L.J.206 however denied that a "bright line separated the "private" from the "commercial." The 
distinctive two part test for private information is taken from the Australian case of Lenah.207 The test firstly 
examines whether the information is obviously private and secondly where the "disclosure or observation of 
information or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities."208 
The inadequacy at common law argument relies upon the understanding that the public interest defence is 
narrower when construed with privacy than with confidence. The author believes that the two post HRA 
limitations on public interest defence namely what interests the public is not necessarily sufficient to be in 
the public interest209 and that the scope must be proportional to the disclosure need a third, which is that 
there is a proprietary right of privacy.210 
Two additional reasons why an action for confidence is unsuitable for its current scope are that confidence 
now protects the dissemination of information whereas privacy is wider than information as shown in the 
US.211 Secondly confidence goes to the damage caused, whereas privacy goes to the invasion itself even 
where no damage is caused an action, but privacy would still offer damages as a remedy. 
Recent leading judgments exemplify that the way in which confidence is applied to adapt to privacy issues is 
still ambiguous, as privacy is still protected by undefined and uncertain means. Lord Phillips M.R., observed 
that "the court should, in so far as it can, develop the action for breach of confidence in such a manner as 
will give effect to both arts.8 and 10 rights. We cannot pretend that we find it satisfactory to be required to 
shoe-horn within the cause of action of breach of confidence claims for publication of unauthorised 
photographs of a private occasion". 212 
(f) Conclusion 
The UK has traditionally been reluctant to recognise a right of privacy which has had a significant and 
profound impact upon the development of protection of persona.213 For example it has meant that the 
system of protection in the UK has originated and developed under a different system to that of the US 
namely breach of confidence. 
The breach of confidence action in the UK has uniquely evolved. In the absence of an imputed obligation of 
confidence, the courts will not intervene solely on the basis of an apparent infringement of privacy. Thus the 
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courts in the light of the HRA would be cautious in reviewing decisions of other jurisdictions that developed 
their law against a different backdrop.214 
Keene LJ ruled215 "there is no watertight division between the two concepts of breach of confidence and 
privacy,216 the former is a developing area of the law, the boundaries of which are not immutable but may 
change to reflect changes in society, technology and business practice." 
Where personal information is involved the courts are no longer tied to the three tiered test created in Coco. 
The courts now ask whether the information is private and if an obligation of confidence occurs. Finally the 
courts then must undertake a balancing act between arts.8 & 10 of the ECHR. 
UK courts are bound to apply, by s.12(1)217 of the HRA, s.12(3),218 which makes pre trial restraint more 
difficult when the right to freedom of expression is engaged than where it is not.219 However, damages now 
appear to be more readily available in confidence cases220 than pre-HRA in addition to, or in substitution for, 
injunctive relief. The courts have offered little explanation or justification for the award of damages 
The existing position of breach of confidence is to be the preferred course of action for the courts in 
protecting privacy within the United Kingdom. As Lord Hoffmann stated "there is in my opinion no question of 
creating an 'image right' or any other unorthodox form of intellectual property".221  The Lords' ruling in 
Douglas has expanded the protection afforded to persons with whom they have contracted to commercialise 
an otherwise private event.222 
Buxton L.J. summarised the decisions that a court now has to make in any case involving breach of 
confidence and arts.8 and 10. The current tests applied by the courts in relation to claims for breach of 
confidence is whether the information is private and therefore protected by art.8? If not, then the case is at 
an end, if yes however, the  question of whether in all the circumstances, must the interest of the owner of 
the private information yield to the right of freedom of expression conferred on the publisher by art.10, 
arises. 
Since the HRA enactment the courts have turned to breach of confidence in order to give effect to art.8 of 
the ECHR,223 rather than introduce a new tort of privacy.224 Phillipson said225 despite the excitement that 
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surrounded the pronouncement by Sedley L.J. in Douglas no new tort of invasion of privacy has yet been 
created.  Article 8(1) of the ECHR has coupled with the ECtHR and the English courts has helped create a 
new privacy law, which have fleshed out by case to case.226 The scope of the action has broadened with the 
examination whether the information is "private" rather than "confidential". The second limb of the Coco test 
is now redundant.227 
Phillipson stated228 that there have been quite dramatic developments in the doctrine of confidence. In 
addition two significant shifts have occurred, the public interest defence being interpreted more flexibly and 
is examined in conjunction with art.10 of the ECHR.229 The second change is in relation to the courts being 
more prepared to award damages, although in fairly modest amounts, for non-pecuniary harm. 
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1.3 Passing off 
(a) Introduction 
Passing off is seen as a cause of action with potential to protect commercial misrepresentation, and 
seemingly misappropriation. The tort has developed considerably over time for example abandoning the 
need to prove fraud. It developed through a series of ad hoc decisions, that were motivated by ethics and 
morality in order to prevent an unmeritorious230 defendant escaping liability. The Irvine cases are a recent 
example of the scope and development of the tort and are examined below. The paper will show the 
development of the tort as well as the current requirements and areas that the tort may continue to develop 
in the coming years. 
(b) The development of the law to its current state 
(i) Introduction 
Passing off as a method of protection was summarised by the Master of the Rolls Lord Langdale in Perry v 
Truefitt (1842).231 stating that"a man is not to sell his own goods or services under the pretence that they are 
the goods of another man."232 
Professor Cornish233 gave an analogy of the past views of the courts when he proposed an instinct "in favour 
of the free use of ideas, whether in the commercial context or otherwise". Copyright and the law of passing 
off are seen as the exceptions to this approach "in order to achieve a fair reurn on creative and promotional 
activities".234 He applauds the "understandable" reluctance to afford rights "in respect of every conceivable 
return from the use of an idea".235 
There have been two significant tests for passing off within the UK. The first was stated by Diplock L.J. in 
Erven Warninck BV and Another v J. Townend & Son (Hull) Ltd and Another (Advocaat) (1979).236 Lord 
Diplock gave an exegesis of the law of passing off saying five characteristics needed to be present for 
passing off: 
1 a misrepresentation; 
2 made by a trader in the course of a trade; 
3 to prospective customer of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him; 
4 which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader; and 
5 which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought 
or will probably do so.237 
The test was revised to a classic trinity formulation created by Oliver LJ in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v 
Borden Inc and Others (Jif Lemon) (1990)238  required three elements to be present: 
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 The claimant must be able to demonstrate goodwill; 
 There must be a misrepresentation as to the goods or services offered by the defendant; and 
 Actual or likely damage239 
(ii) Goodwill 
The element of goodwill is at the heart of an action in the tort of passing off.240 Reputation alone is not 
sufficient for a successful claim,241 the claimant must establish that he is in some sense engaged with 
carrying on a business, from which the trade or public will be led to associate the defendant's activities.242 
The Court of Appeal stated243 that the best definition of goodwill was in Inland Revenue Commissioners v 
Muller & Co's Margarine (1901):244 
"Goodwill is composed of a variety of elements. One element may preponderate here and another element 
there. The benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of a business, is the 
attractive force that brings in custom. The goodwill of a business must emanate from a particular centre or 
source. However widely or extended or diffused its influence may be, goodwill is worth nothing unless it has 
power of attraction sufficient to bring customers home to the source from which it emanates".245 
In Muller & Co's Margarine Ltd,246 Lord Diplock stated Goodwill, as the subject of proprietary rights, is 
incapable of subsisting by itself. It has no independent existence apart from the business to which it is 
attached."247 
(iii) Duration of Goodwill 
The goodwill must exist at the time of the defendant's activities, future goodwill is not within the scope of 
passing off.248 The issue of whether the goodwill has dissipated was examined in Ad-lib Club Ltd v Glanville 
(1972)249 which stated that the issue is not the lapse of time, but rather whether the claimant's goodwill had 
lapsed. Goodwill is not instantaneous requiring time to create, though the courts have proved very generous 
in providing support for relatively new businesses250 against potential predators as proven in Stannard v 
Reay (1967)251 where a five week head start was sufficient to have developed goodwill.252 
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(iv) Geographical extent of goodwill 
Goodwill occurs when there is trade on a natural and daily basis, however there is controversy when there is 
an absence of trade within that country or in different parts of the country.253  Maxims Ltd & Louis Vaudable 
v Jan Grace Dye (1977),254 re-emphasised that goodwill can cross international boundaries,255   indeed was 
more likely to do so in an era of international integration.256 The position changed under the Trade Marks Act 
1994 s.56257 which brought in protections on well known mark(s) from any Convention nation.258 
(v) Goodwill in trading 
For goodwill to occur there must be a representation by the defendant to the claimants customers, as shown 
in Granada Group Ltd v Ford Motor Co Ltd (1973).259 The case concerned the use of the name 'Granada' for 
Ford's new luxury car. Graham J said no confusion arose in the public mind between the very different 
companies and their different products. They may share customers but no common field of activity existed to 
cause confusion, as confirmed in Wombles Ltd v Wombles Skips Ltd (1977).260 Goodwill must be the reason 
why customers use the business, they should not use the business for random reasons, but they must be 
using the business as a result of the business' reputation261 
Post Irvine the test is whether there is likelihood of confusion or deception in the mind of the 'public' and in 
establishing this is an indication of a common field of activity may still be a very relevant factor.262 It remains 
important and highly relevant whether there is any association exist or could exist in the minds of the public 
between the activities of the parties.263 
Even if a person wishes to sell under their own name there are restrictions as by doing so they may be guilty 
of passing off, shown in Baume and Co Ltd v A H Moore Ltd (1958),264 where the other ingredients of 
passing off are established".265 
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In the case it was decided that confusion was likely given the similarity of the name and the type of the 
product. Thereby a person with the same name as a well known celebrity trading in their personality may be 
restricted from using their own name.266 
The protections covered under goodwill for an individual are relatively wide, where they have or seek to use 
their name or 'personality'. Protection is only afforded where goodwill has already been created, such as 
when the individual is a house hold name with a reputation to match. After the Irvine litigation is now 
established that passing off has been extended to grant protection for promotional goodwill. This occurs 
even if the celebrity has sought to use separate companies to 'exploit' their persona, as the goodwill itself is 
in the celebrity's reputation and it is the individual who is represented in the offending action.  
(vi) Misrepresentation 
Misrepresentation is the second of the three limbs of classic passing off trinity set out in Jif Lemon. For 
misrepresentation to be proved the claimant must show that that the defendant has tried to represent his 
goods or services. This representation must result in a false belief of connection between the products in the 
consumer's mind and thus a misrepresentation. 
Traditionally, in relation to celebrities, there are two common misrepresentations which are alleged. The first 
is that the product has been endorsed as to its origin and quality by the celebrity. Secondly is that the public 
believe that there must be a licence agreement between the celebrity and the products manufacturer or 
seller. 
"With the increasing use of licensing and endorsement as a method of advertising, the public may 
increasingly come to make such assumptions, although ... the question whether such a misrepresentation 
has been made will largely be a question of fact."267 
The previous attitude of the courts is shown in Lyngstad v. Anabas (1977)268 where the claimants (ABBA), 
sued the defendants for making and distributing pin badges, t-shirts and pillowcases featuring their picture 
without permission. Oliver J. refused an interlocutory injunction, emphasising that the claimants had no 
business other than that of musicians and singers and stated: 
"I am entirely unsatisfied that there is any real possibility of confusion. I do not think that anyone receiving 
the goods could reasonably imagine that the pop stars were giving their approval to the goods offered or that 
the defendants were doing anything more than catering for a popular demand among teenagers for effigies 
of their idols."269 
No confusion existed as the purchasers of such products were buying the celebrity's likeness, not a badge of 
origin.270 Scanlan's271 article and Lyngstad emphasises the development of the law to Irvine, where the 
courts adapted the law to closer match the market practice. The public had at this time had little familiarity to 
the concept of 'celebrity merchandising' and believed that the celebrity carried on no other business than 
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that of entertainment. This was upheld in a number of legal judgments as a common field of activity was still 
a distinct factor of the indication of the potential for confusion prior to the Irvine decisions.272 
A full misrepresentation must be present as mere confusion or likelihood of confusion is insufficient.273 The 
misrepresentation does not have to be intentional, as in Advocaat case,274 Diplock LJ stated "that the 
misrepresentation is 'calculated to injure' the goodwill of the other trader". The important issue is that the 
misrepresentation is likely to harm the claimant's interests which may occur when the defendant's actions 
are innocent and not intended to harm.275 Browne Wilkinson V-C stated that: 
"if the misrepresentation is made, there is no requirement of law for further evidence to show how the 
misrepresentation was the cause of the public buying the goods in question…the public expect to buy what 
they think they are getting, namely the genuine article…the court must infer that if…the customer in any 
case, were aware the object he is buying is not genuine, he would not buy it but would seek the real 
object."276 
Misrepresentation is examined objectively,277 as demonstrated in Morning Star Co-operative Society Ltd v 
Express Newspapers Ltd (1979).278 Foster J noted that the differences between an austere broadsheet 
Morning Star and the racy tabloid Daily Star were such that "only a moron in a hurry would be misled".279 
The reasonable man is assumed to have the actual or implied knowledge of the customer at the time of the 
representation.280 
The mere use of a name used by another trader does not necessarily create the impression  of 
connection,281 however the use of the same name in a similar field of activity is more likely to be 
restrained.282 In the case of Arsenal FC v Reed (2003),283 the use of the words 'Arsenal' and 'Gunners' on 
unlicensed merchandise were insufficient to establish a misrepresentation. As the club's merchandise said 
official merchandise on it therefore the public were not confused into thinking that they were buying the 
genuine article from Mr Reed. 
The use of a 'real name' can still be a misrepresentation, as shown in Tussaud v Tussaud (1890)284 which 
involved a member of the famous family who wished to create a rival waxwork business, but was restrained 
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by an injunction as confusion would inevitably arise. This decision was upheld in Guccio Gucci SpA v Paolo 
Gucci (1991)285 where the defendant was unable to use his name as the evidence suggested confusion of 
the use of the Gucci name by anyone other than the claimants. 
Although passing off has long been argued as an action to protect the celebrity industry the extensions of 
the action, most notably the removal of the requirement for a common field of activity has increased its use 
and relevance to the celebrity industry to an extent that a number of cases would have been decided 
different if they occurred under the extended ambit of passing off.286 
Misrepresentation is still a highly subjective test of the nature of each judge's appraisal of the alleged 
"misrepresentation" although the reasonable man test of confusion has ensured that the courts are not faced 
with a flood of litigation. Porter287 argues that misrepresentation is the essential part of passing off, which 
has created unpredictability in passing off actions. As a result of this, English law is, in his view, inadequate 
to meet the demands of the modern commercial age. Carty288 disagrees and argues that the tort is adequate 
and has been given a wider remit recently in order to adapt and develop to meet the modern requirements. 
This extended form of passing off has been used by celebrities who are seeking to enforce their personality 
rights in the UK. A celebrity whose persona has been used can successfully sue where there has been a 
misrepresentation in relation to a product or service with regards to an endorsement or sponsorship. 
Additionally passing off is also  relevant to a celebrity whose likeness has been used without authorisation. 
(vii) Damage 
For passing off there must be proof that damage has been incurred by the claimant or a likelihood of 
damage where injunctive relief is sought,. The case of Law Society of England and Wales v Society of 
Lawyers (1996)289 has however muddied the waters of whether the claimant must identify some specific 
head of pecuniary damages in order to succeed. Goddard L.J. commented that the law assumes that if the 
goodwill of a man's business has been interfered with by the passing off of goods, damage results there 
from. 290 
The case of Stringfellow v McCain Foods (GB) Ltd (1984)291 showed that even when there is goodwill, 
unless there is evidence of trade declining or damage to the goodwill itself then the court will not award any 
damages. 
Although there are three elements to passing off actions, in practice they are inter-linked. As the defendant's 
misrepresentation must cause damage to the claimant's goodwill292 as stressed in Stringfellow.293 Although 
possible confusion was found there was no actual evidence of damage, as Stringfellow was not 
merchandising his name and thus was no effect on the reputation of his club. This led Wadlow to conclude: 
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"The fundamental distinction between the English and Australian authorities is whether a misrepresentation 
that one business is licensed by another is conclusively assumed to damage that other, or whether 
likelihood of damage must be proved in its own right".294 
Carty295 highlighted some early dicta which claim that the unauthorised use of a celebrity in advertising is 
something the celebrity brought on himself. So in Clark v Freeman (1848)296 Lord Langdale noted that a 
person of the social status of the claimant must accept such exploitation as the price of their eminence as 
"the very eminence causes it"; while in Tolley v Fry (1930)297 Greer L.J. noted that the claimant having 
"voluntarily" entered into professions "which by their nature invite publicity" deemed it not unreasonable that 
he should submit without complaint to his name and reputation being treated "almost as public property".298 
The existing powers available to the courts to award damages are still limited, with no power for awarding 
punitive damages under English common law. The courts have been reluctant to award more than the lost 
licence fee that would have been paid to properly acquire the rights. This measure fails to account for 
potential lost revenue from not undertaking this offer in favour of another, more high profile endorsement. 
The purpose of damages should not only be to compensate but to deter future unauthorised appropriation. 
(c) Irvine litigation and the effect on the tort of passing off 
(i) Facts and Judgment 
The case of Irvine v Talksport Ltd (2002)299 has radically altered the tort of passing off. Arguably, for the first 
time, Laddie J. recognised property rights in the goodwill of a celebrities name and image, and that this 
property is protected by the tort of passing off. The case involved Talksport Radio station, who as part of 
their re-branding from Talk Radio, sent out a brochure concerning changes they were making and the new 
rights they had acquired. The photograph used on the front cover was of Irvine holding a transistor radio to 
his ear with the defendant company's logo attached.300 The photograph originally did not show Mr Irvine 
holding a radio but rather a mobile telephone. SMP301 took that image and manipulated it to include an 
image of a portable radio to which the words "Talk Radio" had been added. Irvine argued that the distribution 
of the defendant's brochure bearing the manipulated picture was an actionable passing off. He sought 
damages but not an injunction as the defendant promised no more flyers would be despatched.302 
Prior to Irvine, the common field of activity test made a successful passing off action difficult for a celebrity to 
prove for unauthorised or false endorsement.303 Irvine changed this, Laddie J. conclusively rejected the 
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"common field of activity" doctrine and recognising the marketing reality that celebrities endorse products 
and services which extend beyond their own expertise.304 
Irvine proved the material misrepresentation as the unauthorised use of his image in the promotion 
displayed a connection between himself and the goods, in addition the public would buy Talksport's product 
believing Irvine had personally endorsed or approved of it. Also Irvine proved that the false endorsement 
reduced, blurred and/or diminished the exclusivity of the trading goodwill in his name and image.305 
The damages were originally set by Laddie. J. in the High Court at £2,000, which, was assessed as a 
reasonable endorsement fee as the whole promotion reached under 1,000 people and cost £11,000. The 
Court of Appeal however, raised the award to £25,000 as Irvine had not signed any endorsement deals 
since 1999 for less than £25,000 and this should have been taken into account. 
(ii) Academic discussion and criticisms 
Most academic commentators believe that the decision in Irvine was confirmation that passing off had 
indeed been extended to cover pure endorsement cases, which previously escaped the ambit of the action. 
There however have been a number of academic commentaries criticising the judgments in Irvine for leaving 
a series of unanswered questions. 
Learmonth306 strongly criticised the level of damages awarded in Irvine and stated that the lost licence fee 
was inadequate to compensate for the harm to Irvine's goodwill. He said that the goodwill should have been 
protected from both from damage and unlicensed use, and an endorser's goodwill, therefore not only the 
licence fee should be protected in a damages award. Learmonth states that Irvine has re-emphasised that 
the current approach taken is too narrow and should take into account personal factors such as the reasons 
why someone would turn down a £2,000 offer307 for a minor promotion might be that it would prevent him 
later accepting, say, £25,000 to promote another major radio station. The reasoning why such a narrow view 
in this type of passing off case is incorrect is shown by contrasting it with other forms of intangible property 
such as patents where the loss of a licence fee may well be the only loss suffered.308 
Sampson believes that the criticisms given by Learmonth were wholly justified. As the courts are without 
jurisdiction to award aggravated or additional damages for flagrancy, there is little is to stop promoters 
infringing a celebrity's rights and then buying off the action at a knock-down price. 309 
Scanlan310 followed the previous criticisms of the judgment and believes that Irvine has in fact created 
uncertainty in the law of passing off, and is likely to result in further litigation involving similar scenarios to 
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obtain certainty. He believes that the ramifications of the judgment will result in profound and as yet 
immeasurable effects of both a legal and economic nature on a number of areas of the law.311 
As mentioned earlier the Irvine decisions have resulted in a number of further questions being raised by 
leading academics such as Robinson. Who questioned whether the rigidity applied in Irvine will result in 
difficulties as to the reality of the additional protection available to the image-holder.312 
Another criticism of the judgment is that the it did not go far enough to unequivocally set out the new 
boundaries of the action for example according to Smith et al it has left the question of whether the action is 
available where an individual's name and image are used but with no suggestion of an endorsement.313 
Further unanswered problems are the uncertainty, where it is apparent that a look-alike model has been 
used,314 or where the featured celebrity has no endorsement reputation and therefore no trading goodwill. If 
they do manage to meet the requirements of the action, which is by no means certain, how the lost licence 
fee damages are to be calculated is extremely unclear. 
Bains315 accurately summarised the feeling of the leading academics concerning Irvine by arguing that 
although the case represents a marked improvement in protection, in reality it is only false endorsement 
cases that are protected and not merchandising, which are ultimately based on the same use of personality. 
The product endorsement business is a multi million pound industry and the levels of damages available 
under passing off are too limited to offer comprehensive protection and deterrence from infringements. 
(iii) Potential areas of development for Passing Off 
Laddie J. adoption of a non traditional approach has left the possibility of using passing off more creatively in 
the future. In a postscript, the judge stated that if passing off in its traditional form had not been able to 
provide a remedy, he would have looked to the HRA to consider whether art.8 or the First Protocol of the 
ECHR would give the "'final impetus' to reach this result".316 The effect of the HRA on protection of image in 
relation to publicity is yet to be examined within the UK in any significant detail, but the protections granted 
to photographs, under breach of confidence actions, show that potentially the law could develop 
significantly. 
Carty317 argues that the tort will continue with the developments in the type of harm to customer connection, 
allowing more exotic and potentially less precise varieties of harm to be successfully alleged. So far loss of 
licensing opportunity, loss of distinctiveness and loss of control have been alleged. The reasoning that lies 
behind such allegations are attempts to complain about misappropriation and these are sometimes 
combined in the concept of "dilution" or blurring of the mark/image.318 Its allegation, in addition to the 
concept of a "connection misrepresentation" and a widening notion of what constitutes goodwill means that 
the tort promises, in the twenty-first century, to be more useful for the celebrity industry than ever before. 
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In examination of the expected development of the tort in the aftermath of the Irvine litigation, the solicitor for 
Talksport was reported in The Times as predicting that image- holders would push back the boundaries of 
protection further with the courts gradually widening the range of image use that can be said to suggest 
endorsement. 
"A false endorsement, involving a material misrepresentation to consumers, merits legal 
protection. And that protection would obviously arise from the tort of passing off. The central 
issue then becomes whether the tort can retain its coherence and rationale by accepting false 
endorsement within its control."319 
The tort can legitimately accommodate such a claim when properly applied. What Irvine indicates is the 
scope for the tort to move away from misrepresentation towards misappropriation and the protection of fame 
per se.320 The distinction made in the Irvine case between endorsement and merchandising was that under 
endorsement there is a belief that the celebrity approves of the product and is happy to be associated with it. 
Merchandising is the exploitation of an image, theme or article which has become famous, and it is not a 
necessary factor that the public believes there to be a link between the product and the celebrity or idea.  
Sloper and Cordery321 propose that the distinction is correct and that the courts will only protect 
endorsement through passing off, as the likelihood of confusion from the public concerning the endorsement 
of merchandise is unlikely. Learmonth322 also agrees that the distinction between endorsement and mere 
merchandising is crucial. The above reasoning suggests that there is no cause of action in passing off for 
false merchandising where there is no element of false endorsement by the celebrity, but wherever 
merchandising includes an operative misrepresentation of endorsement, then passing off will be found. 
Aldous L.J. believed that passing off could be further expanded to an extent that it is referred to as unfair 
competition,323 enabling it to evolve to meet changes in methods of trade and communication. There have 
been academic and case law arguments that suggest that the current requirements of goodwill324 and 
misrepresentation325 are unlikely to remain as strictly in the future.326 The Gowers Review noted that passing 
off currently does not go far enough to protect many brands and designs from misappropriation.327 
(iv) Conclusion 
The rights acquired under passing off are likely to contain the 'greatest potency'328 to most celebrities, they 
however have less protection than under trade mark law, which usually offer monopoly rights once granted. 
                                                   
319 Paul Stevens of Olswang, reported in The Times, October 28, 2003. In the same article the solicitor for 
Ian Botham in his litigation against Guinness was quoted as saying: “I think it is an area of law we have got 
to work on and create.”  
320 H. Carty above n.288, whilst analysing Cornish above n.233 
321 S. Smith above n.313 
322 A. Learmonth above n.306 
323 Arsenal FC Ltd v Matthew Reed [2003] EWCA Civ 696 
324 Future goodwill could also be protected, and that the requirement to build up goodwill may be lowered to 
a level that pre-advertisement maybe sufficient as discussed in BBC v Talbot Motors [1971] F.S.R. 228. 
325 Misrepresentation will be extended to misappropriation as first discussed by Needham J. in Hexagon v 
ABC [1976] R.P.C. 628 
326 H. Carty above n.12 
327 Gowers Review para 5.84 available at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk December 1st 2006  
328 C. Macleod and A. Wood, ‘The Picasso case, famous names and branding celebrity’, Ent L.R. (2006) 44  
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Macleod believes that under the current rights that even vulnerable trade mark rights are of a greater value 
than valid passing off rights.329 
(d) Summary 
Passing off has developed and it was arguably pressure for specific protection that resulted in the decision 
of Irvine.330 The evaluation and elaboration of the tort adopted by Laddie J., has similarities with the 
Australian case of Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty (1960).331 Within passing off misappropriation332 has 
begun to be present furthering the argument that the tort is adaptable to develop along with and in line with 
"modern commercial practice."333 
The calls for a new character right to extend passing over to cover the gap with copyright law334  were 
discussed by Simon L.J.335 in Elvis Presley Trade Marks (1999.)336 This suggestion has previously been 
rejected by the Whitford Committee in 1977, which in itself was the result of a clamour for a change.337 
Simon L.J. argued for the continued rejection of a new right. In addressing the critical issue of 
distinctiveness there should be no a priori assumption that only a celebrity or his successors may ever 
market338  his own character. "Monopolies should not be so readily created."339 
However in British Telecommunications v One In A Million (1999)340 Aldous L.J. commented that earlier case 
law did not confine the cause of action forever "as to do so would prevent the common law evolving to meet 
changes in methods of trade and communication as it had in the past".341 Recently this attitude has 
continued although not to the extent of creating a distinct common law remedy, such a concept being 
unknown in English law.342 
Madow summarises the past attitudes of the courts at the time by stating: "that famous people are a kind of 
public property whose commercial exploitation, while sometimes deplorable, should not be subject to legal 
                                                   
329 Ibid 
330 Above n.330 
331 Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty [1960] S.R. (NSW) 576  
332 An evil which lies behind the Canadian acceptance of the appropriation wrong and the Australian 
developments in passing off law. Indeed the acceptance of misappropriation as a key to common law 
development can also be detected in recent developments in the action for breach of commercial confidence 
333 H. Carty above n.288 
334 There being no copyright protection in a name 
335 Elvis Presley Trade Marks [1999] R.P.C. 567 
336 Ibid 
337 This began in McCulloch above n.272 
338 Or be able to licence the marketing of an individual’s image 
339 McCulloch above n.272, per Simon L.J. 
340 British Telecommunications v One In a Million [1999] F.S.R. 1, CA. 
341 H. Carty above n.288 
342 Charleston v News Group Newspaper [1995] 2 W.L.R. 450 at 452, where Lord Bridge stressed that the 
question turned on libel alone and there was no consideration “whether the publication of the photograph by 
itself constituted some novel tort”.   
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control".343 This has lead some commentators to discuss whether the action of passing off should not have 
been extended to protect a celebrity's persona something it was not designed to do. Instead of an inherently 
unsuited action there has been debate about whether the UK would be better served by a distinct right of 




The Trademarks Act 1994 (“TMA”) s.1(1) defines a trade mark as being: 
"Any sign capable of being reproduced graphically which is capable of distinguishing goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. A trademark may, in particular, 
consist of words,345 designs, letters, numerals or the shape of goods or their packaging". 
The wording suggests that the trade mark register may be a means of protection for popular personality 
features. Personal names, titles, nicknames and artist names may become word marks;346 likenesses, 
signatures347 and other visual personality features may fall under picture marks,348 and voices can be 
protected as sound marks. A closer examination, however, shows that the trade mark registration system 
fails soon after popularity occurs. Historically, English courts have felt uncomfortable with registering signs 
for mere licensing or merchandising purposes. Names of fictional characters such as "Pussy Galore"349 or 
"Holly Hobbie"350 were rejected.351 
Unlike passing off, enforcement of a trade mark requires no goodwill to have been established. As the 
primary function of a trade mark is to convey a message that the quality of the product bearing the trade 
mark are under the control of some person who customarily uses the mark for conveying this message. 
Parker J, whilst explaining the policy behind the protection of names, said352 that on the one hand, apart 
from the law of trade marks, no one can claim monopoly rights in the use of a word or name. On the other 
hand, no one is entitled by the use of any word or name, or indeed in any other way, to represent his goods 
as being the goods of another to that other's injury. 
He continued to say "if the word is descriptive or becomes the name of an article then, it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to prove that it is distinctive of his own goods or that there will be any deception in use by others, 
                                                   
343 M. Madow, ‘Private Ownership in Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights’, (1993) 81 Cal. L.R. 
125 at 154  
344 Ibid; F. Robinson above n.312 
345 Including personal names 
346 Sometimes difficulties arise with common names such as John Smith or surnames which the Registrar in 
the United Kingdom may regard as incapable of distinguishing goods and/or services of undertakings, see 
Registrar’s Work Manual at Para 3.12.8 
347 Barry Artist Trade Mark [1978] R.P.C. 703 
348 Portraits can be distinctive, see Re Anderson L.R. 26 Ch D. 409; Rowland v Michell (1987) 14 R.P.C. 37 
349 Pussy Galore Trade Mark [1967] R.P.C. 265 
350 Re American Greetings Corp.’s Application [1984] 1 W.L.R. 189  
351 J. Klink, ’50 years of publicity rights in the United States and the never ending hassle with intellectual 
property and personality rights in Europe,’ I.P.Q. 2003, 363 
352 Burberrys v J.C. Cording & Co Ltd (1909) 26 R.P.C 693 
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and apart from the TMA, the right of anyone to the exclusive use of a word is always limited by the 
possibilities of its use by others without any risk of deception."353 
In order for an item or article to qualify as a trade mark, it must demonstrate a capacity to distinguish itself 
from others. The court in Canon Kabushiki v Metro Goldwyn-Mayer (1997) stated354 that the essential 
function of the trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or 
end user by enabling him to distinguish the product or service from others which have another origin". 
Another hurdle facing celebrities who are trying to seek protection through Trade Marks is s.11(2)(b) of the 
TMA, which provides that the use of a mark as an "indication concerning ... characteristics of goods or 
services" will not infringe.355 
Porter proposes that if the name or image is found not to be inherently distinctive, the applicant will have to 
prove acquired distinctiveness through extensive trading under a sign bearing his name or image. He 
argued that there is both positive and a negative sides to this. The positive being to show trading activity 
has been carried out by or under license from the celebrity in the goods or services to which the application 
relates. The negative burden is to show that there has not been widespread use by traders generally of the 
name or image as in Princess Diana's case and Elvis' case.356 
As long ago as 1938 invented words could theoretically be registered as a trade mark, however registration 
was not automatic.357 A line of argument preventing trade mark protection for famous names and signs and 
was introduced in TARZAN.358 Where the mark was rejected because nothing in the word TARZAN 
suggested to the consumer that the film, games and toys had any relationship with the applicant company. It 
was devoid of any distinctive character, which excluded it from trade mark protection.359 This case highlights 
the usual situation of commercialised popularity. 
In order to register an ordinary name, the words must be rearranged in an original way, novel fictional 
names, subject to the Tarzan,360 benefit from this.361 It is in principal possible to register a personal name as 
shown in Cantona 7, although nicknames have traditionally been more acceptable to the trade mark registry 
e.g. Gazza for Paul Gascoigne. However, where the name is common such as James Bond this will be more 
problematic.362 Physical likeness can be registered, as long as there are distinctive features or aspects that 
the public will immediately recognise.363 
                                                   
353 Ibid 
354 Canon Kabushiki v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Case C-39/97 at Para 28  
355 J. Klink above n.351; Bravado Merchandising v Mainstream Publishing [1996] F.S.R. 205, the Court 
found the unauthorised use of the registered band name ‘Wet Wet Wet’ protected, inter alia, for books, on a 
book cover is justified. 
356 H. Porter above n.287 
357 Section 9(1) of the Trade Mark Act 1938 
358 Tarzan Trade Mark [1970] R.P.C. 450 
359 See s.3(1)(b) of the Trade Mark Act 1994 
360 Tarzan above n.358 
361 Section 9(1)(d) of the 1938 Act, above n.395 
362 Chapter 6 of the Trade Registry Work Manual, at paragraph 3.12.8 
363 Examples include Damon Hill, Gazza, Nigel Mansell, Eric Cantona and Jacques Villeneuve 
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As with all trade marks applicants specify the classes that they wish to register for protection, thus if the 
mark is already used by a third party in a separate class then registration is still possible, as long as there 
will be no confusion to the public. 
Section 10(3) states that a person infringes a registered trade mark if they use in the course of trade a sign 
which is identical with or similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to goods and services which are not 
similar to those for which the trade mark is registered. If these requirement are proven that the trade mark 
has been used without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to the distinctive character or 
repute of the mark. 
As mentioned above a trade mark must be registered for specific goods and services, of which there are 45 
classes, 34 for goods and 11 for services e.g. class 25 covers clothing. These classes of goods and services 
restrain unauthorised third parties from using the mark, where not for comparative advertising for example, 
for similar or identical goods. 
Where the use of a trade mark is for comparative advertising this is permitted under s.10(6). The exceptions 
to this are where the use of the mark is not compliant with honest practices in the trade, an unfair advantage 
is taken or damage is caused to the distinctive character or reputation of the mark occurs. If any of these 
occurs the celebrity can bring an action under trade mark law, and potentially a number of other actions 
such as passing off, copyright or a complaint to the relevant regulatory boards, and the courts have a 
number of remedies available to them. The three main remedies for trade mark infringement are damages, 
injunctions and an account of profit. Additional special remedies that are available include an order for 
erasure of the mark, destruction of the goods and an order for delivery up of the infringing goods. 
Registered trade marks are expected to be used364 and not stockpiled, which is contrary to public policy.365 
The registration once accepted lasts for five years and the owner can enforce the protections during this 
period even where the mark has not been used, once the initial five year period has expired the mark can be 
vulnerable for revocation for non use. 
Kerly states that where the application is for goods which the 'reasonable' consumer would obviously 
associate with the celebrity and expect that his name on products would be by way of endorsement, for 
example golfing equipment by Tiger Woods, there should be no difficulty with the application to register, 
however when the application relates to goods or services far from the field of activity of the celebrity, it 
would be subject to further enquiry.366 
Where the use is not identical to a registered mark the celebrity must show a likelihood of confusion. Laddie 
J, confirmed367 that deception to the consumer as to origin of particular goods or services is essential with 
mere association alone not being satisfactory. If the celebrity is a well known foreign celebrity he can seek 
an injunction, where an identical or similar mark is being used, in relation to identical or similar goods or 
services, resulting in a likelihood of damages.368 
(b) European influences 
In addition to the legislation under UK law there are European Directives and agreements which have a 
profound effect on the law. The Paris Convention offers protection to well-known marks, even where there is 
                                                   
364 Re Rawhide Trade Mark [1962] R.P.C 133, see also J. Holyoak, ‘UK Character Rights and 
Merchandising Rights Today’ [1983] J.B.L 444 
365 Section 32(3) Trade Marks Act 1994 
366 Sir D. Kerly, ‘Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Name, 13th ed,’ (Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) para. 22.51 
367 Wagamama v City Centre Restaurants [1995] F.S.R 713 
368 Section 46(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 – so called well known marks 
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no registration or use in a territory.369 The basis of protection for well-known marks appears therefore to be 
not limited to the meaning as to origin but as a work of authorship of the variety of meanings. 
The Community Trade Mark Office has without hesitation registered names of persons370 who have failed 
to obtained protection within the UK for example the name "Elvis",371 "Elvis Presley"372 and "Diana, 
Princess of Wales"373 and therewith granted a European wide trade mark right which includes, of course, 
the territory of the UK. 
However as Klink remarks,374 even when a trade mark registration succeeds, be it on the UK or the 
Community register, the holder is not necessarily protected.375 The registration remains toothless if the 
mark is used as a reference to the celebrity or as a decorating element on merchandising articles.376 In 
Arsenal,377 Laddie J. suggested that s.10(1) of the TMA requires trade mark use in order to constitute trade 
mark infringement. 
The European Directives 84/450 and 97/55 require Member States to prohibit "misleading advertising likely 
to deceive the public".378 However, Jones379 argues that the extent to which it applies to non-comparative 
advertising is unclear, and is aimed more towards damage from deceptions than competitors. Besides 
which, the Government considers the protection already afforded by the TMA sufficient.380 
(c) Summary 
In summary, "trade mark law is concerned only with the distinguishing of the goods of one company from 
those of another. Trade mark law will thus indirectly protect the publicity interest only when and where the 
celebrity's identity, name, or likeness is used in such a way as to identify a particular company's goods, and 
then used in the same or similar way on another company's."381 Trade mark law has traditionally offered a 
limited level of protection for a celebrity, as the protections must in the first place be registered. This can be 
time consuming and becomes more difficult the more well-known the celebrity becomes. The protections 
once the mark is registered are limited to the relevant classes of the mark and in addition similar goods and 
services to those protected. Once the mark has gained registration however it offers increased protection 
over passing off as no requirement is needed of the use of the mark by the claimant. 
                                                   
369 Paris Convention, Article 6(i)(s) 
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Porter382 strongly advocates that if a third party uses, without consent, the trading name or style of another 
trader, the burden of proof should be on him to establish that the intention or effect was not to derive benefit 
from the goodwill attached to that trading name or style. Such a shift in the burden of proof would bring 
English law closer to the US law of unfair competition and would have particular application in the area of 
character merchandising. 
Ownership by a celebrity of a trade mark registration of his name or image provides him with a property 
right which is, at least, protect able in the most blatant of circumstances. Because of the prima facie 
assumption of the validity of a trade mark registration, there is no need to establish the existence of 
goodwill before enforcing it and it is for the defendant to prove the invalidity of the mark. 
1.5 Copyright 
(a) Introduction 
Copyright is designed to protect the original results of the labour, skill and judgement of an author, artist or 
another creator.383 Copyright protects the way in which the work is expressed and not the idea or method 
that has created it. The driving pressure behind the changes with copyright over time has traditionally come 
from music, film and software industries who are continually pushing for greater protection for their clients, 
particularly in the Internet age. One of the main advantages of copyright is that the rights occur 
automatically  with no registration required.384 
Under UK law there is no copyright in a name, likeness, voice or other indications of a persona, which was 
confirmed by the Whitford Committee385 in 1977. The committee's view was upheld in Exxon Corp v Exxon 
Insurance Consultants International Ltd. (1982)386, where the claimants argued that the word 'Exxon' should 
be granted copyright protection under the heading as an original literary work. The name could have 
potentially satisfied the test of skill, labour and judgment under s.1 of the Copy Design and Patents Act 
(“CDPA”) 1988. However, the claim was denied as it was found to not convey information, instruction or 
pleasure, which the court found could not be satisfied by a single word.387 
The thought of using copyright to grant character rights was examined by the committee.388 However they 
believed that an unfair competition law would be the best suitable solution to deal with this 'modern 
phenomenon' rather than extending copyright law. However, where the salient features of a character readily 
are identifiable from existing artistic representations e.g. Popeye,  there should be the possibility of an action 
for infringement without having to identify any particular artistic representations as having been copied. 
The Committee also examined copyright in relation to book titles and fictitious names,389 the report said that 
the present protection for visual representations was sufficient but ruled out protection for names. This was 
because names alone may fail to be of sufficient skill and labour to warrant protection. 
 
                                                   
382 H. Porter above n.287 
383 M. Flint, N. Fitzpatrick & C. Thorne, A User’s Guide to Copyright, 6th Ed, Tottel Publishing  
 
384 C. Oppenheim, ‘Recent changes to Copyright Law and the implications for FE and HE, June 2004, 
available at  http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/publications/copyrightcoppenheim.htm 
385 Whitford Committee, The report of Copyright and Designs, HMSO 1977, Cmnd 6732 
386 Exxon Corp v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] R.P.C 69 
387 Hollinrake v Trustwell (1895) 3 Ch. D 420 
388 Whitford Committee above n.385 
389 Literary copyright does not exist in a name, real or fictional, see Conan Doyle v London Mystery 
Magazine Ltd [1949] 66 R.P.C 312 
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(b) Current law 
The current law of copyright is contained within the CDPA and s.1 sets out the types of works that receive 
protection namely: 
2 original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works; 
3 sound recordings, films, broadcasts or cable programmes, and 
4 the typographical arrangement of published editions 
The copyright in a photograph,390 drawing, film and sculpture, even of well known personality, belongs to the 
creator of the work not the subject, this is provided under s.9(1) and s.11(1) of the CDPA. An exception is 
when the work itself has been commissioned to the celebrity that they granted the copyright in the work to 
them and they receive protection under s.85 of the CDPA.391 This has resulted in the lack of cases in which 
copyright has been cited by celebrities seeking to protect their persona. As well as not being able to sue 
under copyright the celebrity, where they are not the owner, also has no rights of the dissemination or use of 
the work. 
The common law does not accept that there can be copyright in a person's name, or that a celebrity can 
'own' his appearance for example by stopping someone having a copy of a tattoo. However, signatures are 
prima facie distinctive, though not inevitably so; for example a signature which was little more than a series 
of neat capital letters would result in the 'distinctive' presumption being rebuffed. Signatures, if unique would 
fall under a graphic work392 as would other aspects of perceived identity, such as a team badge or strip.393 
Trading in this graphic work could lead to goodwill in the work, which could then result in a potential cause of 
action under passing off.394 However, at present there has been no significant case law to support this 
theory. 
Celebrities can protect their image and voice from exploitation if it has been obtained by making a recording 
that is of a "qualifying performance," as defined by statute, made without the prior consent of the celebrity.395 
All illicit recordings are prevented,396 and their commercial manufacture and distribution,397 are punishable 
both by civil398 and criminal proceedings.399 
Photographs are protected as artistic works, however unless the celebrity is the original copyright owner or 
has acquired the copyright by assignment or is the exclusive licensee, they will have difficulty in preventing 
exploitation. Also the more well known the celebrity the more copyright images will exist not under their 
ownership. 
                                                   
390 Section 4(1)(a) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
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395 Section 180 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
396 Ibid at s.197 
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In order for an individual to obtain copyright protection for a dramatic work, the work must be unified and not 
made up of separate elements capable of being performed.400 The difficulties in establishing copyright 
protection for part of a format are numerous and were established401 in Green v Broadcasting Corp of New 
Zealand (1988), which concerned the format of the game show 'Opportunity Knocks.' Therefore, the current 
law is that a substantial part of the protected work must be taken in order for protection to be provided, as 
re-emphasised in Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd (2006). 
Copyright infringement is actionable, by the copyright owner, through s.96 CDPA,  or where the infringement 
is of a moral right through s.103 as the tort of a breach of statutory duty. Damages are available unless the 
defendant is "innocent,"402 in which case alternate remedies such as injunction and account of profits are 
available under s.97.403 The making, dealing with or use of infringing copies is currently a criminal offence 
under s.107. 
The main copyright protections within the UK are the CDPA mention above, but in addition to the CPDA the 
lengthy and complex Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 also apply. Making it a criminal, in 
addition to a civil offence, to infringe copyright by communicating copyrighted works to the public in the 
course of business.404 
A significant benefit of copyright is the guaranteed period of protection that is granted to the copyrighted 
work, for e.g. 70 years from the end of the year in which the author dies for literary, dramatic and musical 
works. The significant periods of protection ensure that wherever this unregistered right is applicable it is of 
great use to an individual seeking to protect their work. 
In 2005 the Chancellor of the Exchequer requested a review of the protection periods for copyright. The 
review was a comprehensive assessment of the current intellectual property regime, with the intention of 
providing a ''foundation for the government's long-term strategic vision for IP policy.'405 There were three 
main aims:406 
1 strengthen enforcement of IP rights from piracy and counterfeiting; 
2 to provide additional support for British businesses using IP at home and abroad; and 
3 strike a balance to encourage innovation and invest in new ideas whilst ensuring that the markets 
remain competitive. 
The Gower Review was published on 6th December 2006 with recommendations that both sound recordings 
and performers' rights should continue to be protected for 50 years.407 
                                                   
400 H. Carty above n.12 at 237 
401 IPC Media Ltd v Highbury Publications Ltd [2005] F.S.R. 20 as cited in Green v Broadcasting Corp of 
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Copyright law, although having been recently subjected to the Gower Review, according to MacMillan,408 is 
still unpredictable and she quotes Vaver by stating that the institution of copyright is "in crisis."409 Nimmer 
stated that "old-fashioned" copyright can no longer guide us in developing mechanisms to solve the many 
difficulties we encounter"410 Carty411 argues that the current copyright protection in the UK are not 
particularly useful in the area of protection of persona's. This is because there is no copyright in the name 
or image of the celebrity, 412 in addition copyright in photographs belongs to the photographer or his 
employer,413 thus allowing the celebrity no control over distribution. Mere protection of copyright in the 
photographs or images that the celebrity already owns is clearly not satisfactory for the industry, given the 
attention of the world media and particularly of paparazzi in celebrities. In addition, relevant copyright or 
performance rights in the sound or video recordings of the celebrity may also not belong to the celebrity 
themselves. 
1.6 Malicious Falsehood 
(a) Overview 
Malicious falsehood is a classic example of a tort that has developed a long way from its initial roots to its 
current role. It began as a method to deal with wrongful allegations of unlawful claims to proprietary rights in 
land.414 The tort of malicious falsehood also has origins in "slander of title" and "slander of goods". Liability is 
based on the defendant telling lies about the claimant to third parties, which are calculated to cause 
damage. Malicious falsehood protects the claimant 's economic interests,415 but in common with the 
intentional harm tort, it is not confined to the protection of business interests.416 
The tort now covers areas such as trading reputation of a business and its products, additionally Kaye has 
shown that the action also covers individual economic interests. The development occurred over the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, notably in two main cases. The first was Western Countries Manure Co v 
Lawes Chemical Manure Co (1874)417 where the quality of the claimant's product was incorrectly impugned 
by the defendant and it was this attack on the goods that helped to create the novel approach of using the 
tort of malicious falsehood. 
                                                   
408 F. MacMillan, ‘New Directions in Copyright Law: Volume 5’ E.I.P.R 2008 at 209 
409 D. Vaver above n.35 p.21-22. 
410 D. Nimmer, ‘The End of Copyright’ (1995) 48 Vand L. Rev. 1385 at 1420. 
411 H. Carty above n.288 
412 Belisle du Boulay v Jules Rene Hermenegilde du Boulay (1869) 2 L.R.P.C 430; Elvis Presley Enterprises 
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In the second case was Riding v Smith (1876)418 the business itself that was criticised. The wife of the 
claimant who worked in the claimant's shop was alleged to have committed adultery with the vicar. This 
caused a fall in trade for the shop in the aftermath of the allegations. The court found that this was held to 
represent a good cause of action, once again increasing the scope of the tort. 
The varying strands of the tort of malicious falsehood were reigned together in another case at the end of 
the nineteenth century in Ratcliffe v Evans (1892).419 The case concerned an allegation by the defendant 
that the claimant's business had ceased to trade. Bowen LJ found the statements to be actionable when he 
stated:420 
"An action will lie for written or oral falsehoods, not actionable per se nor even defamatory, 
where they are maliciously published, where they are calculated in the ordinary course of 
things to produce, and where they do produce, actual damage." 
Although, discussed below, defamation has a role to play within the field of protection of an image and 
personality, the majority of cases by companies and individuals will be filed under the more appropriate but 
more restrictive tort of malicious falsehood. In Kaye an unauthorised interview and pictures were taken of 
Kaye in hospital without his consent, the court ruled that the action was extended to include protection of his 
economic interests. Kaye would have been able to sell his story for a higher value if the defendant's were 
restrained from publishing their article. 
The tort of malicious falsehood has traditionally been seen as very difficult to prove, as shown by the case of 
British Airways plc v Ryanair Ltd (2001).421 To prove a case under malicious falsehood there are four main 
requirements: 
1 falsity (a false statement); 
2 harmful truth; 
3 malice; and 
4 damage. 
(i) Falsity 
The simplest of the requirements is in line with the defamation test requiring that the statement made must 
not be true. The claimant must prove falsity and that the public were also mislead by the falsity,422  the high 
profile case of British Airways collapsed due to this requirement. Under malicious falsehood the burden of 
proof is upon the claimant unlike defamation cases. Whilst determining the falsity of a statement the 'one 
meaning rule'423 is applied, which states that the single natural and ordinary meaning of the word(s) used 
must be determined.424 
 
 
                                                   
418 Riding v Smith (1876) 1 Ex D 91 
419 Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 confirmed in White v Mellin [1895] AC 154 
420 Ratcliffe Ibid 
421 British Airways plc v Ryanair Ltd [2001] FSR 32 
422 Anderson v Liebig’s extract of meat Co Ltd (1881) 45 LT 757 
423 Vodafone v Orange [1997] E.M.L.R. 84 
424 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] A.C. 135, per Parker J 
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(ii) Harmful truth 
The statement must damage the reputation of the goods or business by harming it, namely that the words in 
the derogatory comment(s) harm the reputation of the goods or the business.425 The context in which the 
statement is made is of crucial importance within this field, as it is an important factor as to whether the 
comment is harmful or not.426 
Even innocuous statements can be seen as denigratory once placed into context as proven in Lyne v 
Nicholls (1906),427 where the defendant falsely stated that his paper's circulation was twenty times that of 
any local rival.428 Denigration also includes persons accused of lying as to facts.429 
(iii) Malice 
A core element of the action which places the burden upon the claimant to prove, though defendants often 
claim accidental mistake rather than deliberate malice as the reason for the false statement. This element 
illustrates a major difference between malicious falsehood and passing-off or defamation where it is not a 
requirement. As discussed by Jones,430 the troublesome term 'malice' has been traditionally interpreted as 
'contriving and intending to injure the claimants,431 or an indirect object or purpose,432 but in recent years, a 
form of 'recklessly indifferent malice'433 has emerged.434 It is the requirement to prove a lie has been told 
which has curtailed the use of the tort. 
The courts have yet to establish a clear definition of malice. In Royal Baking Powder Co v Wright, Crossley 
& Co (1900),435 Bankes L.J, defined malice as the absence of any 'just cause or excuse.'436 A second 
definition was in Shapiro v La Morta (1923),437 as being 'an intentionally or recklessly made statement.'438  In 
McDonald's Hamburgers Ltd v Burgerking (UK) Ltd (1986),439 Whitford J. encapsulated malice when he said 
that it was to be regarded as, at least, a reckless indifference as to whether harm may be caused to the 
interests of the claimant. 440 
                                                   
425 Ibid  
426 De Beers Abrasive Products Ltd v International General Electric Co of New York Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 599, 
[1975] 1 WLR 972 
427 Lyne v Nicholls (1906) 23 TLR 86 
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429 Serville v Constance [1954] 1 All ER 662, [1954] 1 WLR 487 
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431 Western Counties above n.417 at 223, per Polluck B. 
432 Balden v Shorter [1933] 1 Ch. 427 at 430, per Maugham J. 
433 Joyce v Sengupta [1993] 1 All E.R. 897 at 905, per Sir Donald Nicholls V-C 
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437 Shapiro v La Morta (1923) 40 TLR 201 
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439 McDonald’s Hamburgers Ltd v Burgerking (UK) Ltd [1986] FSR 45, reversed [1987] FSR 112 on another 
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Special damage441 was required to be proven before a claim would be complete,442 which required evidence 
of harm to their business. This requirement is now superfluous following the Defamation Act 1952, s.3(1) 
which established that necessity is no longer necessary if the following words are used 'Calculated to cause 
pecuniary damage to the (claimant) and are published in writing or other permanent form'. 
(b) Summary 
As Crown443 states in his article malicious falsehood is a very old cause of action and has been rather 
underused,444 in comparison to passing off and defamation. It retains an important role to play in the 
protection of celebrity personalities especially in control of inaccurate damaging but not defamatory 
commercial speech. Compaq Computer Corp v Dell Computer Corp Ltd (1992)445 showed that the tort can 
be used outside its traditional use for comparative advertising, where the defendant misled the public 
through details of two computers, one of which displayed the discounted price whereas the other was full 
price. The single and natural meaning test determined that the customer would have been misled by the 
falsity in this occasion.446 
The likelihood is that malicious falsehood is used as one of a few cause of actions cited rather than as the 
principal action. Kaye re-emphasises that the tort can be of benefit where other actions fail for example in 
obtaining an injunction.447 The tort enables a celebrity free to contract with whoever they choose, as 
exclusivity is often of key importance. 
1.7 Defamation 
(a) Overview448 
Defamation actions cover the protection of the reputation of an individual, they also extend to cover 
professional and business aspects of the individual as shown in Tolley v JS Fry Ltd (1931).449 In Tolley, an 
amateur golfer was photographed with a bar of Fry's chocolate sticking out of his back pocket. The 
photograph was used without consent by the defendant to promote sales of their chocolate. At the time the 
distinction between an amateur and a professional sportsman was a real one and Tolley was concerned that 
his amateur status would be jeopardised if the public thought he accepted money for his consent. Tolley was 
able to obtain an injunction against Fry's restraining their use of this photograph because it implied that he 
                                                   
441 Fielding v Variety Inc [1967] 2 QB 841 gave guidelines on the quantum 
442 Horrocks above n.424 per Parker J, who while reiterating the essential requirements of the tort, set out in 
Kaye above n.303, stated that “the defendant must have published words about the claimant which were 
false, have done so maliciously and special damage must have followed as the direct and natural result of 
the publication of those words.” 
443 G. Crown, ‘Malicious falsehood: Into the twenty first Century’ Ent L.R. 1997, 8(1), 6 
444 Pearson, ‘Pecuniary elements of malicious falsehood’ (1998) 12/6 Lawyer 12 
445 Compaq Computer Corp v Dell Computer Corp Ltd [1992] FSR 93; D. Bainbridge above n.155 at pg 817. 
446 The opposite result was found in Vodafone above n.423 and therefore the claimant was unsuccessful.  
447 Court awarded an injunction under this action rather than defamation 
448 L. McNamara, ‘Reputation and Defamation’ Reviewed in Comms L. (2008) 63 for a full analysis of 
defamation 
449 Tolley above n.297 
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had been paid to advertise Fry's product. As claimants in a libel action must prove damage to his reputation, 
defamation laws have been used rarely to prevent commercial use of their name or likeness.450 
Smith  defines defamation actions as a legal means of restoring or vindicating a reputation which has 
suffered distress, harm or embarrassment as the result of publication to a third party by the defendant.451 
Klink452 proposes that sometimes the traditionally strong defamation law might prove an effective substitute 
for the elusive privacy, personality or publicity right. As discussed above the tort of malicious falsehood may 
apply when false statements are maliciously made in order to cause pecuniary damage to a trade 
competitor, as shown in Vodafone v Orange. 453 The reputation established in the amateur status of a golfer 
was held to be lowered by presenting him as having been paid for a caricature-advertisement.454 
The test applied by the courts for defamation was proposed by Atkin L.J, in Sim v Stretch (1936).455 The test 
is "would the words tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right thinking members of society 
generally."456 This test was applied in the case of Paul McKenna the hypnotist who was accused by the 
Sunday Mirror of buying a fake PhD from an American University for £1,400.457 
An important issue is that the test is objective as it looks at what the thoughts of "right thinking members of 
society" are and whether it would lower the estimation of these persons. However, a problem exists in 
relation to which right thinking members of society are and to what actions do they need to take to be 
encompassed as a member of the group. Harwich LJ, in Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
(1995)458 said: 
"I have no doubt that…many News of the World readers who saw the offending publication 
would have looked at the headlines and the photographs and nothing more. But if these 
readers, without taking the trouble to discover what the article was all about, carried away the 
impression that two well known actors…were also involved in making pornographic films, they 
could hardly be described as ordinary, reasonable, fair-minded readers."459 
Defamation law therefore is not the strongest means by which personality can be protected, as the action 
does not protect against appropriation and exploitation of the personality but rather against criticism and 
ridicule of the personality. Whereas in practice third parties usually want to exploit personalities in their best 
light to attract higher profits, with the main exceptions being the newspaper industry.460 No free rider wants 
to hijack popular personality features in order to diminish or criticise.461 By contrast, he will use the most 
excellent reputation he can for his marketing.462 A further weakness of the action according to Klink's is a 
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disclaimer using small letter to the missing consent of the celebrity as the mere exploitation of another's 
popularity is not defamatory.463 
1.8 Other protections 
(a) Introduction 
In addition to the legal protections mentioned above, there are two other areas that this paper will briefly 
examine, namely regulatory boards and the Data Protection Act 1998 ("DPA"). A recent example is shown 
by the Duke of Edinburgh's complaint to the Press Complaints Commission about an incorrect report 
concerning his health in the London Evening Standard.464 He sought redress for details of his medical 
records becoming public knowledge, which he strongly objected to. The HRA has had an effect upon the 
protections as the bodies, and courts have had to ensure that art.10 of ECHR is not infringed, unless 
otherwise justified. Jones465 believes that the laws protecting celebrity personas are deficient but that there 
is some token redress under both the boards of protections and the DPA. 
(b) Regulatory Boards 
Regulatory bodies have a place in the protection of personality and privacy of individuals. Although useful in 
theory they have been seen as largely toothless in reality. They fall under the umbrella term of 'public 
authorities' so therefore have to ensure that they defend personalities in line with the HRA. This paper will 
examine the two most important regulatory boards, namely the Press Complaints Commission and the 
Advertising Standards Agency. 
The Press Complaints Commission's Code of Practice was ratified on the 1st August 2007 and was created 
in conjunction with the newspaper and periodical industries.466 The code contains sixteen separate sections 
as well as the outline for the public interest exception. Of particular interest to persons wishing to protect 
their personality and privacy are s.3 which states:467 
i Everyone is entitled to respect for their private and family life, home, health and 
correspondence, including digital communications. Editors will be expected to justify 
intrusions into any individual's private life without consent; and 
ii It is unacceptable to photograph individuals in a private place without their consent.468 
Section 4 of the code offers protection against harassment, and states that journalists must not persist in 
questioning, telephoning, pursuing or photographing individuals once asked to desist, nor remain on their 
property when asked to leave and must not follow them. This offers a dual protection, one for the individual 
themselves and another for their family. Section 10 covers an increasingly contentious area of the method of 
obtaining information such as clandestine listening devices or photographic means. 
The PCC's Code would appear to prohibit the Charleston lacuna,469 which is where a digitally manipulated 
photograph of two characters from the soap opera Neighbours was found not to be libellous due to the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
462 Ibid 
463 Charleston above n.342 
464 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7549077.stm 
465 P. Jones above n.379 
466 http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/practice.html 
467 B. Pillans above n.14 at 213  
468 Although the phrase private place this definition private places are public or private property where there 
is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
469 Charleston above n.342 
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accompanying text470 even though the picture alone would probably have been libellous. This has shown 
one way in which the Code of Practice has become more important in determining whether processing 
through manipulation or appropriation of photographic material relating to a data subject is reasonable. 
The Code is subject to a similar public interest test as used in confidence actions and includes, but is not 
exclusive to, detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety and preventing the public from being misled 
by an action or statement of an individual or organisation. 
The Broadcasting Act 1996 (as amended) requires Ofcom to consider complaints about unwarranted 
infringements of privacy contained within a programme or in connection with the obtaining of material 
included in a programme. When examining a complaint Ofcom will balance the public interest exception 
available under rule 8.1 Ofcom's code of conduct. The Committee of Advertising Practice (“CAP”)471 is the 
industry body responsible for the UK's advertising codes. CAP's Broadcast Committee is contracted by the 
broadcast regulator, Ofcom, to write and enforce the practice codes governing TV and radio 
advertising.472  The Committee comprises representatives of broadcasters licensed by Ofcom, advertisers, 
agencies, direct marketers and interactive marketers. 
The Advertising Standards Agency (“ASA”) independently administers the CAP codes which, covering 
television473 and radio474 advertisement as well as non broadcast media such as sales promotion and direct 
marketing.475 The ASA is recognised by Ofcom and the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) as the established 
body responsible for regulating misleading and comparative adverts within the UK. If ASA fails to secure an 
advertisers agreement to comply with the self regulatory system they can ask the OFT to consider action 
under the Control of Misleading Advertisement Regulations 1988 (as amended). A remedy which can be 
sought from the courts is an injunction to avoid the repeated use of misleading claims or implications within 
the advert.476 
The Radio code under s.14 offers protection to well known personalities by prohibiting the use of, or 
implication of an endorsement where no contractual agreement exists.477 The section is widely drafted to 
include impersonations, soundalikes, parodies and similar take-offs from well known persons, and states 
that they are only permitted where their use is instantly recognisable as such and the person being 
mimicked could reasonable be expected to have no reason to object. 
The case of David Bedford and the Number emphasised the regulators478 limited powers to protect 
appropriation of celebrity personalities. The case concerned a caricature of a 1970's runner, with a droopy 
moustache and red hooped running tops. Mr Bedford claimed there had been a breach of Independent 
Television Committee Advertising Standards Code, rule 6.5. 'Protection of privacy and exploitation of the 
                                                   
470 Ibid at pg 73, Lord Bridge felt that persons who only saw the headline and the photograph and not the 
accompanying text could not be described as ordinary, fair minded readers. 
 
471 R. Burn and M. Sannie, ‘How image conscious are you?’, C.W 2008 178, 19-23.  
472 See Communications Act 2003, s.3(2)(f) and Broadcasting Act 1996 (as amended) s.107(1) and s.130, 




476 Companies referred to the OFT recently include Sport Newspapers and Fones4Free 
477http://www.cap.org.uk/cap/codes/broadcast_codes/radio_code/Radio+Code+General+Rules+Protection+
of+Privacy.htm 
478 In this case Ofcom 
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individual.'479 While deciding for Mr Bedford, Ofcom said that they felt "the decision that the company had 
breached the Advertising Standards Code was punishment enough and banning the adverts would be 
disproportionate."480 There was no award of damages as Ofcom does not have the power to award 
damages, therefore in order to obtain damages Mr Bedford needed to go to court. The adverts were still 
continuing in early 2006, presumably still without Mr Bedford's permission, suggesting that the ruling by 
Ofcom showed a lack of effectiveness.481 
A strong weakness of these protections are the lack of effective sanctions currently available under both the 
PCC and the ASA codes.482 Both heavily rely on self regulation and the threat of adverse publicity and the 
requirement of an apology or at worst, through the OFT, seeking an injunction. The possibility of an on 
screen apology is however, potentially beneficial to a personality who seeks to ensure that his reputation, 
and future potential earnings are not damaged. The lack of available damages means that the codes are not 
as effective or as useful to well known persons as they potentially could be. In part due to this more people 
are looking to the DPA to seek the required remedy, for example in Campbell.483 
(c) Data Protection Act 
It has become increasing popular for persons claiming breach of confidence to also claim under the DPA, as 
seen in Campbell and Murray.484 The DPA ensures that data which can identify living persons, both related 
to a person's individual or their business life, needs to be processed in accordance with eight protection 
principles.485 Personal data under the Act includes a persons name, address and likeness.486 
The DPA might be used by an celebrity who suspects an advertiser intends to utilise his image without 
consent, given that personal data,487 which is defined488 as data which relates to a living individual who can 
be identified, might encompass photographic material and processing and includes organisation, adaptation 
or alteration of the data, which conceivably includes photo-montage.489 
Section 10(1) of the DPA states that an individual is entitled at any time by notice in writing to a data 
controller to cease within a reasonable time, or not to begin processing, any personal data in respect of 
which he is the data subject, on the grounds that ... processing for that purpose or in that manner is likely to 
cause substantial damage or substantial distress to him or another. 
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Section 13 further entitles anyone suffering distress and damage by reason of any contravention to be 
entitled to compensation for that distress, although the damages awarded by the courts have been limited, 
e.g. £3,500 in Campbell.490 However, in Murray,491 the claimants sort damages for the breach of the DPA 
that were equivalent to the market value of the photographs, i.e. a notional licence fee.492 The Court of 
Appeal held that the claimant can pursue this course, and the claimants counsel argued that the courts 
failure to give effective protection to people rights under the DPA could conflict with art.23 of the European 
directive.493 
As so far the damages are limited under the DPA an individual may seek compensation from an advertiser 
who has processed photographic data relating to an individual without consent. If they made it appear that 
they endorsed the product or service, they may be forced to pay compensation under s.13(2) of the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968,494 which grants an entitlement to such compensation, providing the individual also 
suffers damage by reason of the contravention or the contravention relates to the processing of personal 
data for special purposes.495. 
The use of the DPA is likely to increase over the coming years, particularly if breach of confidence actions 
continue to offer limited damages. If the claimants in Murray are successful with their claim the likelihood is 
an increased examination of the DPA by potential clients and a likelihood of a flood of litigation utilising the 
act. 
1.9 Conclusion to UK Protections 
The protections available within the UK in relation to privacy have been centred on the breach of confidence 
action both prior to and post the HRA. The action has undoubtedly developed and extended since its 
inception and even though the courts have attempted to downplay the extension of confidence actions, 
Sims'496 demonstrates that the effects of the extension resulted in a dramatic shift in breach of confidence.497 
Whilst the action had rarely been successfully invoked in instances to protect aspects of privacy in the 
past,498 it is now being asked to protect privacy generally to a much wider extent in the post HRA era, due to 
wider circumstances covered by confidential obligations. 
                                                   
490 The courts never distinguished whether the damages were under the Data Protection Act 1998 or under 
the breach of confidence action. 
491 Murray above n.82 
492 K. MacMillan, ‘Baby Steps’ Comms L. 2008 at 72 
493 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and of the free movement of such 
data. Official Journal L281 23/11/1995 P, 0031-0050. The directive states ‘Member States shall provide that 
any person who has suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act 
incompatible with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this directive is entitled to receive 
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered.’  
494 Trade Description Act 1968 
495 Journalism, literary or artistic purposes 
 
496 A. Sims above n.175 
 
497 Campbell, above n.13 per Lord Hope rejecting Lord Hoffmann’s claim that the use of breach of 
confidence to protect privacy had seen “a shift in the centre of gravity” of breach of confidence. 
 
498 Law Commission above n.19 at Pt II(A), para.8.7; D. Seipp, “English Judicial Recognition of a Right to 
Privacy” (1983) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 325 at p.359; M. Thompson, “Breach of Confidence and 
Privacy” in Clarke (ed.), Confidentiality and the Law (Lloyd's, London, 1990), pp.65-81; M. Richardson, 
“Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained Information and Privacy: Theory versus 
 -59- 
Ref: S2.57/LIT1:3250465.1/IKAT 
The actions to protect publicity or personality rights are more numerous than for privacy but many of the 
actions have also developed dramatically from their original scope e.g. passing off and malicious falsehood. 
The protections available are wide but still are not sufficient to protect all the necessary areas in order to 
offer as full protection as is available in the US, as shown in the next chapter. A significant problem that still 
faces individuals in the UK is the area of damages and specifically the quantum of damages that the courts 
have been willing to offer as shown in Irvine. The lack of punitive damages as a deterrent is a significant 
issue facing the UK in relation to protection of an individual's persona. 
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2 Examination of other common law jurisdictions 
This paper will now examine the protections afforded within the US, a jurisdiction with the world's largest 
body of case law related to privacy and publicity. After a detailed examination of the US I shall look 
individually at Canada and Australia. This chapter highlights the anomalies between the protections 
available in the UK and other common law jurisdictions. The history of the protections available in the US 
shows how initially the right of privacy developed from authorities from the UK rather than the US. This 
shows that at least in the past the two jurisdictions have influenced the other in the development of the law. 
2.1 United States 
(d) History 
According to Smith499 there are seven reasons why celebrities sue in relation to unauthorised use of 
personality, ranging from the feeling of personal invasion of having their identity exploited contrary to his 
will500 to worries that their endorsement value is reduced or damaged due to the unauthorised use of his 
image in advertising.501 The reasons and possibilities for bringing causes of action have increased since the 
right of privacy was raised in Warren and Brandeis revolutionary article.502 Where they stated: 
'That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as 
the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact 
nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the 
recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the 
demands of society.'503 
The paper will examine and highlight the main cases, articles, legislation and arguments that have created 
the existing US legal systems. Both the right to privacy and right of publicity are examined as well as 
undertaking a brief overview of other available laws within the US, it is however imperative to remember that 
there are substantial differences between different states. 
Huw Beverley-Smith stated: 
"the central problem which emerges lies in reconciling economic and dignitary aspects of 
personality within a cause of action (right of privacy) that developed primarily to protect 
dignitary rather than economic interests. This problem was partial resolved with the 
development of the right of publicity in the United States."504 
The historical link between the development of the right of privacy and the problem of appropriation of 
personality in the US is strong, the conceptual link is however less certain. Despite the fact that 
appropriation of personality and the right of privacy might seem to be inextricably intertwined, there is no 
conceptual link between a general right to privacy and the problem of appropriation of personality.505 
2.2 Privacy 
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The right of privacy is rooted within the common law and provides all individuals within the US with the 
privilege of a life free from unwarranted publicity.506  Cooley first described the right, a decade before the 
famous Warren and Brandeis article, as the right "to be let alone."507 
The right of privacy was initiated not by the courts or politicians but rather through the pen and wisdom of 
two leading academic lights Warren and Brandeis.508 During their research they noted the limits of the 
causes of action for breach of contract509 and confidence,510 and the absence of any common law concept of 
insult to honour akin to Roman law, Warren and Brandeis therefore were forced to look elsewhere for 
support for their 'right to privacy.'511 In reality they concluded that the protection afforded by common law 
copyright512 in certain circumstances was merely the application of a more general right to privacy.513 
As Beverly-Smith highlighted many believed that there was a superficial similarity between invasion of 
privacy and defamation, in that both were concerned with injury to wounded feelings, whereas defamation 
rested on damage to reputation, concerning a person's external relations with the community, an injury of an 
essentially material rather than spiritual nature.514 Using the dicta of Lord Cottenham LC on appeal in Prince 
Albert515 Beverly-Smith came to the conclusion: 
"The protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium 
of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of 
the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not 
to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously 
prosecuted, the right not to be defamed.  The principle protects personal writings and all other 
personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any 
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of inviolate personality".516 
The article's intention was that the protection afforded should not be curtailed to conscious products of 
labour, based on a need to encourage effort. This was because they believed that the right to privacy was 
part .  of a more general right to the immunity of the person and the right to one's personality.517 Through this 
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right that Warren and Brandeis were concerned 
513 Warren above n.5 at 198 
514 H. Beverley-Smith above n.91 at pg 146 
515 Prince Albert above n.24 at 42 and 47 
516 Warren above n.5 at 205 
517 Ibid at 206 - 207 
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they envisaged the application of an existing principle to a new set of facts rather than creating a novel 
principle.518 
The article also peripherally examined the issue and problems associated with appropriation of personality, 
which was prominent in their conception of a right to privacy and was one of the 'evils' they sought to 
redress. As shown below many early cases in the aftermath519 of the article sought to test this new 'right of 
privacy', particularly involving the unauthorised use of a person's name for advertisement purposes. 
A right to privacy in the US has continually evolved since its inception, quickly developing proprietary 
attributes through the courts protection of economic interests of a proprietary nature rather than dignitary 
interests in inviolate personality.520 
(b) Creation of Right of Privacy 
In Schuyler v Curtis (1891),521 the Supreme Court of New York County determined a right of privacy existed 
despite the fact that the claimant's relative was a famous philanthropist, the claimant remained a private 
person and had not surrender her right of privacy. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal,522 who 
did not attempt to repeal the availability of a right to privacy, but restated that the right was not descendible 
or inheritable, and therefore did not survive post mortem. 
Another New York case two years later raised the issue of whether the new right of privacy could be 
outweighed by the First Amendment. The case was Corliss v Walker (1893)523 where Colt J, felt the right of 
privacy could on occasion be outweighed by the freedom of the presses under the First Amendment. In 
Corliss the widow of a deceased inventor sought to restrain the publication of a biographical sketch and 
picture of her late husband. Cobb J acknowledged that the main stumbling block in the recognition of a right 
of privacy was whether it could curtail freedom of speech and the press, though he regarded both as natural 
rights which should be enforced with due respect for each other.524 This statement appeared to acknowledge 
a problem stemming from Corliss525 and which, had not yet been satisfactorily resolved. The availability of a 
defence under the First Amendment is discussed in greater detail below. 
Cases such as Schuyler, Corliss and Atkinson foretold the problem faced by the courts of reconciling a 
person's status as a public figure with a right of privacy. The case of Schuyler later resulted in the 
development of the right of publicity, discussed in depth later in the chapter.526 Corliss gave a foretaste of 
the problems of balancing a right of privacy with free speech and the liberty of the press. 
                                                   
518 Ibid at 213 
519 Despite Prosser, above n.506, stating that the article had little immediate effect on the law, D. Leebron, 
‘Privacy in Tort Law’, M.L.R. 1992 55(1) 111, has persuasively shown that the impact of the article within 
academic circles, and in the courts, was immediate and significant 
520 A. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants To Be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights for Noncelebrities Unduly 
Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1605, 1612-13 (2001) at 1613 
521 Schuyler v Curtis 15 NYS 787 (Sup Ct 1891) 
522 Ibid 
523 Corliss v Walker 57 Fed Rep 434 (1893) 
524 Ibid at 73 
525 Ibid 
526 R. Wacks (ed.) Privacy (Aldershot, 1993), Vol. II, pt III; see also B. Markesinis, ‘The Right to Be Let Alone 
Versus Freedom of Speech’ [1986] PL 67, which argues that the American courts have traditionally been 
over protective of freedom of speech to the detriment of interests in personal privacy 
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The case of Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co. (1902)527 centred on the whether the defendants 
obtained, without knowledge or consent, the claimant's likeness for use in their flour advertisements with the 
caption of 'flour of the family.' Roberson remains influential as Roberson based her claim neither on libel,528 
nor on the English authority from Wilkinson v Downton (1897),529 despite similarities in relation to claims 
concerning the suffering of nervous shock. The claimant claimed that as the portrait had been used without 
consent to advertise the defendant's product, and as a result of their impertinence, she had been subjected 
to publicity in contravention to her right of privacy which she found disagreeable. The Supreme Court of New 
York based its decision on invasion of the right to privacy, a decision overturned by a bare majority, who did 
not take the view that privacy was a pre-existing principle, emphasising the danger of a flood of claims530 
that may have resulted. Moreover, acceptance of such a claim would allow redress for injured feelings, 
which the majority of the court were reluctant to embrace, in the absence of a clear common law principle.531 
The minority took a more dynamic view of the options available, by stressing the need to extend the 
principles to remedy a wrong. The minority said that this was made possible by changing social conditions 
and commercial practices and rejected the majority's insistence on basing the issue of liability on the 
invasion of a purely property interest. Privacy rights were regarded as complementary to the right to the 
immunity of one's person since the common law had regarded one's person and property as inviolate.532 
Relying on the Warren analogy with private writings and other products of the mind, Gray J. used the 
analogy that a writer was protected in his right to a literary property in a letter against unauthorised 
publication, as it was property to which the right of privacy was attached.533 Consequently, the claimant 
should be afforded the same property in the right to be protected against the use of her face for commercial 
purposes as if the defendants were publishing her literary compositions. If her face or her portrait had value, 
then the value was exclusively hers until she granted use to the public. 
In the event, the Roberson decision received widespread criticism from academic circles534 and the public as 
a whole. This led to the unprecedented step of a majority judge publishing an article in defence of the 
decision.535 The New York legislature intervened the following year by enacting a statute making the 
unconsented use of a person's name, portrait or picture for advertising, or the purpose of trade, both a tort 
and a misdemeanour.536 
In stark contrast to Roberson, three years later, in Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co., (1905)537 the 
Georgian Supreme Court recognised the existence of a right to privacy at common law. In the court's view, 
                                                   
527 Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co. 171 NY 538 (1902) 
528 She acknowledged that the likeness was a good one 
529 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57 
530 Roberson above n.527 at 545 
531 Ibid at 546-7, citing H. Hadley, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1894) 3 Northwestern U L Rev 1, challenging the 
Warren and Brandeis thesis  
532 Roberson above n.527 at 564 
533 Ibid at 564 
534 D. O’Brien. ‘An Actionable Right of Privacy? Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co.’ (1902) 12 Yale LJ 
35 
535 D. O’Brien. ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1902) 2 Colum L Rev 437, which sought to address the criticisms 
made by ‘such a well informed and conservative’ journal as the New York Times (23rd August 1902) 
536 NY Sess. Laws 1903 Ch. 132 ss. 1-2 
537 Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co. 50 SE 68 (1905) 
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the foundation of the right to privacy lay in the instincts of nature. They felt privacy should to be regarded as 
an absolute right which belongs to any person in a state of nature, which every person would be entitled to 
enjoy within or without society. It thus takes its place alongside other absolute rights such as personal 
security and personal liberty.538 
One result of Roberson was the appearance of limitation of powers available to the court in creating 
precedents and the potential for practical dangers resulting from usurpation of powers from legislative 
bodies. The court felt compelled to call for legislative intervention, before its detailed analysis of the case law 
denied a remedy for lack of formal authority. In stark contrast, the unanimous decision in Pavesich laid 
emphasis on broad principles rather than a formal analysis of the relevant precedents, which were invoked 
ex post facto to justify a conclusion the court had already reached. Prosser noted,539 that Pavesich became 
the leading case and the courts in most states adopted its lead rather than approve the conservative stance 
taken in Roberson. 
(c) Inviolate personality and the addition of some proprietary attributes 
The right to privacy has constantly evolved since its creation as a right of inviolate personality, quickly 
developing proprietary attributes. Even in the earliest privacy cases, the courts protected economic interests 
rather than dignitary interests in inviolate personality. As shown in Edison v Edison Polyform Manufacturing 
Co. (1907),540 where the inventor Thomas Edison brought an action to restrain a company from using: 
1 His name as their corporate name; and 
2 His name and picture in advertisements for a medicinal preparation, Polyform, which he had invented 
several years previously and had sold to the defendants.541 
The assignment did not give the defendants permission to use Edison's name and picture in connection with 
the medicine. Edison's action for invasion of privacy was successful, and Stevens VC noted: 
'if a man's name be his own property…it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of 
one's features is not also one's property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not 
belong to its owner, rather than to the person seeking to make unauthorised use of it.'542 
Therefore, Edison differed from two leading privacy cases, Roberson and Pavesich, in that the claimant was 
well known, and, significantly, the right of privacy was seen as developing in order to be capable of 
remedying injuries to interests of an economic nature in addition to injuries to inviolate personality. 
In Munden v Harris, (1911)543 the claimant, a young boy, claimed an injunction and damages for the 
unauthorised use of his picture in a jewellery advertisement, on its face a claim for injured feelings or dignity. 
However, in giving judgment for the claimant, Ellison J. noted that a person might have a peculiarity of 
appearance from which he might benefit if used in advertising or merchandising. In such a case, 'it is a right 
which he may wish to exercise for his own profit, and why may he not restrain another from using it. If there 
is value in it, sufficient to excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the property of him who gives it the 
value and from whom the value springs?'544 
                                                   
538 Ibid at 70 
539 Prosser above n.506 at 386 
540 Edison v Edison Polyform Mfg Co. 67 A 392 (1907) 
541 Ibid 
542 Ibid 
543 Munden v Harris 134 SW 1076 (1911) 
544 Ibid at 1078 
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The court concluded that a person had 'an exclusive right to his picture on the score of its being a property 
right of material profit,'545 and that general damages could be recovered without need to prove specific 
loss.546 Although the use of the property label might not have been intentional, what was clear was the 
acknowledgement of an economic or proprietary interest that any person may have in his own image.547 
In Munden, the court took the view that commercial value could lie in the image of an unknown person and 
that 'what was worth taking was worth protecting'.548 It is difficult to draw a line between the multifarious de 
facto interests that different people might enjoy in their image. 
The evolution continued in Fairfield v American Photocopy Equipment Co.(1955),549 where a lawyer's name 
was used without permission in an photocopier advert, the Californian Court of Appeals stated the cause of 
action for invasion of privacy was a wrong of a personal character resulting in injury to feelings, without 
regard to effect the publication might have on a person's property, business, pecuniary interests, or standing 
in the community.550 
In Gautier v Pro-Football Inc. (1951),551 the courts stressed that, although the right to privacy was intended 
primarily for protection of an individual's personality against unlawful invasion, damages may include 
'recovery for a 'property' interest inherent and inextricably interwoven in the individual's personality,' although 
it was injury to the person not property which established the cause of action.552 
What the development of the law of privacy in the US shows is that the rights can be used to protect 
economic and dignitary interests ranging from trading interests to interests in feelings or sensibilities. Even 
though such broad and expansive legal categories as the right of privacy have boundaries the courts have 
yet to satisfactorily define these boundaries. The Restatement (Second) of Torts553 recognised four types of 
invasions of privacy, the second which is commonly thought of as the right of publicity: 
1 intrusion; 
2 appropriation of name or likeness; 
3 unreasonable publicity; and 
4 false light.554 
Despite four different kinds of invasion highlighted, Prosser only identified three interests to be protected.555 
The first interest was the intrusion tort protecting primarily menial interests which had been useful in filling 
                                                   
545 Ibid at 1079 
546 Ibid  
547 In referring to the value which excited the cupidity of another, Ellison J was essentially giving expression 
to the unjust enrichment rationale for a remedy for appropriation of personality 
548 Munden above n.543 at 1080 
549 Fairfield v American Photocopy Equipment Co. 291 P 2d 194 (1955) 
550 Ibid at 197 
551 Gautier v Pro-Football Inc. 106 NYS 2d 553 (1951) 
552 Ibid 
553 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, comments a and b, note some states protect the right of publicity 
through unfair competition laws 
554 Prosser above n.506 at 389 (outlining the creation of the law of privacy doctrine). 
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gaps left by trespass, nuisance and the intentional infliction of mental distress.556 Prosser’s second interest 
was the disclosure tort557 which along with the tort of false light558 protected interests in reputation.559 The 
final interest was the appropriation tort which protected 'not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in the 
exclusive use of the claimant's name and likeness as aspects of his identity.' 
The appropriation invasion was unlike the others and the ambit of the appropriation category was governed 
by two rules, the first being that the law protects a person's name only as a symbol of his identity and not 
protect the name itself from being adopted by others.560 The second is a consequence of the first, in that 
liability only arises when a defendant pirated the claimant's identity for their own advantage. 
Two leading American tort scholars 561 responding to Prosser, believed that public figures could suffer from 
invasion of privacy, and the law should apply an appropriately sharp distinction between cases involving 
economic considerations and purely emotional disturbances such as grief, humiliation and loss of dignity. 
The difficulty is in reconciling a right to privacy with a right to prevent the unauthorised commercial 
exploitation of essentially economic attributes in personality proved considerable, and led to the 
development of a separate right of publicity. 
The right of privacy in its infancy was seen as a residual category of tort law, covering cases where harm 
was emotionally based.562 Prosser believed that when the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering 
became fully developed and received general recognition, the great majority of privacy cases would be 
absorbed into it.563 
(i) Common law invasion of privacy 
Using Florida as an example this paper briefly examines two actions available under common law invasion 
of privacy, to show additional protections that people can utilise to protect privacy. In addition the paper will 
briefly examine the right of standing for bring an action under common law invasion of privacy. 
(ii) False Light Invasion of Privacy564 
Where a person has been placed by another before the public in a false light then this person is subject to 
liability under the common law tort of false light invasion of privacy. Both must occur for liability: 
1 the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and 
                                                                                                                                                                        
555 A fact noted by E. Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 
NYULRev. 962 and H. Gross, ‘The Concept of Privacy,’ (1967) 42 NYULRev 34 at 46 
556 Prosser above n.506 at 392  
557 Ibid at 398 
558 Ibid at 400 
559 He presented this with some of the same overtones of mental distress that can be found within 
defamation 
560 Cited as support by Prosser were; DuBolay v DuBolay (1869) LR 2 PC 430 and Cowley v Cowley [1901] 
AC 450; note there is no exclusive rights available in a name 
561 Harper and James, The Law of Torts (Boston, 1956), 689-90 
562 G. White, Tort Law in America – An Intellectual History (Oxford, 1980), 174 
563 Ibid citing Prosser’s 1955 edition of the Law of Torts 
564 J. Tabach-Bank, ‘Missing the right of publicity boat: How Tyne v Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
threatens to “Sink” the First Amendment.’ 24(2) Loy.L.A.Ent.L.Rev. 247 (2004) 
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2 the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard565 as to the falsity of the publicised matter 
and the false light in which the other would be placed.566 
A key requirement is that the published matter is false as the purpose of the tort's protection is related to 
persons appearing before the public in a light that is other than truthful.567 Additionally the action also 
requires publicity,568 for this to exist the publication must be communicated to at least enough persons so 
that the information becomes general knowledge.569 Finally the action requires a 'reasonable' person to be 
seriously offended as a result of a major misrepresentation of character, history, activities or beliefs.570 This 
requirement prevents a 'hypersensitive' claimant from protection,571 and mere inaccuracy in reporting will not 
support recovery.572 Defamation is not a requirement of the action, although many false light cases form a 
basis for defamation actions as well.573 The main difference between the two is that actions for false light 
protect a person's right to be left alone whereas defamation actions are intended to protect public 
reputation.574 
(iii) Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
A second common law tort that falls under the invasion of privacy is public disclosure of private facts. Where 
a person gives publicity to matters related to the private life of another they are subject to liability for invasion 
of privacy, if the publicised matter is likely to be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the matter is 
not in the public interest.575 An action for public disclosure of private facts require:576 
1 disclosure must be public; 
2 disclosure must include private facts that are not already exposed to the public eye; 
3 disclosure must be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person; and 
4 no legitimate public interest in the disclosure. 
                                                   
565 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, The American Law Institute that drafted the Restatement of Torts 
set forth a caveat that it took "no position on whether there are any circumstances under which recovery can 
be obtained . . . if the actor did not know of or act with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the matter 
publicized and the false light in which the other would be placed but was negligent in regard to these 
matters." 
566 Ibid 
567 Ibid at § 652E cmt a.(1977) 
568 Prosser above n.506 
569 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt a.(1977) 
570 Ibid at § 652E cmt c.(1977) 
571 Jacova v. S. Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (holding that the claimants privacy had not 
been violated when he became the innocent subject of a televised gambling crackdown.  
572 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt c.(1977) 
573 Ibid at § 652E cmt b.(1977) 
574 Prosser above n.506 at 400 




The hypersensitive individual is treated in the same way as under false light invasion of privacy.577 However, 
Florida unlike California has chosen not to adopt the 'fifth prong' requiring malice or reckless disregard in 
addition to the requisite of the offensiveness of the disclosure.578 
When first sought the action required written disclosure of the private facts, spoken words would not support 
a privacy action.579 This requirement has widened to include disclosure through photographs,580 television581 
and motion pictures582 amongst other media. If the facts are true and of public record then under the First 
Amendment there can be no recovery for the disclosure of such facts,583 shown in Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn (1975).584 An unsolved issue is whether a case can be brought where the private facts are highly 
offensive to a 'reasonable person' but not of legitimate public concern.585 The public concern test examines 
whether the matter as a whole is of public concern and not just the individual facts, courts  also takes into 
account whether the individual is a public figure.586 
(d) Damages 
A significant difference between the right of privacy and right of publicity is in damages. Privacy protects less 
tangible interests, in dignity and integrity of the self,587 whereas publicity protects monetary and commercial 
interest.588 The measure of damages, under privacy,589 are based upon the mental distress that have 
resulted from the intrusion into a secluded and private life, free from the prying eyes and ears of the 
public.590 Thus an invasion of 'appropriation privacy' focuses on injury to the psyche.591 
Under an action for invasion of privacy, a claimant can be afforded with injunctive relief,592 actual or 
compensatory damages.593 The damages can, if proven be based upon injuries resulting from the tortious 
                                                   
577 Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. 1982) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983) (stating 
that kidnapping situations are matters of general public interest, and therefore information that is lawfully 
obtained about a particular case is considered newsworthy). 
578 Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (1983). 
579 Warren above n.5 
580 Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942). 
581 Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 525 P.2d 984, 988 (Idaho 1974). 
582 Donahue v. Warner Bros., 272 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1954). 
583 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v Cohn 420 U.S. 469 (1975) 
584 Ibid at 496 
585 Ibid at 490-1 
586 D. Zimmerman, ‘Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort’, 68 
Cornell L.Rev. 291, 299-300 (1983); Jacova above n.571 at 36 
587 J. McCarthy, Rights of Publicity and Privacy, 2nd Ed (New York: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 2001) 
588 Ibid 
589 J. Tabach-Bank above n.564 
590 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. b (1976). 
591 J. McCarthy above n.587 
592 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 48(2) (1995). 
The appropriateness and scope of injunctive relief depend upon a comparative 
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conduct, including impairment of health, mental anguish, loss of friends, loss of respect in the community, 
and injury to character or reputation.594 However, where the claimant fails to successfully demonstrate injury 
nominal or statutory damages can still be awarded to the claimant.595 
(e) Privacy as principle 
Bloustein proposed a general theory of individual privacy which attempted to reconcile the divergent strands 
of legal development, proposing that privacy needed to be re-established as a single, unified, legal 
concept.596 Following a critique of Prosser's analysis, Bloustein argued that a common thread of principle, 
namely Brandeis' inviolate personality,597 running through all the cases could be discerned.598 He argued 
cases like Pavesich involved the claimant's interests preserving their own personal dignity, rather than 
injuries to their proprietary interests as in Prosser's scheme.599 
                                                                                                                                                                        
appraisal of all the factors of the case, including the following primary factors: (a) 
the nature of the interest to be protected; (b) the nature and extent of the 
appropriation; (c) the relative adequacy to the claimant of an injunction and of other 
remedies; (d) the relative harm likely to result to the legitimate interests of the 
defendant if an injunction is granted and to the legitimate interests of the claimant if 
an injunction is denied; (e) the interests of third persons and of the public; (f) any 
unreasonable delay by the claimant in bringing suit or otherwise asserting his or her 
rights; (g) any related misconduct on the part of the claimant; and (h) the 
practicality of framing and enforcing the injunction. 
593 Ibid at 49(2)  
Whether an award of monetary relief is appropriate and the appropriate method of 
measuring such relief depend upon a comparative appraisal of all the factors of the 
case, including the following primary factors: (a) the degree of certainty with which 
the claimant has established the fact and extent of the pecuniary loss or the actor's 
pecuniary gain resulting from the appropriation; (b) the nature and extent of the 
appropriation; (c) the relative adequacy to the claimant of other remedies; (d) the 
intent of the actor and whether the actor knew or should have known that the 
conduct was unlawful; (e) any unreasonable delay by the claimant in bringing suit 
or otherwise asserting his or her rights; and (f) any related misconduct on the part 
of the claimant. 
594 Cason v Baskin 30 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1947) 
595 Ibid 
596 Bloustein above n.555 
597 Warren above n.5 
598 Bloustein above n.555 at 1001 
599 Ibid at 986 
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Bloustein argued that:600 
"No man wants to be 'used' by another against his will, and for this reason that the commercial 
use of a personal photograph is obnoxious. Use of a photograph for trade purposes turns a 
man into a commodity and makes him serve the economic needs and interests of others. In a 
community at all sensitive to the commercialisation of human values, it is degrading to thus 
make a man part of commerce against his will." 
He argued that the potential existence of a right of publicity was dependent on the fact that names and 
likeness could only command a commercial price in a society which recognised a right to privacy, which 
enabled control over the conditions under which their name or likeness could be used. He also proposed 
that there was no right of publicity, but 'a right, under circumstances, to command a commercial price for 
abandoning privacy.'601 
However the main flaw in this argument is that it glossed over the fact that, in reality, advertisers do not pay 
famous persons for giving up their privacy, but pay because such persons' images have a 'recognition 
value'602 in society. 
Gavison, undertook a strong and thoughtful attack on the reductionist approach within academic literature, 
where he attempted to restore privacy as a unitary legal concept, reflecting extra-legal notions of privacy 
rather than breaking it down into its separate component interests.603  He argued that everyday speech 
reveals that the concept of privacy is coherent and useful in three different, but related contexts: 
1 as a neutral concept, which allows us to identify when a loss of privacy has occurred; 
2 as a distinctive value, since claims for legal protection of privacy are compelling only if losses of 
privacy are undesirable for similar reasons; and 
3 As a legal concept, that enables us to identify those occasions calling for legal protection. 
Gavison expressly rejected the argument that there can be commercial exploitation of personality as an 
aspect of privacy, by noting that privacy 'can be invaded in ways that have nothing to do with such 
exploitation,'604 citing governmental wiretapping as an example of an invasion of privacy with no hint of 
commercial exploitation.605 
Despite the increased opportunity that arose due to creation of the right of publicity, any attempt to banish 
commercial appropriation from privacy altogether is however unrealistic and undesirable. The courts must 
take into account whether protection exists under the right to privacy despite elements of economic interests 
forming part of an action, few cases solely deal with purely dignitary or economic interests. Highlighting that 
looking at the problem purely from a commercial appropriation perspective, or from an exclusively dignitary 
right of privacy perspective,606 distorts the true picture, both economic and dignitary interests must be taken 
into account by the courts. 
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601 Ibid at 989, Every man had the right to prevent commercial exploitation of his personality ‘not because of 
its commercial worth, but because it would be demeaning to human dignity to fail to enforce such a right 
602 D’Amato, ‘Comment on Professor Posner’s Lecture on Privacy’ (1978) 12 GaLRev 497 at 499; Lugosi v 
Universal Pictures Cal. 603 P2d 425 (1979), 438 
603 R. Gavison,  above n.220 at 424 
604 Ibid at 440 
605 Ibid 
606 E. Bloustein above n.555 
 -71- 
Ref: S2.57/LIT1:3250465.1/IKAT 
Alternatively, the choice need not be limited to a simple adoption or rejection of the concept of privacy.607 If 
the notion of privacy is sufficiently coherent as a social or psychological concept, then a question arises as 
to whether it can be embodied within a legal system, having due regard to various competing interests. If we 
define an interest as a claim, demand, need or concern, and a right as a legally protected interest, then the 
question arises as to whether privacy should be accorded the status of an interest and then a right.608 
Freund argued that the right of privacy is of cardinal worth as a principle, and that although it is misleading to 
incorporate a right of privacy into a legal rule, it would be equally undesirable to exclude it as the term of a 
legal principle.609 Although legislation and binding precedent are the ultimate sources of law, principles, 
embodying the persuasive sources, should not be excluded if only for the reason that principles play a 
considerable part in the solution of a legal problem to which no rule is directly applicable.610 
Some regional treaties are also used to protect privacy, art.11 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
sets out the right to privacy in terms similar to the Universal Declaration.611 In 1965, the Organisation of 
American States (“O.A.S”) proclaimed the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which 
called for the protection of numerous human rights, including privacy.612 The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has begun to address privacy issues in its cases. the use of these Declarations is however still limited 
in comparison to the 'right to privacy' discussed above. 
Thus, with varying levels of generality, the essence of the right of privacy has involved into the following: 
1 the right to be 'let alone';613 
2 the protection of human dignity or inviolate personality;614 
3 a person's control over access to information about himself;615 
4 a person's limited accessibility to others;616 and 
5 autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity.617 
(f) Conclusion 
It is not surprising that such an expansive category as privacy has received so much attention from 
academic commentators, the law itself has still to develop and encompass all areas that could be seen as 
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falling under the umbrella term 'privacy'.618 The advantage of Prosser's reductionist account lies in the fact 
that it manages to reduce a potentially vague concept into a number of autonomous torts, held together 
under a common umbrella title. 
The actions for right of privacy are personal rights specific to the person whose privacy has been invaded,619 
therefore there can be no invasion of a personal right post mortem, and relatives of a deceased person can 
not bring an action for an invasion of the deceased's privacy, which occurred after the death.620 An action 
can only be brought if the family member's own rights of privacy were violated,621 as otherwise they have no 
standing under common law.622 An exception to this is permitted where the portrayal of a dead family 
member is "sufficiently egregious," and not "merely inaccurate or dramatised."623 
The privacy laws offer a wide range of protections from the traditional intrusion element to protection from 
being placed in a false light. The main difficult faced under bringing an action in relation to a celebrity is the 
availability of a defence under the First Amendment, discussed in greater detail below. However, where an 
action is successfully brought the courts have a wide range of remedies at their disposal such as injunctions, 
damages for mental distress, injury to reputation and compensatory damages. 
2.3 Publicity 
(a) Introduction 
Currently within the US there is no federal law protecting an individual's right of publicity despite increasing 
pressure. The right of publicity varies from state to state but under either common law or statutory law 
almost every state protects certain individuals from the unauthorised exploitation of their identity. McCarthy 
believes, "the right of publicity is not just another kind of privacy right, it is a wholly different and separate 
legal right."624 Despite McCarthy's belief the emergence of the right of publicity from the privacy right is 
similar to what Phillips was hinting was being to occur in the UK in Hello! The emergence of a separate right 
of publicity from a right based in privacy was because unlike the right of privacy the right of publicity is 
conceptually regarded as a property right, which is transferable and is potentially inheritable. 
Right of publicity cases prevent "unjust enrichment by providing remedies against exploitation of goodwill 
and reputation that a person develops in their persona through the investment of time, effort, and money."625 
Weller believes that rights of publicity cases require 'celebrity' claimants, as "there is little pecuniary gain in 
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appropriating the name and likeness of an unknown individual."626 In reality there have been hundreds of 
right of publicity cases involving non-celebrities.627 
Most jurisdictions require no 'celebrity status' in order to bring an action under the tort.628 The focus of the 
tort should not be on the individual's celebrity, but rather on the interest that the action protects by 
preventing the unauthorised use of that identity. In practice the 'celebrity status' is more relevant when 
examining the commercial damages.629 The proposal for a federal right of publicity statue from the American 
Bar Association's ("ABA") Intellectual Property Law Section's believes that the right of publicity should apply 
to both celebrity and non-celebrity alike regardless of the commercial value of their identity.630 
The right of publicity was still in its embryonic stage when Prosser and Bloustein proposed rival conceptions 
of the right to privacy. In differing ways they both under-estimated the problems in reconciling a right of 
personal privacy with commercial exploitation of personality,631 and the increasing momentum towards 
recognising the right of publicity as separate legal category.632 
Bloustein refused to acknowledge the existence of economic interests in personality which might be the 
subject of a separate claim, as he viewed appropriation of personality exclusively as injury to human dignity. 
Prosser accepted the existence of economic interests preferring to view the appropriation type of privacy as 
encompassing both economic and dignitary interests. 
Without doubt a significant problem facing the right to privacy was the reconciliation of a public figure status 
with a claim for right to privacy. Although touched upon in Pavesich, the difficulties that have arisen are more 
substantial than the Georgian Supreme Court envisaged. The result in cases involving well known claimant's 
claiming invasion of privacy by unauthorised use of their image, was that courts often refused to accept that 
the claimant suffered any indignity, which could form the basis of an award of damages, especially when the 
celebrity had shown a willingness to license to others the use of their image. 
In order to establish whether liability arises the courts examine whether the claimant's persona is used for 
the purposes of trade, such as in advertising or merchandising.633 The seller's interests in attracting attention 
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630 See Proposed Right of Publicity Act, 2000 A.B.A. SEC. OF INTELL. PROP. L. Comm. 
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to his wares do not outweigh the personal and economic interests protected by the right of publicity.634 
Commercial appropriations of personality often falsely and misleadingly suggest a celebrity endorsement.635 
(b) Birth of the right of publicity 
The New York state legislature led the way for the birth of a right to publicity with the enactment of New York 
Civil Right Law 1903 s.50 and s.51. Which prohibit the use of the name, portrait, or picture of any living 
person without prior consent for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade. 
A further development came after decisions in O'Brien v Pabst Sales Co. (1941)636 inter alia. In O'Brien the 
claimant was a well known professional footballer, who sued the Pabst beer company for using his 
photograph on its advertising calendar, claiming that this had invaded his right to privacy. O'Brien was 
particularly aggrieved as he was an active member in a temperance organisation and had refused previous 
offers to endorse beer. The Court held, by a majority, that since the claimant was one of the best-known and 
most publicised football players he was not a private person and had effectively surrendered his right to 
privacy; the publicity he received was only that which he was constantly seeking and receiving.637 
Holmes J, dissented, arguing that the claimant was entitled to precisely such a claim, for the defendant's 
infringement of his property right to use his name and picture for commercial products.638 A view based on 
an awareness and acknowledgement that commercial advertisers customarily paid for the right to use the 
name and likeness of a famous person. This was true in the case, as O'Brien had rejected a previous offer 
from a New York beer company to endorse its product.639 Holmes J further argued that the majority decision 
left the claimant and others without a remedy in a case where a non-libellous use was made of his image, 
but which was contrary to usage and custom among advertisers who were 'undoubtedly in the habit of 
buying the right to use one's name or picture to create demand and goodwill for their merchandise.'640 
Accordingly, in the absence of an action for invasion of privacy, Holmes J believed the defendant committed 
a tort of misappropriating the claimant's valuable property right, entitling the claimant to damages or 
restitution.641 
The first significant right to publicity case, was Haelen Laboratories Inc. v Topps Chewing Gum Inc. 
(1953).642 The parties were rival manufacturers of chewing-gum, and the claimant's company entered into 
contracts with baseball stars for the exclusive right to use their images in connection with its products. With 
knowledge of these contracts the defendant deliberately induced the players to enter into contracts 
authorising the defendant to use their image in connection with their chewing gum. The defendant argued 
that even if such facts were proved, they disclosed no actionable wrong since the contracts with the baseball 
players were merely waivers of the players' right to sue in tort for invasion of privacy. The right of privacy, in 
this case deriving from the New York Statute, was a personal and non-assignable right. 
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In Haelan, Frank J. coined the phrase "right of publicity,"643 reasoning that prominent persons, "far from 
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they 
no longer received money for authorising advertisements, popularising their countenances, displayed in 
newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways."644 Post Haelen, under the right of publicity, anyone 
who appropriated the commercial value attached to an individual's identify for purposes of trade was subject 
to liability. Judge Frank by designating this new tort progressed toward breaking the "logjam of confusion"645 
regarding the similar and often confusing privacy torts.646 
The court found that independently to the right to privacy, people had 'a right in the publicity value of his 
photograph i.e. the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture.'647 Frank J acknowledged 
that many prominent people suffer no injury to feelings from having their name or likeness exploited without 
consent, but, rather, feel deprived from not receiving compensation for such exploitation. In Haelan, the 
court was unwilling to work within the restrictive confines of the right to privacy, realising its inadequacy to 
deal with problems of commercial appropriation, and developed a new head of liability to allow the law to 
respond to changing commercial circumstances. 
Initially, most states were reluctant to accept the new right of publicity,648 despite support from influential 
academics particularly Professor Nimmer,649 who highlighted deficiencies to the right to privacy and 
advocated increased recognition of the right of publicity.650 
(c) Growth and Recognition of the right of publicity 
(i) The growth of the right of publicity 
The law's development was due to case law rather than academic pressure unlike the right to privacy. The 
case of Hogan v A.S. Barnes & Co Inc. (1957)651 highlights the reluctance of the courts however. In Hogan 
the claimant was a golf professional who claimed under five headings, including infringement of the right of 
publicity. The Court adopted the viewpoint that the right of publicity, recognised in Haelan, was a way of 
applying the unfair competition doctrine under another label rather than a separate cause of action, with the 
'right of publicity' was as apt a label as any.652 
Despite this initial reluctance by the courts to adopt the right of publicity as a new basis of liability in favour of 
utilising existing causes of action, they gradually acknowledged the legitimacy of the right to privacy and 
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right of publicity as separate claims.653 This resulted in the right of publicity being a distinctly independent 
tort and not an application of the misappropriation doctrine654 as previously occurred. 
McCarthy argues that although misappropriation may have produced a basis for the right of publicity in early 
cases, the right of publicity should not be viewed merely as an application of the misappropriation doctrine 
since it 'has developed and matured over time into a distinct intellectual property right more defined and 
precise than the amorphous misappropriation doctrine.'655 
There are significant variances between the statutory and common law provisions available within the 
different states.656 Despite the apparent autonomous nature in relation to the right to publicity, there are still 
precedents from privacy cases which the courts continue to adopt in order to determine the scope and limits 
of the publicity right. The links between the two rights have yet to be fully severed, particularly in states 
where the right of publicity is still in its infancy.657 
(ii) The recognition of the right of publicity 
The canonisation of the right of publicity was in the Supreme Court case of Zacchini v Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co. (1977)658 where the court ruled the reporting of a fifteen second performance was not 
protected under the First Amendment. The crucial element of the verdict was the distinction drawn between 
invasion of privacy and infringement of a right of publicity.659 
In Zacchini the court stated that "petitioner's right of publicity here rests on more than a desire to 
compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in the act; the protection provided an economic 
incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public."660 The 
court felt although the interest protected through a cause of action for a false light invasion of privacy was an 
interest in reputation, with overtones of mental distress, the core rational with the right of publicity lay in 
'protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his in part to encourage such entertainment.'661 
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The law's aims were considered equivalent to the goals of patent and copyright law,662 focusing on the right 
of the individual to reap the reward for his endeavours,663 and not  based on feelings or reputation.664 The 
court approved Kalven's665 rationale for the appropriation branch of privacy,666 preventing unjust enrichment 
by the theft of goodwill. Kalven argued there could be no social value served by allowing defendants to get 
for free something with a market value which he would usually pay for.667 
Cases involving neither the name or image of a famous individual still fell under the right to publicity. The 
Carson case668 involved the use of his well known introduction of "Here's Johnny" on the Tonight Show. The 
Motschenbacher case669 related to a race car that was clearly identifiable as that of the claimant, even 
though in neither case was there a suggestion of a celebrity endorsement. The courts found that both 
companies infringed the claimant's right to publicity as they were infringing the unequivocal public 
association with the phrase or car and the celebrity. 
The right of publicity was extended through a series of "impersonator" cases, notably those of Midler,670 
Waits671 and White.672 Midler and Waits involved similar facts in that both Bette Middler and Tom Waits did 
not wish to lend their recognisable voices to advertisement from two well known manufacturers. As the 
celebrities would not participate in the advertisements the companies employed performers to mimic their 
voices. The courts found in the claimants favour under the right of publicity and awarded damages of 
$400,000 for Midler and $2.5m for Waits four years later. Another impersonator case featured a robot 
designed to mimic Vanna White, who had been made famous by the television show Wheel of Fortune. The 
robot, during the advert, was dressed in similar attire to Ms White and turned the letters like Ms White in the 
show. The court decided that despite the fact that there was no likelihood of confusion of thinking the robot 
was Ms White, it infringed her right of publicity and awarded $430,000. 
(d) Requirements for the right of publicity 
Liability arises when the defendant has appropriated the commercial value of a person's identity by using, 
without consent, the person's name, likeness or other indications of identity for purposes of trade.673 Liability 
is strictly based on misappropriation rather than misrepresentation, therefore no need for proof of deception 
                                                   
662 C. Fernandez, ‘The Right of Publicity’ Marquette Sports Law Journal (1998), 8, 2, argued that the right to 
publicity could not be justified by purely economic rationale. 
663 M. Madow above n.343 at 182 
664 Zacchini, above n.658 at 573 
665 Ibid at 574 
666 H. Kalven, ‘Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?’ (1966) 31 ContProbl 326 at 331 
667 Zacchini, above n.658 at 574 
668 Carson v Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) 
669 Motschenbacher v R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)  
670 Midler v Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) 
671 Waits v Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) 
672 White above n.633 
673 Restatement, Third, Unfair Competition (1995) s. 46 
 -78- 
Ref: S2.57/LIT1:3250465.1/IKAT 
or consumer confusion.674 The protected interest is not, as in passing off in the UK, trading or promotional 
goodwill but rather the intangible value attached to the person's identity.675 
Despite dicta to the contrary,676 prior commercial exploitation or use of identity by the claimants is not a 
prerequisite. Therefore claimants who have not yet 'exploited' their image677 or who have not contemplated 
exploiting their image,678 are not precluded from claiming an infringement of his right of publicity. The courts 
have extended this through their statement that the 'appropriation of the identity of an unknown person may 
result in economic injury or may itself create economic value in what was previously valueless.'679 
For a successful cause of action any unauthorised appropriation must be sufficient to identify the claimant, 
otherwise the claimant's identity has not been misappropriated, nor his interest violated.680 This illustrates a 
difference between publicity rights and that of registered and unregistered trade marks, as under the law of 
trade marks there may be liability despite no likelihood of confusion as to source or connection by way of 
endorsement or sponsorship.681 
The Restatement states that, 'the name as used by the defendant must be understood by the audience as 
referring to the claimant,' while in relation to visual likenesses, 'the claimant must be reasonably identifiable 
from the photograph or other depiction.'682 McCarthy proposed a variation of the test applied in defamation 
and privacy cases,683 namely the statement was published 'of and concerning' the claimant and they are 
identifiable by the defendant's use to more than a de minimis number of persons.684 
A person's identity may be appropriated in varying ways685 most commonly personal name,686 nickname687 
or likeness, use of other indicia of identity such as claimant's voice688 or distinctive catch-phrase689 all may 
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give rise to liability. Protection is also extended to cover more vague indicia of identity which might combine 
to identify the claimant, such as a distinctive style of dress, hairstyle and pose.690 Intent to infringe another's 
right of publicity is not a requirement of liability at common law and a mistake relating to the claimant's 
consent is not a valid defence.691 Goodenough692 and Kahn693 both argued that it is human self-
determination in aspects of personal identity that supports personality rights. 
(e) Defence under the First Amendment 
As with rights of privacy a defence is available is under the First Amendment of the US Constitution.694 As 
newsworthy and political speech, in addition to speech in the guise of entertainment enjoy protection under 
the First Amendment, freedom of speech continues to be a defence against a right of publicity action.695 The 
courts try to balance the rights under the right to publicity with that of societal interests held within the 
freedom of expression.696 In general a person is able to use the name, image, likeness or other 
characteristics in order to convey newsworthy events and matters of public interest but not for commercial 
use.697 
In order for an individual's identity to be used in connection with a 'news' story or 'public interest' story 
without their permission the story requires a reasonable relationship between the person and the story. In 
order to succeed with an action the individual must demonstrate that their identity was used merely as a 
vehicle to attract attention to the story and not as part of the story as a whole. In addition an individual can 
not bring an action for right of publicity concerning an unauthorised biography as the First Amendment 
protects discussion and legitimate commentary of public person's lives. The exception is where the audience 
is lead to believe that the work is fact when in fact it is fiction. 
The film and publishing industries are largely designed around entertainment principle and thus are afforded 
wide immunity for right of publicity liability. As shown in Rogers v Grimaldi (1989)698 the court allowed Fellini 
to use Ginger Rogers' first name in the title of his film, Ginger and Fred. The court drew an analogy between 
film and music titles and held that the use for this purpose was covered under the First Amendment. As the 
Amendment will provide a complete defence as long as the film is not an "advertisement in disguise."699 
In Hoffman v Capital Cities/ABC Inc. (2001)700 Dustin Hoffman initially successfully sued Los Angeles 
Magazine after it used a picture of him in character from the film Tootsie. The magazine successfully 
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appealed the trial court's ruling claiming that the use of the picture was in fact non-commercial speech and 
as such protected under the First Amendment. 
The case of Comedy III Productions Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001)701 examined the First Amendment and 
the right of publicity arguments in relation to whether the newsworthiness defence has a timeliness 
component. The defendant was an artist who using his charcoal depiction of the Three Stooges sold the 
artwork on lithographs and T-shirts. He argued that as the Three Stooges had once made headlines that his 
merchandise was 'newsworthy'. The Judge ruled for the claimant and created a new balancing test to 
determine whether the First Amendment would be set aside by the right of publicity. This occurs when the 
celebrity was the subject of a work of art which is not an original single work of art. A celebrity's publicity 
rights are outweighed by the artist's right to commercially produce his art only where it is "sufficiently 
transformative." 
The publicity right does not allow a right to control the celebrity's image by censoring disagreeable 
portrayals; once the celebrity thrusts himself or herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment 
dictates that the right to comment on, parody,702 lampoon and make other expressive uses of the celebrity 
image must be given broad scope.703 It is not a technique for persons to use in order to choose what enters 
the public limelight but rather a legal option available to ensure that unauthorised appropriation can not 
occur to their economic detriment.704 
(f) Descendibility 
A fundamental issue was the definition of duration and descendibility of a right of publicity.705 While privacy 
rights are personal right which die with the claimant, the right of publicity is a property right. There are 
considerable variations between statutory and common law provisions in the different states,706 e.g. at 
common law, the descendibility of the right of publicity has been recognised in Georgia,707 New Jersey708 
and in Tennessee.709 Under statute, the right of publicity is descendible in California,710 but in New York 
whatever rights of publicity exist are found in the privacy framework of section 50 of the Civil Rights Law711 
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708 Estate of Presley v Russen, 513 F Supp 1339 (1981) 
709 The State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. The Elvis Presley International Memorial Foundation v Crowell, 733 SW 
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711 Constanza v Seinfield, 719 NYS 2d 29 (NYAD 1 Dept 2000) at 30; Stephano v News Group Publications, 
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with rights terminating at death.712 Although many jurisdictions have yet to consider the descendibility 
issue,713 most jurisdictions which have done so have recognised that the right is descendible714 with post 
mortem duration of between 10715 and 100 years.716 Washington717 however differentiates the time period for 
protection of individuals and personalities. The celebrity is granted protection for 75 years post mortem 
whereas an individual is protected for 10 years, although the protections covered for both encompasses 
names, voices, signatures, photographs and likeness. 
Although canonisation began in Zacchini, publicity rights for living personalities had begun to be established 
in California in 1972 through the Civil Code s.3344. In 1985 California enacted s.990, establishing the right 
to pass the publicity right to a successor in order to prevent unauthorised use of the deceased's name and 
likeness within a 50 year period. In 1999 the California legislature amended s.990 and incorporated it into 
s.3344, when the post mortem duration was extended to 70 years to be consistent with the copyright 
protection afforded under the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 1998. 
Numerous states have protection exemptions limiting the available rights post mortem to avoid clashes with 
the First Amendment, some states protect names and pictures, whilst others offer wider 'persona' protection. 
(g) Damages 
Once unauthorised commercial appropriation is established the defendant can be liable for either the 
claimant's pecuniary loss or their own pecuniary gain, although Comedy III Productions718 according to a 
Professor Barnett719 may have "quietly rubbed out" the commercial purpose requirement in relation to 
merchandising. The court did not require the image to be used in advertising or "on or in products" as 
required by the Californian code, because the court characterised the lithographs themselves as the 
products. Barnett argued that this would mean that the sale of photographs would be enjoined by the right of 
publicity, rather than the right only covering images once applied to objects or used in advertising. As in 
unfair competition, the claimant may establish either or both measures of relief, but may only recover the 
greater of the two amounts720 to prevent double recovery.721 
Proof of monetary loss is not a prerequisite to recovery of damages, and although the claimant may be 
compensated purely for the deprivation of his right to control the use of the commercially valuable asset of 
his name or likeness, in the absence of specific loss such damages will be nominal.722 As there can be 
difficulty in proving loss to the claimant, or gain to the defendant resulting from the unauthorised 
                                                   
712 Pirone v MacMillan Inc. 894 F 2d 579 (2nd Cir 1990); see S. McEvoy, ‘Pirone v MacMillan Inc.: Trying to 
Protect the Name and Likeness of a Deceased Celebrity Under Trade Mark Law and the Right of Publicity’ 
(1997) 19 Comm & L 51 
713 R. Badin, ‘USA & Germany: publicity protection – recent developments’, (2000) 11(4) Ent L.R N43 
714 Restatement, Third, Unfair Competition at s. 46(h) 
715 Tennessee Code section 47-25-1104 (Personal Rights Protection Act 1984) 
716 Indiana Code section 32-13-1-8 
717 Wash. Rev. Code § 63.60.010 et seq. 
718 Comedy III above n.701 
719 Professor Barnett of University of California (Berkeley) as quoted by T. Catanzariti, ‘Swimmers, Surfers 
and Sue Smith – Personality rights in Australia,’ Ent L.R. 2002, 13(7), 135 
720 Restatement above n.714 at section 49(d) 
721 Professor Barnett above n.719 
722 Zim v Western Publishing Co. 573 F 2d 1318 (1978) (5th Cir CA) at 1327 
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appropriation, the courts can apply a 'fair market value' for a lost licence fee as damages, though this is 
rarely mathematically exact.723 This applies to both celebrities and private persons whose damages are 
measured by the fee that the defendant would need to pay an alternative person for a similar service.724 This 
measure however may not deprive the defendant of the full extent of their gain, though the courts have 
flexibility in determining a fair market value, to avoid unjust enrichment and to provide adequate 
deterrence.725 Full restitutionary relief is available in the form of account of the defendant's profits,726 or 
punitive damages when appropriate.727  As shown before the level of damages within the US is considerably 
higher than the levels awarded under passing off in the UK.728 This is exemplified in a comparison with the 
damages awarded in Hello! to OK! magazine of £1,033,156 despite OK! having initially paying out a £1m for 
the rights to the photographs.  The availability of punitive damages, unlike the UK, offers the courts a 
significant deterrent against flagrant breaches of the right. 
(h) Conclusion 
The right to publicity has significantly developed from its origins in the right of privacy, based on the principle 
of inviolate personality. From an early point in its history, the appropriation branch of privacy had developed 
distinctly proprietary attributes, before developing into an autonomous right of publicity, taking the form of a 
property right more akin to intellectual property rights such as copyright, patents and trade marks, than a 
right of personality.729 However, there are difficulties in aligning the right of publicity with well-established 
core areas of intellectual property, and the justifications which underpin the latter apply uneasily to the right 
of publicity or a sui generis tort of appropriation of personality.730 
Professor McCarthy believes the right of publicity is borne from common sense and the notion that "my 
identity is mine, and it is my property to control as I see fit."731 The right of publicity is a limited right enabling 
control of commercial use of an individual's persona.732  The aims of the right are clearly diverse to the aims 
of the right to privacy as the right to publicity was a freely assignable right of property, rather than a personal 
right.733 When the right is assigned, the assignee has a direct cause of action against a third party infringer, 
rather than a mere release of liability for the invasion of the subject's privacy.734 However, an assignment or 
                                                   
723 An example could be shown with the O’Brien case where he was offered $400 to promote a similar 
alternative product; above n.298 at section 49(d); Cher v Forum Intern Ltd, 692 F 2d 634 (CA Cal 1982); Zim 
at ibid at 1327 
724 Restatement above n.714 at section 49(d); Canessa v J.L. Kislak Inc. 97 N.J. Suoer 327, 235 A 2d 62 
(1967) 
725 Restatement above n.714 at section 49(d)  
726 Ibid at section 49(d); see also Bi-Rite above n.625 
727 Waits above n.671 
728 Irvine received £25,000 compared to US cases in the 1980’s and 1990’s awarding Midler $400,000, 
White $430,000 and Waits $2.5m  
 
729 J. Brown above n.702 
730 H. Beverley-Smith above n.91 at Ch 9 
731 J. McCarthy above n.587 at 3  
732 Ibid 
733 Haelan above n.642 
734 M. Armstrong, ‘The Reification of Celebrity: persona as Property’ (1991) 51 Louisiana L.R, 443 at 444 
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licence of the right of publicity only transfers the right to exploit the commercial value of the assignor's 
image, and does not transfer any rights of privacy.735 
The initial law and cases involved with the appropriation of privacy were criticised for inadequately 
distinguishing between dignitary aspects such as mental distress, humiliation and damage to personal 
dignity, and the economic interests of celebrities.736 Although, its too simplistic to draw a sharp distinction 
between damage to purely economic interests suffered by celebrities and purely dignitary interests suffered 
by others. Consequently the development of the right of publicity ended to the incongruity of a celebrity 
claiming invasion of a right of privacy for this harm. Although dignitary and economic interests do not fall 
neatly under separate causes of action for invasion of privacy and infringement of the right of publicity.737 
Sen warned that increased protection or development towards an "increasing privatisation of the celebrity," 
would stifle cultural debate and lead to a decline in the exchange of ideas and be to the detriment of 
society.738 
McCarthy proposed that the law would be more coherent if the courts recognised a sui generis legal right 
with damages measured by both mental distress and commercial loss. With separately entitled categories 
the law would be simpler than the existing structure of 'separate' rights of privacy by appropriation and a 
right of publicity.739 The successful formulation of such a sui generis action in legal systems which do not 
follow the American model is dependent on two factors. 
1 the problem of appropriation of personality must be severed from the discussion of the desirability of 
introducing a general right of privacy; and 
2 it needs to be considered whether there are any convincing underlying justifications for such a new 
remedy for appropriation of personality, such a new remedy must be based on existing authorities, 
or logical extension of the authorities. 
There has been a debate amongst academics over the extent of the publicity rights that are available within 
certain states.740 This debate increased in the aftermath of White where the California court found, logically, 
that there was no likelihood of confusion on the public's behalf but still awarded Ms White a decision based 
upon the right of publicity. In effect the decision has expanded the scope of the right to not only 
encompassing her name and likeness but grants protection for any representation that evokes her identity to 
the viewer. 
The right has moved away from its initial roots stemming from the right of privacy to the most significant and 
widest right of its type within any of the countries examined. The question remains that the states continue to 
adopt a differing scope to their rights, in relation both to the acts protected the remedies available and the 
availability of post mortem protection. This has been discussed and been found to be inappropriate by a 
number of leading academics,741 however due to the reluctance to adopt a Federal statute it is a situation 
that will continue for the forthcoming future. 
                                                   
735 Bi-Rite above n.625 at 1199 
736 Krouse v Chrysler Canada Ltd (1972) 25 DLR (3d) 49 at 68 
737 H. Beverley-Smith above n.91 at pg 189 
738 S. Sen, ‘Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an expanding right of publicity’, (1995) 59 Albany L.R. 739 at 742-
743 
739 J. McCarthy above n.587 at 1.39  
 
740 Ibid; A. Adrian, ‘What a lovely bunch of Coconuts! A comparison between Louisiana and the United 
Kingdom with regards to the appropriation of personality,’ Ent L.R. 2004, 15(7), 212 
741 H. Beverley-Smith above n.91  
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Finally, but perhaps most important, the philosophy that every person should have autonomy over what they 
endorse, be it an idea, a political candidate or a product, provides a compelling policy reason behind the 
support for the right of publicity. The opportunities to benefit from celebrity endorsement have exploded in 
the past few decades, enough to ensure that the law must keep pace with issues in the modern age. The 
alternative side of this endorsement policy is the important right of a celebrity to be able to choose, as some 
do, not to exploit his or her identity in commercial ventures. Jack Nicholson, among others, for example has 
sued to preserve that "non-exploitation" right. The right of publicity helps make this choice lawfully 
respected, however neither the right to privacy nor the right of publicity are still fully developed in some 
states notably Louisiana.742 
2.4 Additional protection under the Lanham Act 
In addition to the rights of privacy and right to publicity discussed above there are other protections available 
within the US, for example the Lanham Act and its protections for Trade Marks, false advertising and 
Federal protection for Copyright. The Lanham (Trademark) Act 1946 (“Lanham Act!”) took effect on 5 July 
1947743 and is a Federal piece of legislation containing the statutes related to trademark law within the US, 
prohibiting activities such as trademark infringement, trademark dilution and false advertisement. 
(a) Trademarks 
Trademarks744 are protected under the Federal Lanham Act and through individual states statutory and/or 
common law. Trademarks registered under the Lanham Act are granted nationwide protection.745 The 
definition of trademarks is very similar to the UK and are usually distinctive symbols, pictures, or words used 
by sellers in order to enable their products to be distinguished and identified. US trademark status can be 
granted to unique and/or distinctive colour combinations, building designs, product styles, and overall 
presentations. An extension of this is the availability of trademark status even where initially there is no 
distinctive or unique element.746 This protection is granted when a secondary meaning there has developed 
over a period of time. The granting of such a trademark747 enables an exclusive right to use or assign the 
right to use the trademark.748 In order for the mark to be effective under the Federal protection it must be 
registered with the Patent and Trademark Office, although the mark can be for either current or for future 
use. Under some state's common law, trademarks are granted protection as part of the law of unfair 
competition,749 no registration is required. Addition protections for trademarks are also provided through the 
Tariff Act of 1930.750 
(b) False Advertising 
                                                   
742 A. Adrian, above n.740 
743 D. Phelps, ‘Certification Marks under the Lanham Act, Journal of Marketing’ (1949) 13(4): 498 
744 M. Lemley, ‘The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense’, Yale Law Journal (1999) 108(7), 
1687 
745 Lanham Act § 1115  
746 Parks v. LaFace Records, 6th Cir., No. 99-2495, 5/12/03 
747 Called a service mark when in relation to a service rather than a product 
748 B. Hoffman, ‘Copyright and the First Amendment: defining the delicate balance.’ A.A. & L. 2004, 9(4), 
383 
749 States have traditionally adopted the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which doesn’t require 
registration or the Model Trademark Bill, which does provide for registration. 




Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C § 1125(a), is a short broadly phrased section, 
covering amongst other things, false advertising. The section prohibits use of a false or misleading 
description or representation in commercial advertising or promotion that "misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of goods, services, or commercial activities."751 The section 
although initially aimed at the protection of consumers, can only be used as an action by a business 
competitor, or an individual protecting his persona, in order to protect its value.752 This statutory provision 
can be utilised to protect the rights of personality. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act753 prohibits: 
'Unauthorised use of an aspect of a persons identified in connection with any goods or services…which is 
likely to cause, confusion, or cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection of association of 
such person.' 
The courts formulated guidelines requiring five elements under § 43(a):754 
1 the defendant must have made a false or misleading statement of fact in advertising; 
2 that statement must have actually deceived or had the capacity to deceive a substantial segment of 
the audience;755 
3 the deception must have been material, in that it was likely to influence the purchasing decision; 
4 the defendant must have caused its goods to enter interstate commerce; and 
5 the claimant must have been or is likely to be injured as a result. 
The case of George Wendt and John Ratzenberger v Host International Inc. and Paramount Pictures 
Corporation (1994)756 shows the court's application of the section. Two actors from the US soap Cheers, 
brought an action in respect of two robot figures installed at a number of airport bars and which were based 
on the claimants' characters. The court applied an eight part test, extending the previous five part test to be 
used in such important cases namely:757 
1 the strength of the claimant's mark;758 
2 the proximity test, i.e. how relatively similar the goods are; 
3 similarity of the marks; 
4 actual evidence of confusion; 
5 the manner in which the goods/services have been promoted; 
6 whether a potential purchaser is likely to be influenced by the association; 
7 the state of mind of the defendant in using the mark; and 
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8 the likelihood of expansion of the product line. 
Despite the appearance of a more complex test than the UK passing off tort there is no automatic 
requirement to satisfy all 8 parts.759 The US courts have said that s.43 of the Lanham Act extends to "use of 
any symbol or device which is likely to deceive consumers as to the association, sponsorship, or approval of 
goods or services by another person."760 
The result of the protection afforded by the Lanham Act appears to be comprehensive to English lawyers as 
shown by Abdul-Jabbar761 where the claimant was able to stop General Motors from using his previous 
name in an advertisement despite having no apparent protection or reputation over a former name. Another 
case involved basketball player namely Dennis Rodman762 who prevented the unauthorised reproduction of 
his tattoos on merchandise. 
In addition to damages, injunctive relief is also available under s.43 for which the claimant needs to 
demonstrate that there has been actual consumer reliance upon the false advertisement which had an 
economical impact on its own 'business'. 
(c) Copyright 
The US currently has Federal legislation protecting copyright under the Constitutional's authority to protect 
the writings of authors.763 The U.S. Copyright Act764 has been expanded to include new understanding of the 
word 'writings',765 with s.106766 of the Act including software design, graphic arts, motion pictures and sound 
recordings. 
Unlike trademark law within the US the copyright legislation is almost entirely Federal based, as s.301 of the 
act,767 includes a provision precluding inconsistent state law. Copyright protection under s.106 grants the 
owner an exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform, display, or license his work. As with trademark law 
the owner under s.201(d) is granted an exclusive right to produce or license derivatives of their 
work.768 There are limited exceptions under s.107769 e.g. fair use, e.g. when reviewing a copyright protected 
subject such as a book review. In order to qualify for copyright protection under s.102,770 the work must be 
original and in a recognised medium of expression.771 
                                                   
759 Cher above n.723; Geisel v Poynter Products, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 353, 158 U.S.P.Q. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 
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762 Dennis Rodman v Fanatix Apparel, Inc. (D.N.J. May 28th 1996) 
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764 http://uscode.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode17 
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There is no requirement of registration of a copyrighted work, and neither is there a need to place a 
copyright notice with the work in order for it to be covered. In addition to the rights mentioned above in 1989 
the US is a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,772 which offers 
authors protections within and externally to the US. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The protections available in the US are more specific than those available within the UK. The twentieth 
century has seen a continuous dramatic increase in the range of protection afforded within the US, e.g. 
White where there was no likelihood of confusion, but a right of publicity was found and protected with 
significant level of damages. 
Although the right of privacy and right of publicity arose from similar style claims, they are now very distinct 
and established in their own right. The lack of a Federal right of privacy or right of publicity means that 
individual states continue to protect persons in differing ways, notably in relation to the descendibility of 
protections. 
Although the majority of claims from a celebrity would be based either under an action for privacy or 
publicity, the availability of the Federal Lanham Act a significant additional protection against unlawful use of 
trademarks as well as false advertising, and copyright protection. Although the Lanham Act appears to have 
been under-utilised in comparison to the right of publicity. 
2.6 Australia 
(a) Introduction 
Australia has taken many of its protections from the traditions of UK law, but has been more open to the 
adaptations of these causes of actions.773 The range of rights available is relatively broad as, like the United 
Kingdom, no right to privacy or publicity statute has been enacted. Although no general right to privacy 
exists, privacy protects different interests from personality rights. An infringement of a person's personality 
rights deprives the person of the opportunity to commercially exploit their name or likeness for their own 
benefit, and causes financial loss. In contrast, a person's right to privacy protects the person's personal 
autonomy, seclusion from surveillance, and protects a person from intrusive behaviour, which causes 
humiliation or personal distress.774 
(b) Tort of Invasion of Privacy 
(i) General Privacy Right 
There is no statutory tort of privacy as such in Australia, as was re-emphasised in the High Court's landmark 
ruling in Victoria Park Racing v Taylor.775 Which involved an application for an injunction to restrain the 
owner of adjoining land erecting a platform from which the races could be viewed and commentated on. 
In 1979 the Australian Law Reform commission released a paper on ‘Unfair publication: defamation and 
privacy’ which proposed bringing in a privacy right that included a type of publicity right. The Draft Bill for 
Unfair Competition was criticised for anchoring the publicity right to the right to privacy.776 The assessment 
of privacy damages gave regard to a wide number of issues including the extent to which the defendant's 
                                                   
772 http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/overview.html 
773 S Crennan, ‘The Commercial Exploitation of Personality’, (1995) 8 Australian Intellectual Property Law 
Bulletin10, 129  
774 T. Cantanzariti above n.719 
775 Victoria Park Racing v Taylor (1937) 1A IPR 308 
776 The Draft Commonwealth Bill for an Unfair Publication Act 1979 
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conduct resulted in injury to the financial position of the claimant777 and the pecuniary loss suffered or likely 
to be suffered by the claimant.778 Although the right to institute an action was survivable779 it was not 
descendible.780 The Draft Bill however in my opinion placed the wrong emphasis on the quantification of 
damages focusing on solely the financial injury suffered by the claimant rather than the greater of either the 
injury suffered (an effective licence fee) or an adequate payment to prevent an unauthorised violation (such 
as an account of profits). 
Callinan J when discussing Victoria Park in Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp. 
(1999)781 stated that the time could be approaching where Australian law recognised that there could be 
property in a spectacle. He suggested that the time was ripe for a consideration of whether a tort for invasion 
of privacy could be introduced either by the legislature or the courts.782 
In the same case Gummow and Hayne JJ. agreed that Lenah could be distinguished from Victoria Park 
Racing, by stating that the decision in that case "does not stand in the path of the development of such a 
cause of action, it does not stand for any proposition respecting the existence or otherwise of a tort identified 
as unjustified invasion of privacy".783 They commented in obiter that 784 the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) as 
amended by the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) "stopped short of enacting what might 
be called a statutory tort of privacy invasion."785 
The Australian position post Lenah,786 appears to display a division between those in the High Court who 
might continue to support a liberal-utilitarian approach to the protection of privacy and those who might 
espouse a narrower Kantian787 idea of the future for privacy law. 
(ii) Breach of Confidence 
As there is no general right of privacy in Australia788 currently privacy interests are protected by the equitable 
action for breach of confidence. To bring a breach of confidence claim, a claimant must establish that: 
1 the material is confidential; and 
2 there is a relationship of confidence; and/or 
                                                   
777 Ibid at s.29(1)(b) 
778 Ibid at s.29(1)(c)  
779 Ibid at s.37(1) 
780 J. McCarthy above n.587 
781 Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1999] Tas. S.C. 114 
782 Ibid 
783 Ibid per Gummow and Hayne JJ at para.132  
784 Ibid at para.106-8  
785 A. Fitzgerald, ‘Australia: Procedure – Interlocutory Injunction – Publication of film resulting from secret 
filming – confidential information – copyright – Unconscionability – Privacy’, E.I.P.R., 2002, 24(6), N85 
786 Lenah, above n.781 
787 I. Kant, The Moral Law: Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Hugh Paton trans, 1948 ed) 
90: ‘Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a 
means for every arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, whether they are directed at 
himself or other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end’. 
788 Victoria Park above n.775; D. Butler, ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne 
University Law Review 339 at pp.373-375. 
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3 the material has been improperly or surreptitiously obtained. 
However, in Lenah789 it was shown that where information is obtained as a result of trespass it should be 
treated in the same way as confidential information. There can be protection if a photographic image, has 
been improperly or surreptitiously obtained, as this may constitute confidential information if depiction is 
private. Images and sounds of private activities, recorded by surreptitious methods, would be confidential 
and thus convey an obligation of confidence on the persons who obtained them and on those into whose 
possession they came, if they knew or ought to have known, the manner in which they were obtained.790 
Young J. said791 "the Court has power to grant an injunction in the appropriate case to prevent publication of 
a video tape or photograph taken by a trespasser even though no confidentiality is involved. However, the 
Court will only intervene if the circumstances are such as to make publication unconscionable."792 He 
added793 that, prima facie, an injunction should seriously be considered where a film was taken by a 
trespasser on private premises and there is some evidence that publication of the film would affect 
goodwill.794 
A person may not be able to bring an action for breach of confidence even if in a private context, on private 
property or in a private forum, because simple photographs or footage of a person alone may not possess 
the necessary quality of confidence. It has been acknowledged in the High Court that breach of confidence 
'extends to information as to the personal affairs and private life of the claimant, and in that sense may be 
protective of privacy.'795 
Breach of confidence, is unlike the tort of passing off in that it developed differently, however dicta from 
Lenah796 suggests that the courts are not prepared to restrict themselves in matters of the protection of 
privacy in the way that the English courts did in the post HRA case of Kaye.797 
It has been argued that, while a sui generis privacy doctrine might have advantages in terms of greater 
transparency, the breach of confidence doctrine has already proved to offer appropriate protection of 
private information.798 
Whatever developments may take place in the field of breach of confidence it will benefit natural, not 
artificial, persons. Development may best be achieved by looking across the range of established legal and 
equitable wrongs. Although in some respects these may be seen as representing species of a genus, being 
a principle protecting the interests of the individual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a secluded and 
private life, in the words of the Restatement, "free from the prying eyes, ears and publications of others”.799 
                                                   
789 Lenah Game above n.781 per Gleeson C.J. at para.34 
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(c) Publicity Rights800 
(i) Formal right to publicity 
"The traditional view in Australia has been that there is no proprietary right in one's own name, 
image, or persona equivalent to the US 'right of publicity' or the Canadian 'appropriation of 
personality'".801 
Lockhart J delivering the principal judgment in Sony Music Australia Ltd v Tansing (2000),802 commented 
on the ‘right of publicity' claim noting that the right has not been held to be part of the law in Australia to 
date. He referred to a number of Australian decisions, including Henderson803 and Moorgate (No.2).804 
These cases do not recognise the existence of a ‘right of publicity' as such but contain statements which 
suggest that an individual should be able to prevent use of a person's attributes where the use is 
misleading or deceptive.805 In Australia this has been described as a right to merchandise a character 
rather than a right of publicity.806 
(ii) Personality rights 
It is a misnomer to talk about personality rights in Australia as they are not rights in the sense of positive 
rights.807 Australia has a common commercial practice for celebrities entering endorsement or sponsorship 
agreements.808 In addition, the Australian Media and Entertainment Arts Alliance, insist film and television 
industrial agreements and awards do not cover merchandising and insist tele-visual producers enter 
agreements if they wish to use an actor's image in merchandising.809 
In Pacific Dunlop v. Hogan (1989),810 Burchett J. described the appeal of a celebrity's image as: 
"Character merchandising through television advertisements should not be seen as setting off 
a logical train of thought in the minds of television viewers. Its appeal is nothing like the 
insistence of a logical argument on behalf of a product, which may persuade, but also may 
repel. An association of some desirable character with the product proceeds more subtly to 
foster favourable inclination towards it, a good feeling about it, an emotional attachment to it. 
                                                   
800 R Zapparoni, “Propertising identity: Understanding the United States right of publicity and its Implications 
– some lessons for Australia” Melbourne University Law Review, 2004, Vol. 28, No. 3, 690-723. 
801 McMullen, "Personality Rights in Australia" [1997] Australian Intellectual Property Journal 86; see also S. 
Boyd above n.675 
802 Sony Music Australia Ltd v Tansing (Unreported) 
803 Henderson v Radio Corporation Pty [1960] S.R. (NSW) 576 
804 Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No.2) (1984) 156 CLR 414 
805 M Alderson, ‘Privacy and publicity – whose life is it anyway?’,(1996) 9 Australian Intellectual Property 
Law Bulletin 7 
806 A. Dufty, ‘Australia- Passing Off: Unauthorised release of Michael Jackson recordings – Whether right of 
publicity exists in Australian law’, Ent L.R. 1994, 5(1), E3 
807 S Ricketson, ‘Character Merchandising in Australia: Its Benefits and Burdens’, (1990) 1 Intellectual 
Property Journal 4, 191 
808 South Australian Brewing Company Pty Ltd v Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (2002) 53 IPR 90 
809 See for example certified agreement MEAA Fox Studios Australia – Employees Agreement 1999 clause 
8.4 (f) 
810 Pacific Dunlop Ltd v. Hogan [1989] 23 F.C.R. 553 
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No logic tells the consumer that boots are better because Crocodile Dundee wears them for a 
few seconds on the screen ... but the boots are better in his eyes, [because they are] worn by 
his idol." 
Australian laws stands in the tradition of English law and the protections of common law personality focus on 
the actions of passing off and breach of confidence. As there is no statutory right to publicity the approach 
taken by the Australian Courts has echoes of the UK as the courts have been required to stretch passing off 
to cover cases involving misappropriation as well as cases of misrepresentation. 
However, Australian law has been more willing to adapt to the modern needs of personality and this can be 
shown through the case of Grosse v Purvis (2003)811 which it was argued could lead to the start of a free 
standing tort of privacy. However the case law in the aftermath has not progressed this argument further and 
it remains to be seen if Australia will develop such a tort in the near future. Cantanzariti argues that 
acknowledging and protecting personality rights would protect privacy, but protecting privacy is not the focus 
and is an unintended incidental. Protecting personality rights protects investment, and has more in common 
with unfair competition than privacy.812 
(d) Trade Mark 
There is currently no comprehensive legal protection for celebrity personality under Australian law.813 Until 
recently celebrities attempting to prevent unauthorised exploitation of their personalities relied upon passing 
off and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (“TPA”), discussed below. However the Trade Marks Act 1995 
(“TMA”)814 has enabled trade marks to play an increased role in the protection of celebrity personality,815 as 
registration provides protection for selected indicia of personality such as portraits,816 pictures and 
                                                   
811 Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 
812 T. Cantanzaritti above n.719 at 135 
813 I Motsyni, “Protection of celebrities names and trade marks under the ICANN Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy” Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, Vol. 10, No.4 (December 2003) 
814 Prompted by the GATT, WTO and TRIPS agreement of December 1993 
815 M. Pendleton, ‘Exercising Consumer Protection – The Key to Reforming Trade Mark Law’ (1992) 3 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 110 at 113 




representations of the individual,817 surnames,818 famous names,819 signatures820 and slogans associated 
with the individual.821 
Australian legislation states that a trade mark is a 'sign used, or intended to be used, to distinguish goods or 
services dealt with or provided in the course of trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with by 
any other person'.822A 'sign' includes any 'letter, word, name, signature, numeral, device, brand, heading, 
label, ticket, aspect of packaging, shape, colour, sound or scent'.823 A trade mark serves to 'distinguish the 
goods or services of the enterprise from those of another'.824 If an individual successfully registers their 
photograph changes to their appearance for use as a mark could mean that the new mark is not 
substantially identical,825 the new mark is potentially unlikely to pass the threshold for deceptive similarity826 
as the test is not a side by side comparison but one of a potentially imperfect recollection of the registered 
mark and the impression of the new mark.827 
In essence, character and personality merchandising are the licensing of a trade mark, to be associated with 
the licensee's goods where the proprietor has no direct connection in trade with such goods.828 Previously, 
the role of trade marks with regards character and personality merchandising was hindered by the view, at 
common law, that trade marks as badges of origin, and could not be licensed without the traders' goodwill.829 
Consequently, protection was denied for character merchandising because it was not permissible to deal 
with trade marks as commodities in their own right.830  
                                                   
817 These are always registrable but usually require endorsement by the applicant to the effect that the 
photograph is a good likeness of the applicant: Trade Marks Office, Manual of Practice and Procedure, Pt 
22, para 22.2 (‘TMO Manual’). See Trade Mark No.654914, MPL Communications Ltd, London (Linda 
McCartney); Trade Mark No.726720, Universal Products Marketing GmbH, Germany (Michael Schumacher) 
and Trade Mark No.701835-701841, Jaques Villeneuve, Monaco (Jacques Villeneuve) 
818 However, a trade marked name must be “…inherently adapted to distinguish.” The relevant goods or 
services: 1995 Act s.41(3). The commonness of a surname is a guide to the extent of inherent adaption to 
distinguish that the surname has in relation to the applicant’s goods or services. 
819 Famous names are registerable as long as they are not misleading: 1995 Act s.43  
820 The signature of an applicant is always registerable but requires endorsement to the effect that the 
trademark consists of the applicant’s signature: TMO Manual, Part 22, Para 18.1   
821 TMO Manual, Part 22, Para 12, Carson v Reynolds, 48 CPR (2d) 57 (1980) 
822 Trade Marks Act 1995 s.17 
823 Trade Marks Act 1995 s.6 
824 A Terry, ‘Proprietary Rights in Character Merchandising Marks’, (August 1990) Australian Business Law 
Review, 229 
825 B. Ladas, ‘Australian Athletes need a statutory publicity right’, IPSANZ, Intellectual Property Forum Vol. 
56, March 2004 
826 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s.10 
827 Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd (1961) 1B IPR 523 at 529 
828 L. Weathered, Trade Marking Celebrity Image: The Impact of Distinctiveness and Use of Trade Mark - 
[2000] BondLRev 13; (2000) 12(2) Bond Law Review 161 
829 Bowden Wire Ltd v Bowden Brake Co Ltd (No.1) (1914) 31 RPC 385; Pinto v Badman (1891) 8 RPC 181 
at 194-5 (Fry LJ) 
830 American Greetings Corp Application (1983) 1 IPR 133 (‘Holly Hobbie Case’) 
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In common with passing off and the TPA misrepresentation is the device used in trade mark law to balance 
the demands of trade mark owners, competitors and consumers.831 The 1995 Act recognised trade marks as 
a form of personal property,832 abolishing the prohibition preventing trafficking or assignment of trade marks 
without their accompanying business goodwill,833 and makes provision for multi-class applications.834 In 
addition post mortem rights are available under the act unlike under passing off.835 
Infringement occurs when a substantially identical or deceptively similar sign is used on goods or services in 
respect of which the trade mark is registered, or on similar goods, 'as a trade mark'.836 No high profile 
celebrity marks cases have come to court in Australia and therefore the lead is taken from the leading brand 
name case-law. 
Section 41(2) TMA states: 
"An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not 
capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is 
sought to be registered...from the goods or services of other persons." 
The Pritikin837 case shows that the courts will examine the style of the packaging in helping to determine 
whether there has been an infringement of a trade mark, i.e. has the party sought to emphasis the word or 
image.838 If the work used is merely descriptive or describing a function and not acting as a badge of 
origin839 then the claim is unlikely to be successful.840 Sackville. J gave an in-depth analysis on 'use as a 
mark' cases,841  confirming that the impression given to the consumer is vital. This impression was the result 
of examining the context in which the potentially infringing material appears. When a 'reasonable' 
                                                   
831 M. Pendleton above n.815 at 113 
832 Trade Marks Act 1995, s.21(1) 
833 Trade Marks Act 1995, s.74 and s.106(3) which permit the assignment of trade marks with or without 
goodwill of the business concerned in the relevant goods or services 
834 Trade Marks Act 1995, s.27(5) Recommended by the Working Party to Review the Trade Marks 
Legislation, to reduce the complexity and cost of trade mark applications: Recommended Changes to the 
Australian Trade Mark Legislation, Report to the Hon. R. Free, Minister for Science and Technology, AGPS 
July 1992, 59 (‘The Free Report’) 
835 At common law the motto actis personalis moritur cum persona, applies so that the estate of a deceased 
person cannot sue or be sued for any tort committed by or against the deceased: Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 
Camp 483. This rule has been modified by statute through Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 
(NSW) s.2. It is however still uncertain whether this provision would allow the estate of a deceased celebrity 
personality to take action under passing off. It is possible for misleading or deceptive conduct under the TPA 
may survive the death of a party although this is still an open question; Premiership Investment Pty Ltd v 
White Diamond Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 178 
836 Trade Marks Act 1995 s.120 
837 Berzins Specialty Bakeries Pty Ltd v Monty’s Continental Bakery (Vic) Pty Ltd, (1987) APIC 90-427. 
838 M. Pendleton above n.815 at 113 
839 Shell above n.827 
840 Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 12 IPR 1; Koninklijke 
Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 816; Parkdale Custom Built 
Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 225-6 
841 Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd v The Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1996) AIPC 91-213 
 -94- 
Ref: S2.57/LIT1:3250465.1/IKAT 
hypothetical customer would believe they indicated the origin of the product, then an infringement is likely to 
have occurred. 
In relation to celebrities the test for whether they would obtain protection would potentially relate to whether 
there was endorsement or merchandise. Endorsement would suggest a service behind the product whereas 
merchandise suggests a service behind the product itself.842 Where a celebrity has trade marked their image 
for advertising services, any unauthorised use of their image or personality is sufficient for advertising 
purposes to falsely imply a celebrity's sponsorship or connection to the product. Although this does not imply 
that the celebrity's advertising service is the source of the advertisement, there is a need to suggest the 
latter to be 'use as a mark'. A mere consumer impression of celebrity connection to the product is not 
sufficient. 
An advantage of registration is the possibility of obtaining defensive trade marks where, due to prior use, it is 
likely that use of the trade mark would lead to an indication of a connection between the registered owner 
and the proposed goods and services.843 An advantage of these marks are that there is no need to prove 
that there is an intention to use the mark on other goods and services.844 A second advantage is the 
availability of Notice of Objections against the importation of infringing goods,845 which when lodged by the 
registered owner846 with Customs, allows the owner to bring proceedings847 to stop third parties from using a 
similar or deceptively similar trade mark. 
The dilution provision of the TMA as shown in Campomar Sociedad v Nike International Ltd (2002)848 lies at 
the centre of a significant rewriting of trade mark law for Australia.849 The courts try850 to "restrain activities 
which are likely adversely to affect the interests of the owner of a 'famous' or 'well-known' trade mark by the 
'dilution' of its distinctive qualities or of its value to the owner":851 In Nike852 the High Court particularly 
referred to the dilution provision as concerned with protecting interests in "famous" or "well-known" trade 
marks, adding that dilution theory "does not require proof of a likelihood of confusion", rather, what is 
protected is "the commercial value or 'selling power' of a mark by prohibiting uses that dilute the 
distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish the associations evoked by the mark".853 Even if deception or 
                                                   
842 Hogan v Koala Dundee Pty Ltd (1988) 10 ATPR 40-902 and Pacific Dunlop Ltd v Hogan (1989) 11 ATPR 
40-948 
843 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s.185(1) 
844 Ibid at ss.185(2) and 186 
845 Ibid at Part 13 
846 Ibid at ss.132(2) and (3) 
847 Ibid at s.230, the ability to bring an action in passing off is expressly preserved 
848 Campomar Sociedad Ltd v. Nike International Ltd. (2000) 46 I.P.R. 481 
849 M. Richardson, ‘Promotional Trade Marks and Trade Mark Law in Australia: Recent Cases,’ Ent L.R. 
2000, 11(8), 189 
850 M. Richardson, in ‘Redefining the boundaries of Unfair competition? The changing face of Trade Mark 
Law in Australia’, I.P.Q. 2000, 3, 295   
 
851 Campomar, above n.848 at 492-493, referring to Trade Marks Act 1995, s. 120(3), which provides a 
ground for infringement in these cases involving the use of a "deceptively similar or substantially identical" 
trade mark with respect to goods or services "unrelated" to the owner's 
852 Ibid at 494 
853 Ibid at 493, quoting from the U.S. Restatement Third, Unfair Competition, § 25, comment (a) 
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confusion are likely to occur and could be broadly interpreted to include suggestions of endorsement or 
approval this should not have to be proved for infringement by dilution.854  
The initial cost of trade mark registration,855 the complexities of the registration process,856 the time involved 
in obtaining registration857 and the organisational and financial infrastructure required to maintain its use, 
either by the owner or his/her assignees,858 means it is only of practical use to relatively well established 
individuals. Trade mark registration has the advantage of providing post mortem protection for celebrity 
personality which may be difficult to establish under as passing off and the TPA ss.52 and 53.859 Trade 
marks are now devisable by will and by operation of law.860 
In addition to the limitations above there are a number of defences that could dilute the use of a trade mark 
as a form of protection. If the mark is used in good faith to indicate the kind, quality or another characteristic 
of the goods or services being offered then no infringement occurs.861 If the mark is used for comparative 
advertising this would also not be an infringement.862 There is no current defence for parody or satire under 
the Act.863 
Whilst trade mark law does provide one of the strongest forms of protection available in Australia they can 
not by definition provide blanket protection for publicity rights. However, this right is not fully open to many 
people due to the cost, time and complications it takes to register a trade mark, which in turn can only be 
used for the relevant goods and services it covers. 
 
                                                   
854 M. Richardson above n.850; Querying the effect of the High Court's decision for the authority of the full 
Federal Court's judgment in Coca-Cola Co. v. All-Fect Distributors Ltd, (2000) 47 I.P.R. 481. In that case the 
claimant's concession in an infringement action that the defendant's sweets could be considered "goods of 
the same description as" its soft drink meant that the case could be resolved under Trade Marks Act, s. 
120(2), a provision which allows an exception to infringement where the actual use would not be likely to 
confuse. Thus the issue of dilution under s. 120(3) (which is expressed to be a provision that only applies if 
s. 120(2) does not) was closed off. Before Nike, the Coca-Cola result could be interpreted to leave little 
scope for dilution arguments in future cases. But such an interpretation can now be seen as contrary to the 
High Court's endorsement of dilution issues being resolved under s. 120(3). That the High Court also 
refused to accept the binding authority of the concession made in New South Wales Dairy Corporation 
implies that Coca-Cola should now be similarly confined to its facts. 
855 S. Murumba, ‘Commercial Exploitation of Personality,’ (Sydney, 1986) Pg 23 
856 IP Australia, Trade Marks Application Kit, Feb 1999, sets out the steps required to obtain a trade mark 
registration under the 1995 Act 
857 Minimum time for registration from date of filing is ten months 
858 If the trade mark owner is unable to obtain users in the classes in which the trade mark is registered it 
becomes vulnerable to removal under the 1995 Act, s.94(2) 
859 At common law the motto actis personalis moritur cum persona, applies so that the estate of a deceased 
person cannot sue or be sued for any tort committed by or against the deceased: Baker above n.855. This 
rule has been modified by statute through Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW) s.2. It is 
however still uncertain whether this provision would allow the estate of a deceased celebrity personality to 
take action under passing off. It is possible for misleading or deceptive conduct under the TPA may survive 
the death of a party although this is still an open question; Premiership above n.835. 
860 As recommended, prior to the 1995 Act by the Free Report, 38 
861 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss.122(1)(a), (b), (e), (f) and (i) 
862 Ibid s.122(1)(d) 
863 Coca-Cola Co. Above n.854 
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(e) Use of Personal Identity 
(i) Passing Off 
Australian passing off law is broader in scope than its English counterpart and offers greater protection 
against the unpermitted use of personal identity in advertising and commercial promotion.864 With the lack 
of a right to privacy claimants have looked to the tort of passing off to protect their publicity value.865 
Passing off arises where a competitor creates the impression that his product is in some way connected to 
another, competing product, and has occurred without permission to do so.866 He "passes off' his product 
as another, profiting from the goodwill that attaches to it. 
The tort of passing off is designed to protect a person's business, especially its goodwill and reputation. 
The basis of the cause of action lies squarely in misrepresentation, for its underlying rationale is to prevent 
commercial dishonesty.867 
The three key elements868 are: 
1 that a person has an established reputation or goodwill; 
2 there is a misrepresentation; and 
3 the misrepresentation causes damage. 
The first passing off action that was applied to a case of false endorsement, was Henderson v Radio Corp. 
Pty. Ltd (1960),869 which involved two professional dancers who sought protection from the producer who 
had appropriated their picture for use on the picture that was to adorn the album cover. The significance of 
this case was the abandonment of the 'common field of activity' doctrine870 as an essential element of 
passing off. In Henderson the courts adopted a different approach to the UK courts, as the court considered 
that customers of the claimants could be misled as to whether the defendants had approved or 
recommended the record. This misappropriation was sufficient for an action of passing off. Thus in the 
Henderson case false endorsement in advertising was identified as one of the elements of passing off. 
In Hutchence & Others v South Seas Bubble Co Pty Ltd & Another (1986)871 a company had sold T-shirts 
with an INXS design on them without the permission of the holders of the design. Wilcox J stated: 
"The better view now is that there is no necessity for a common field of activity between the 
claimant and the defendant, provided that there is a misrepresentation by the defendant 
concerning the defendant's name or product resulting in a likelihood of damage to the 
                                                   
864 S. Boyd above n.675 
 
865 Interestingly, in Moorgate above n.804 at 445 Deane J. rejected a tort of unfair competition but noted that 
traders could look to adapt the tort of passing off, to meet "new situations and circumstances" and exampled 
passing off developed "to meet new circumstances involving the deceptive or confusing use of name or 
other indicia to persuade purchasers or customers to believe that the goods or services have an 
association, quality or endorsement". 
866 See F.A. Trindade, P. Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia, Oxford U.P. at p. 158. J.G. Fleming, The Law 
of Torts, 7th Ed at 673. 
867 ConAgra v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd [1992] 23 IPR 193  
868 Reddaway v Banham [1896] AC 1999 
869 Henderson above n.803 
870 McCulloch above n. 272 
 
871 Hutchence & Others v South Seas Bubble Co Pty Ltd & Another 64 ALR 330. 
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claimant, as for example confusion adversely affecting goodwill ... or wrongful appropriation of 
the claimant's name and reputation."872 
For a successful action, there must be a misrepresentation of a commercial connection or 
misrepresentation of an association to succeed in passing off, therefore mere misappropriation of 
reputation is not enough.873 This means that the tort is not useful in circumstances where it is clear there is 
a mere association,874 no connection such as where there is a prominent and credible disclaimer of any 
consent875, or where it is plain unlikely that there is a commercial connection. 
The courts have sometimes struggled to find a misrepresentation, and have on occasion resorted876 to a 
circular legal fiction, that the public assume that if a person's image is used, that there must be a 
commercial connection. This assumption is based in part on the fact that the public are aware of cases 
which provide that a person has to consent to their image being used. 
Since Henderson the courts have gone further to include protection of passing off for the 'look and feel' of 
Paul Hogan from the highly successful Crocodile Dundee films. The first case was Hogan and Another v 
Koala Dundee Pty Limited (1988),877 in which a shop used a Koala equipped with the Crocodile Dundee 
insignia as a logo and the shop also sold items associated with the film. The second case was Pacific 
Dunlop Ltd v Hogan (1989) 878 which involved an advertisement in which an actor, who did not resemble 
Crocodile Dundee but used elements such as the hat and the jacket (as worn by the actor in the film), 
endorsed a particular variety of shoes. Neither copyright nor trade mark law protected such claims. The 
court held that a passing off action included such character appropriation by association. 
These cases879 illustrate how far the action for passing off has been extended to protect celebrities whose 
persona is employed to enhance sales of products without consent. They also extend protection to a broadly 
defined image, including virtually any characteristic recalling the celebrity in the minds of a sufficient number 
of consumers. 
Carty argued that the policy in Australia is to take the tort of passing off as close to a tort of misappropriation 
as possible.880 Wadlow referred to the Henderson decision as "ambiguous", it not being clear whether the 
unauthorised use of the claimants' photograph was unlawful per se or only because there was a 
misrepresentation of sponsorship.881 
It is not necessary under passing off for the claimant to have had an existing licensing business or whether 
they have previously preferred not to grant licenses. Nor does it matter that the defendant may have 
                                                   
872 Ibid at 341 per Wilcox J (obiter) 
873 McIlhenny Co. v Blue Yonder Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] 39 IPR 187; B. McCabe, ‘When Trading Off 
Reputation of Others in Not Misleading or Deceptive.’ (1998) 6 T.P.L.J. 51 
874 Honey v Australian Airlines Ltd & Another 14 IPR 264. Northrop J 
875 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v The South Australian Brewing Co. Ltd [1996] 34 IPR 225 (‘Duff 
Beer Case’) 
876 Hogan above n.842 
877 Pacific Dunlop above n.814 
878 Ibid 
879 Ibid per Gummow J; Hogan, above n.240 per Pincus J 
880 H. Carty, above n.12 at 237 
881 C. Wadlow above n.294 at pg297 
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derived no benefit from the supposed endorsement, and would not voluntarily have paid a fee.882 Given the 
existence a misrepresentation, it does not appear to be necessary that the public actually rely on or to 
which they attach any importance, and by the same reasoning it does not have to be calculated to cause 
damage over and above the loss of a licensing fee.883 
(ii) Trade Practices Act 
Parallel to the tort of passing off, there is the statutory action for deceptive trading, contained in s.52 of the 
TPA,884 which says that using an image or persona without permission can amount to misleading or 
deceptive commercial behaviour.885 The advantages of using of the TPA are that there is no need to prove 
damage, nor the existence of a reputation, to achieve injunctive relief.  
Section 52 of the TPA has been used to protect personality rights. The key elements are: 
1 a corporation;886 
2 in the course of trade or commerce; and 
3 engages in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. 
It is sufficient that the conduct is likely to mislead the public into thinking the respondent's product was in 
some way promoted or distributed or associated with the applicant, that there was some form of 
association, provided that it is beyond mere wonderment.887 The relevant misconception is that the other 
person endorses or is otherwise associated with the first person. 
Section 52 is wider in scope than passing off in that it is not strictly necessary to establish reputation. 
However, it is difficult for a person to establish that the conduct is misleading and deceptive unless the 
person is sufficiently famous that the public would assume that the person would license the use of their 
image, so that the use of their image suggests that a licence in fact exists. 
Section 53 of the Act provides protection for celebrities against corporation as a corporation shall not, in 
trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or in connection 
with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of goods or services.888 
The corporation shall not represent that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, performance, 
characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits they do not have, nor that they have a sponsorship, approval 
or affiliation it does not have. 
Although designed to protect consumers from buying goods or services that have been falsely associated 
with another product or a personality the TPA, albeit tacitly, serves to protect against the unauthorised 
                                                   
882 S. Boyd above n.675 
883 C. Wadlow above n.294 at pp. 298-299. 
 
884 "A corporation shall not in trade or commerce engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is 
likely to mislead or deceive." There is no need to prove damage or the existence of a reputation. Although 
this is part of a consumer protection statute, the vast majority of actions are brought by traders rather than 
consumers. 
885 Mark Foys Pty Ltd v TVSN (Pacific) Ltd (2000) 49 I.P.R. 303; H. Carty above n.12 
886 If the protagonist is not a corporation, the conduct may still be subject to s.52 if it has occurred within a 
territory, or the conduct involves the use of postal, telegraphic or telephonic services or takes place in a 
radio or television broadcast, s.6 TPA 
887 T. Cantanzariti above n.719 
888 For an in depth look at the Trade Practices Act see S. Boyd above n.675 
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exploitation of reputation or personality.889 However, the use of a disclaimer890 may serve as notice to the 
public so that they are not misled or deceived by the packaging and this may remove the possibility of using 
a claim under the TPA.891 The statutory right available under the TPA overlaps considerably892 with passing 
off e.g. both require a misrepresentation, the difference being that the TPA893 looks to protect the consumer, 
whereas passing off894 aims to property the intellectual property rights in the goodwill,895 attached to either a 
business or an individual.896 
(iii) Defamation 
The Defamation Act 1974 provides that a person has a cause of action against another if:897 
1 another publishes a statement which makes an imputation which is defamatory of a person,898 and 
the statement is likely to cause the ordinary reasonable member of the community to think less of a 
person or avoid a person; and 
2 the person is identified as the subject of the statement. 
The potential threat of a defamation claim can discourage the use of an image where a person's image is 
vulnerable to damage if it is associated with unsavoury goods or services or it puts the person in a 
"ridiculous light". The argument placed in front of the court is that the publication of the image is an 
imputation that the person is the kind of person who would endorse such products or services, and is a 
defamatory imputation because members of the community would think less of them. 
This was the analysis used in Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated (1991),899 where the claimant was a 
footballer who argued that publishing a photograph of him naked in the shower. This raised an imputation 
that he was the type of person who would consent to having his photo taken whilst naked, and would 
consent to such photos being published, and that ordinary reasonable members of the community would 
think less of him if they because of this. Defamation may also assist where a person's image is vulnerable 
to damage by being associated with any goods or services. 
Defamation only assists where a person's reputation is adversely affected. It does not prevent anyone 
exploiting a person's image in circumstances where there is no defamatory imputation because ordinary 
reasonable members of the community would not think less of the person from the exploitation of the 
image. For example, it would not prevent a person using the image to endorse innocuous goods and 
services where the person has not held themselves out as eschewing endorsements. Defamation also 
                                                   
889 M. Henry, ‘International Privacy, Publicity and Personality Laws’ (Michael Henry, ed.) 3.79. 
890 Sony above n.802 
891 A. Dufty above n.806 
892 Hutchence above n.871 at 478 
893 Taco Bell Pty Ltd v Taco Co of Australia (1982) 42 ALR 177 at 202 per Deane and Fitzgerald JJ 
894 ConAgra above n.867 
895 IRC above n.244at 223-4 per Lord McNaughton 
896 Henderson above n.803at 636 per Evatt CJ and Myers J 
897 See T.K. Tobin & M.G. Sexton, “Australian Defamation Law and Practice,” Butterworths, Loose-Leaf 
Service, NSW Law Reform Commission Report No.75, September, 1995 
898 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s.9 
899 Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press [1991] 23 N.S.W.L.R 443 
 -100- 
Ref: S2.57/LIT1:3250465.1/IKAT 
does not provide or protect any positive right for a person to enter into agreements to exploit their own 
person and only applies during a person's life.900 
(f) Summary 
Richardson901 argued that Australian cases have been valuable in emphasising that personal autonomy is 
the basis of the protections granted. However, the precise reasons for privacy protection and the 
implications of those reasons for the scope of protection permitted are still to be elucidated. The liberal-
utilitarian idea902 that persons should be free to conduct themselves as they wish, in the hope that they will 
flourish into better persons and, society will benefit as a whole, leaves scope for broader claims for a 'right' 
to privacy coupled with a balancing of interests in cases where privacy and freedom of speech collide. 
Traditionally when seeking to prevent the unauthorised use of their personality individuals have been 
granted only limited protection in relation to privacy aspects. The primary reason for a lack of a per se 
publicity right according to Ladas903 was the refusal of the High Court in Victoria Park Racing to recognise a 
common law right of privacy nor allowing an expansion of the law by introducing a doctrine of unfair 
competition. 
Individuals have traditionally brought actions under the TPA and passing off for claims involving their 
persona in a commercial context. However, the use of passing off and the TPA in these circumstances has 
been described as "artificial and fictitious"904 as the Courts have granted relief in situations where only a 
mere hint of confusion has been presented rather than a misrepresentation.905 
It is the lack of a clear publicity right that has resulted in the use of passing off and the TPA for areas that 
they were never intended to cover, and this has created some problems. For example the additional 
evidential burden that is required under passing off to prove misrepresentation has resulted in increased 
costs in comparison to a claim brought under trade mark law, where the registration of a mark has the strong 
advantage of a presumption of validity, making the prevention of infringement easier, quicker and cheaper. 
In summary there are circumstances when a celebrity's image can not be used without permission. Firstly, 
where the use of the image may constitute a misrepresentation that the other person has some sort of 
connection or association, with the product or service. This is especially important when an image or 
identifying features are used in a commercial context, such as to advertise commercially available goods 
and services. An example is if there is a binding agreement in place which contractually prohibits the other 
person's image or identifying features being used, or contractually prohibits the image or identifying features 
being used unless a further fee is paid. This includes individual agreements as well as applicable industry 




                                                   
900 T. Cantanzariti above n.719 
901 M. Richardson above n.718 
902 I. Kant above n.787, J. Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in Mary Warnock (ed), Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on 
Bentham, Together with Selected Writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin (1962) 126, 136. 
903 B. Ladas above n.825 
904 J. McMullen above n.801 at 89 
905 B. Ladas above n.825 





Canada has traditionally recognised that all people have proprietary rights in the exclusive marketing for 
gain of their personality and that the law entitles him to protect that right if invaded.907 However, each 
province has their own approach to protecting personality, therefore it is crucial to determine where the 
violation took place as determines which rights are available.908 Statutory privacy rights have been passed 
in British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan909 of which only British Columbia has a 
specific provision devoted to the unauthorised commercial exploitation of name and likeness.910 Ontario has 
developed a common law approach, in the form of the tort of the misappropriation of personality, which is 
similar to that existing in many US states.911 The tort shows an evolutionary approach in its development,912 
which was created through two cases which did not involve endorsement by the claimant, meaning that 
passing off was inapplicable.913 
(b) Privacy 
(i) Introduction 
Under the Canadian Constitution and Charter of rights there is no explicit right to privacy.914 This is because 
matters of civil or private law fall within provincial jurisdiction as there is no single privacy law, the source of 
privacy protection may be common law, civil law, or statute, depending on the province.915 
There are two main Federal acts,916 the Privacy Act 1982 (which adopted the CSA International Privacy 
Code917 into law), and the Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act 2000.918 However, these Acts 
are targeted at avoiding invasions of privacy in ways rarely benefited celebrities, such as wiretaps by the 
police or excessive surveillance in the workplace and therefore are beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                                   
907 Athans v Canadian Adventures Company Ltd [1977] O.R 2d 425 at 435  
908 L. Murray ‘Chapter 1: Copyright Talk: Patterns and Pitfalls in Canadian Policy Discourses’ In the Public 
Interest, The Future of Canadian Copyright Law, ed by M. Geist, September 2005 
909 British Columbia (1996), Manitoba (1987), Newfoundland (1990) and Saskatchewan (1978). It is still not 
clear whether publicity rights are included, though the British Columbia law includes protection against the 
unauthorised use of name or portrait for advertising. 
910 R. Howell, ‘Publicity Rights in the Common Law Provinces of Canada,’ 18 Loy.L.A.Ent L.J 487 (1998) 
911 C. Wadlow above n.294 at p.304; R.Howell ibid 
912 H. Carty above n.12 
913 In Krouse, above n.735, the lack of a common field of activity was stressed in the discussion of the tort of 
passing off 
914 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (United Kingdom), 1982, c. 11, s. 8, at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter 
 
915 M. Homsi. ‘Outsourcing Our Privacy?: Privacy and Security in a Borderless Commercial World’, 54 UNB 
Law Journal 272 (2005) 
 
916 Protection can be available under the Federal Copyright Act, particularly under the provisions relating to 
performer’s rights and moral rights see R.S.C. 1995, c. C-42 as amended; W. Hayhurst, ‘Canada: Privacy – 
Photographs’, E.I.P.R. 1997, 19(7), D172 
917 A national standard: CAN/CSA-Q830-96. 




(ii) Recognition of Privacy 
Invasion of privacy was first recognised under art.1053 of the Quebec Civil Code in Robbins v. C.B.C. 
(1957).919 Since Robbins, the right of privacy has been codified in both the Quebec Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms,920 and in the Civil Code.921 Under s.8 of the charter there is a right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure, which the courts have recognised an individual's right to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.922 The Quebec civil law offers protection to safeguard dignity, honour, 
reputation923 and for respect for private life,924 as shown in Bogajewicz.925 Trudeau J. stated that Sony of 
Canada was obligated to ensure that it obtained consent before using a photograph of the claimant's 
likeness. As with the appropriation of personality unintentional infringement is no defence in Canadian law. 
Quebec's lead in the development of protection for personal privacy was followed by British Columbia,926 
Manitoba,927 Newfoundland928 and Saskatchewan929 who have all enacted privacy statutes that, inter alia, 
prohibit the unauthorised use of a name or likeness in advertising and promotion of goods or services.930  
There is no requirement for the subject to be 'well-known' in order to bring a claim, a photograph of a 
seventeen year old girl931 sitting in a public place, was published in the defendant's magazine and the 
claimant successfully brought a claim. The Supreme Court said the decision was based on the infringement 
of her privacy, as there was an abuse of her previous anonymous status, which people cherish. 
Whilst, traditionally Quebec932 relies on the tort of misappropriation of personality to deal with cases like 
Bogajewicz933 some common law provinces have enacted specific legislation providing for redress when an 
individual's right to privacy has been invaded.934 
                                                   
919 Robbins v C.B.C. (1957) 12 D.L.R. (2d) 35 (Que. S.C.). The history of privacy protection in Quebec is 
canvassed by Biron J. in Aubry v. Duclos (1996), 141 D.L.R. (4th) 683 (Que. C.A.) at 688-691. 
920 R.S.Q. 1977, c. 12. Art. 5 guarantees to everyone the "right to respect for his private life". 
921 S.Q. 1991, c. 64. Art. 3 of the Civil Code of Quebec now states: "Every person is the holder of personality 
rights, such as the right to life, the right to the inviolability of his person, and the right to respect of his name, 
reputation and privacy. These rights are inalienable." 
922 Hunter v Southam, 2 S.C.R 145 (1984) at 159 - 60 
923 Quebec Charter s.4 
924 Ibid at s.5 
925 Bogajewicz v Sony of Canada Ltd (1995) 63 C.P.R (3d) 458 
926 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 336  
927 The Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P-125 
928 Privacy Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. P-22. 
929 The Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24 
930 S. Boyd above n.675 
931 Aubry v Editions Vice-Versa Inc [1998] 1 S.C.R 591 
932 In the civil law province, Quebec, the right to one's image was also accepted in the Quebec Supreme 
Court decision, Deschamps v Renault Canada (1977) 18 C de D 937 where film footage of celebrities was 
used without their permission in the defendant's advertising campaign, mentioned in D. Collins, ‘Age of the 
Living Dead: Personality Rights of Deceased Persons’ [2002] Albany Law Review 39. Only 14 states provide 
a post-mortem right. 
933 Bogajewicz above n.925 
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However, no court has yet examined the constitutional validity of the publicity aspect of the right of privacy, 
and whether this can co-exist with freedom of expression, or whether it should be amended to account for 
free press.935 It is vital to remember that the Charter seeks to protect both freedom of expression and 
privacy,936 both are fundamental constitutional rights, which should both be considered when scrutinising 
legislation to which the Constitution applies.937 Thus, freedom of speech, like any other freedom ... must be 
balanced against the essential need of individuals to protect their reputation. 
As argued in Pierre v Pacific Press Limited (1994)938 there was a belief that the protections available in 
privacy torts, in this case British Columbia's statutory privacy tort, were unsuitable for publicity protections 
and indeed inoperative in the light of the right to freedom of expression. In obiter McEachern C.J.B.C. 
stated, "[t]he Defendants may not succeed on this issue because if they did it could mean that the Charter 
protects a right to injure, which would be an unusual application for a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms".939The case exemplifies the pressure for the emergence of a publicity right which has echoes of 
a privacy right in a similar fashion to that which Phillips was hinting at in Hello! The emergence of the tort of 
appropriation is discussed in further detail below. 
Canada has faced similar problems to other jurisdictions in relation to the lengths that privacy protection 
extends to. Inevitably, such cases implicate constitutional considerations because the right of privacy 940 is 
being asserted in a manner which seeks to limit the freedom of the press.941 Section 2(b) of the Charter942 
guarantees "freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication". 
Quebec has enacted the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedom, s.5 guarantees every person a 
'right to respect for his private life'. In Aubry v Editions Vice-Versa (1998),943 the Supreme Court held that 
publication of a citizen's photograph without consent could violate their right of privacy under Quebec law. 
The Court found that the right to one's image is covered under the right to respect one's private life in s.5. 
The freedom of expression and right of the public to be informed are defences under the Charter that in this 
case did not overrule the person's right. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
934 D. Tackaberry, ‘Canada: Appropriation of Personality – Unauthorised use of Claimant’s photograph in 
advertisement’, Ent L.R. 1996, 7(3), E44 
935 In Pierre v. Pacific Press Ltd, [1994] 7 W.W.R. 579 (B.C.C.A.), the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
considered Pacific Press's argument that the claimant's wrongful publicity claim was too complex for a jury 
trial. Pacific Press intended to raise at trial the argument that the publicity aspect of British Columbia's 
statutory privacy tort was inoperative, in light of the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the 
Charter. (at 594). 
936 It is necessary to recall that the rights guaranteed by the Charter apply directly to legislation including 
Quebec's Civil Code (which is, after all, enacted by statute). The Charter does not apply directly to the 
common law, but impacts indirectly upon the common law through the "Charter values" interpretative 
approach. See R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 603 
937 For example provincial privacy statutes and Quebec’s civil code 
938 Pierre above n.935 
939 Ibid at 594 
 
940 J. Craig, & N. Nolte, ‘Privacy And Free Speech In Germany And Canada: Lessons For An English 
Privacy Tort’, E.H.R.L.R. 1998, 2, 162 
941 Ibid at 162 
942 Canadian Charter of Rights 
943 Aubry above n.931 
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In summary one general privacy tort exists within Manitoba, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan.944 Whilst 
British Columbia has a tort that is actionable without proof of damage and is available to prohibit 
unauthorised appropriation of a person's name or portrait for the purpose of advertising or promoting the 
sale or trading in, property or services.945 
(c) Appropriation of personality 
(i) Introduction 
The courts have recognised that a person,946 "has a proprietary right in the exclusive marketing for gain of 
his personality, image and name, and that the law entitles him to protect that right if it is invaded".947 The 
primary vehicle for protecting personality and publicity interests in common law jurisdictions is the tort of 
"appropriation of personality." The tort exists largely in response to the failure of passing off to provide an 
adequate remedy for unauthorised uses of an individual's persona948 and is based on taking the 
commercial magnetism of an individual without paying for it.949 
(ii) Tort of Appropriation of personality 
The tort was first recognised by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Limited 
(1973).950 According to Estey J.A., a professional athlete has a commercial property right with regard to his 
photograph or likeness when used in advertisements. He continued stating no cause of action is available if 
the photograph does not suggest an endorsement of the product but merely illustrates the sport in which 
the athlete participated. 
In developing the tort of appropriation of personality, the Ontario Court of Appeal expressly recognised: 
1 a tort of this nature was contemplated within Commonwealth common law, being derived from the 
source of all new torts, the seminal proceeding of "the action on the case;"951 
2 a specific comparison of the tort with "an action for trover952 or conversion in its modern form; 
and"953 
                                                   
944 See Privacy Act, R.S.M. ch. P-125, § 3(c) (1987) (Can.); Privacy Act, Nfld. R.S. ch. P-22, § 4(c) (1990) 
(Can.); and Privacy Act, R.S.S. ch. P-24, § 3(c) (1978) (Can.). 
945 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 373 § 3(1) (1996) (Can.). This section provides detailed provisions concerning 
identification of the claimant and an intent "to exploit" by the defendant. Id. §§ 3(2)-(3). Furthermore, it 
includes defenses relating to news reporting and incidental usages of the name or portrait. Id. § 3(4). The 
provision is limited to a "name" or "portrait." The term "portrait" is defined as: "mean[ing] a likeness, still or 
moving, and includes a likeness of another deliberately disguised to resemble the claimant, and a 
caricature." Id. § 3(5). This definition would seem to exclude "sound-alikes" and the use of a model who 
"naturally" resembles the claimant. 
946 R. Howell, ‘Character Merchandising: The Marketing Potential Attaching to a Name, Image, Persona or 
Copyright Work’, 6 Intell. Prop. J. 197 (1991) (Can.). at 218; so far the tort is limited to human characters 
947 Athans above n.907 at 435. The Jamaican Court adopted a similar approach in Bob Marley Foundation v. 
Dino Michelle Limited [1994] Supreme Court No. CLR 115 of 1992 
948 H. Carty above n.12 
 
949 Krouse above n. 735; Athans above n.907 
950 Krouse ibid at 15  
951 Ibid at 27 




3 a favourable comparison of the tort with the American principle of "Right of Publicity", although with 
the acknowledgement that such a proceeding had not in itself yet been recognised in Canada or 
UK.954 
The development followed upon the tort of passing off being found inapplicable as the parties were not in a 
relationship that would cause public confusion955 as to an "association" between them.956 Instead, the 
court's reference to an "endorsement" factor may be seen as part of establishing "a threshold issue 
establishing a sufficient degree of nexus before the defendant can be said to have culpably appropriated 
the claimant's personality."957 
The courts have, marked out factors analogous to the right of publicity in the US, including: 
1 the claimant must be identified in the depiction or other indicia;958 
2 the defendant's use of the claimant's persona should be more than incidental or de minimis;959 
3 there is no express requirement of an intent to misappropriate;960 
4 there must be damage;961 and 
5 there cannot be a public interest in publication that would counter any misappropriation action.962 
The potential defences to the tort of appropriation of personality are discussed in greater detail below. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
953 Krouse above n.735 at 27 
954 Ibid at 23,24,27 and 31  
955 Ibid at 25-26; R. Howell, ‘The Common law Appropriation of Personality Tort’, 2 Intell. Prop. J. 149,(1986) 
(Can.) at 170-1 
956 S. Boyd above n.675 
957 R. Howell above n.955 at 170 
958 Joseph v Daniels [1986] 4 B.C.L.R.2d at 244; Krouse, above n.735 at 29-30; J. McCarthy, above n.587 at 
§ 4.15[A]  
959 This element is also a prerequisite or "threshold" issue for the right of publicity proceeding in the United 
States; R. Howell, ‘Personality Rights: A Canadian Perspective: Some Comparisons With Australia’, 1 Intell. 
Prop. J. 212, 218 (1990) (Austl.). Similarly, proceedings under provincial privacy statutes, require an 
intention "to exploit." See Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 373, § 3(2) (Can.); Privacy Act, R.S.M. ch. P-125, § 3(c) 
(1987) (Can.); Privacy Act, R.S.S. ch. P-24, § 3(c) (1978) (Can.); see also Privacy Act, Nfld. R.S. ch. P-22, § 
4(c) (1990) (Can.). 
960 Though all current cases in Canada have involved intentional conduct 
961 For the extent to which damage may be implied or to which equitable unjust enrichment may be 
applicable in this context, see R. Howell above n.955 at 179-86. See also supra text accompanying note 46, 
concerning the remedy of unjust enrichment for right of publicity violations in the US under Zacchini, above 
n.658 
962 The need for a "public interest" exception to preclude an application of the tort was expressly recognized 
in Krouse, above n.735 at 30, but without providing any detail as to how a public interest would relate to the 
propriety interest in publicity.  An appropriate analogy can be drawn with developments in the right of 
publicity proceeding in the US; R. Howell, Important Aspects of Canadian Law and Canadian Legal Systems 
and Institutions of Interest to Law Librarians and Researchers in Law Libraries, in Law Libraries in Canada: 
Essays to Honour Diana M. Priestly 42-48 (J.N. Fraser ed., 1988). at 192-96; above n.981 at 226-27. 
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Shortly after Krouse was Athans v Canadian Adventures Company Ltd (1977)963 where a well-known water-
skier, sued Canadian Adventure Camps for misappropriation of his image. The camps used a photograph of 
Athans to create a line drawing in their advertising materials.964 The Ontario High Court determined that 
those individuals involved in creating the line drawing were aware that the photograph was a distinctive 
image of Athans, easily recognisable by those familiar with water-skiing.965 
After examining the photograph and the drawing, the court concluded that the distinctive nature of the 
photograph was preserved in the drawing.966 The court held that the image's use in the drawing without 
consent was an infringement on his exclusive right to market his personality.967 The decision was 
distinguished from Krouse by stating that the defendant in Krouse did not target a particular athlete's 
personality, but merely intended to depict an anonymous football player as part of a promotional 
campaign.968 The court concluded that an action based on the infringement of one's personality is distinct 
from an action based on trademark or copyright law.969 In the case, passing off was not demonstrated, the 
court found that the use of the image was an infringement of his exclusive right to market his own 
personality. Henry J found that the defendants were liable for the tort of appropriation of personality and 
damages were quantified at the level of a reasonable licence fee had permission been sought. This led to 
the new tort being recognised and was subsequently accepted in a number of cases.970 
A common link between this tort and that of passing off971 is a requirement of public confusion. For example 
in the case of the sale of unofficial T-shirts of Crocodile Dundee,972 the public973 were found to be in all 
likelihood buying the goods assuming them to be official merchandise and in fair expectation that quality 
standards would be higher. Over time, the courts have developed various tests to determine whether a 
claimant endorsed the defendant's product or business, but difficulties remained in establishing the requisite 
level of association.974 
The tort of appropriation of personality has continued to develop as shown in Gould Estate v. Stoddart 
Publishing Co. (1996),975 Horton v. Tim Donut Ltd. (1997),976 and Shaw v. Berman (1997)977. These cases 
                                                   
963 Athans above n.907 
964 Ibid at 584 
965 Ibid at 589 
966 Ibid at 588 
967 Ibid at 595 
968 Ibid at 593 
969 Ibid at 595 
970 Racine v C.J.R. Radio Capitale Ltd [1977] 17 O.R. (2d) 370; Heath v Weist-Barron School of T.V. Ltd 
[1981] 34 O.R. (2) 126; Dowell v Mengen Institute [1983] 72 C.P.R. (2d) 238 
971 For a leading Canadian passing off case see National Hockey League v Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd (1992) 
70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 27, where the court found that a disclaimer was enough to remove any confusion 
972 Paramount Pictures v Howley (1992) 39 C.P.R. (3d) 419 (Van Camp J.) 
973 The public was not just point of sale consumers but also trade retailers 
974 R. Howell above n.959 at 154 (setting out various tests including: "endorsing," "quality control," 
"association," and "authorizing or approving"). 
975 Gould Estate v Stoddart Publishing Co. [1996] 30 O.R.3d 520 (Ont. G.D.) (Can.) (holding that the 
publisher and author of a book about the claimant did not appropriate his personality in light of the fact that 
he was a famous Canadian pianist). 
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first introduced the issue of a public interest limit upon protection of personalities and the descendibility of 
personality rights.978 Each case saw the appropriation of personality claim denied in favour of a public 
interest in the use of the claimant's identity. 
(d) Defences 
(i) Unrecognisable or de minimis 
There is a strict requirement that the claimant must be identifiable from the depiction or indicia as shown in 
Joseph v Daniels (1986),979 where the use of only the model's torso was sufficient to avoid identification of 
the claimant. 
In Krouse980 the court took this requirement further by finding in favour of the defendant even though the 
claimant was clearly depicted, the court ruled that the aim of the poster was to exploit the game of football 
rather than the claimant. McCarthy discusses the "identification" requirement and provided a number of 
examples to illustrate that the courts had been prepared to established identification from not merely direct 
indicia but also from the whole of the circumstances of presentation such as captions and accompanying 
commentary.981 
The courts established in Krouse and Pacific Press that there must be a degree of usage of the person's 
persona that constitutes a "culpable" taking. This requirement has been similar to that of Australia and 
requires an embedded, rather than mere, caricature of the person before the court will find the necessary 
culpable taking.982 
(ii) Public Interest defence 
Gould Estate provides a complete analysis of the public interest debate and presents the issue as "sales vs. 
subject." This reflects the distinction between appropriations primarily for commercial or merchandising 
purposes, where public interest in publication cannot displace the proprietary claim of the celebrity, and 
those that are closer in nature to reporting of facts, ideas and newsworthy events, where the public interest 
in publication has greater weight.983 
                                                                                                                                                                        
976 Horton v Tim Donut Ltd., [1997] 75 C.P.R.3d 451 (Ont. G.D.), aff'd, No. C26845 (Ont. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 
1997) (Can.) (holding that the appropriation of personality tort did not allow the widow of a famous hockey 
player to enjoin the use of a picture of the player where the defendant had acquired the rights previously).  
977 Shaw v Berman [1997] 72 C.P.R.3d 9, 18 (Ont. G.D.) (Can.) (holding that the tort of appropriation of 
personality arises only where the claimant's identity is commercially exploited but does not arise where the 
claimant is the actual subject of the defendant's work). 
978 The Civil Code in Quebec may well enable an estate or next of kin to bring proceedings for the violation 
of an interest with respect to the deceased. Civil Code, S.Q. ch. 64 (1991) (Can.). 
979 Joseph above n.958 at 244 
980 Krouse, above n.735 at 29-30 
981 J. McCarthy, above n.587at § 4.15[A] 
982 It is suggested that the "endorsement" factor in Krouse, above n.735; See Pacific Dunlop, above n.814 at 
43-44 (Austl.); R. Howell above n. 959 at 218. Similarly, proceedings under provincial privacy statutes, 
require an intention "to exploit. 
 
983 Gould Estate above n.975 at 526-27; Shaw above n.977 (following Gould Estate in the context of the 
American celebrity Artie Shaw and the making of a documentary film of his life); Horton above n.976 at 451. 
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Support for the "sales vs. subject" distinction is found in British Columbia's statutory cause of action for use 
of "the name or portrait of another."984 To be actionable, the usage must be primarily for the defendant's 
benefit, as opposed to the reporting of "current or historical events or affairs, or other matters of public 
interest."985 The unauthorised publication of the photographic biography in Gould Estate, for example, was 
found to have met the public interest test by providing a "glimpse into Gould's solitary life" and "knowing 
more about one of Canada's musical geniuses."986 
(iii) Unintentional infringement 
Unintentional infringement is no defence, as shown in Bogajewicz987 where images purchased from an 
agency in good faith, with all necessary consents of those depicted thought to have been purchased with it. 
These images were then used in the defendant's promotional material. 
(e) Descendibility 
The issue of inheritability was discussed in the case of Gould,988 in which 14 years after Mr Gould's death 
the defendants published a book containing an interview and photographs taken 40 years previously. In 
addition to Athans989 and Krouse990 the court sought help from the British Columbia case of Joseph.991 The 
court held that the right of publicity was inheritable, however the case failed as it fell under the 
informational, artistic or newsworthy exception which is protected as a freedom of expression.992 
Only two cases in the common law jurisdictions have involved the assertion of personality rights by the 
estate of a deceased celebrity.993 In Gould Estate, the court found that Gould's publicity rights were 
descendible and enforceable by the estate, subject to the public interest in publication. The court's 
reasoning was threefold: 
1 the court drew a distinction between privacy and publicity interests, noting that whereas privacy 
interests are non-descendible or non-inheritable because of their nature as personal interests "in 
dignity and peace of mind," publicity interests, by contrast, are descendible or inheritable as property 
rights;994 
2 the court avoided a "durational limit" on the inheritance, noting that "Gould passed away in 1982, 
and it seems reasonable to conclude that whatever the durational limit, if any, it is unlikely to be less 
than 14 years"; and995 
                                                   
984 Privacy Act 1996 s.3 
985 See Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. ch. 373, § 3(4), (5) (1996); R. Howell above n.959 at 196. 
986 Gould Estate above n.975 at 527. 
987 Bogajewicz above n.925 
988 Gould Estate above n.975 at 520 
989 Athans above n.907 
990 Krouse above n.735 
991 Joseph above n.958 
992 The Court followed the same approach as its US counterparts 
993 Gould Estate above n.975 at 520; Horton above n.976 at 451. 




3 the court found statutory preclusion of descendibility of personality rights under provincial Privacy 
Acts in British Columbia, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan to be inconsequential. Reasoning that 
because statutory actions were separate from common law proceedings, being the creation of 
legislatures, they could be limited as any legislature sees fit.996 
Furthermore, because provincial statutory rights of action are found in the Privacy Acts, whatever statutory 
restrictions there may be on rights of action for privacy violations and unauthorised use of personality should 
not be applied to the common law tort of appropriation of personality.997 In British Columbia, s.3 of the 
Privacy Act covering the use of "the name or portrait of another" is a tort separate from the general statutory 
tort of "privacy." This is consistent with Joseph,998 where the Supreme Court viewed s.3 of the Privacy Act as 
available in addition to the common law tort.999 There are current only 14 states that recognise a post-
mortem right.1000 
(f) Summary 
Collins, argued that "Canada has employed the tort of 'misappropriation of personality' as the primary 
method of protecting the publicity rights of celebrities". However the tort is still in the process of evolving in 
particular there is still debate as to whether it only applies to advertising and the promotion of goods or 
services through endorsement. Commentators have drawn distinctions between the use of a personality to 
promote a product and presentation of the personality as the subject of the product itself1001 the so-called 
"sales vs. subject" debate. Its evolution to bridge gaps left under passing off looks likely to continue into the 
next decade. 
(g) Conclusion 
The privacy laws within Canada have been established despite have no explicit right to privacy under the 
Constitution. The balance of common, civil and statutory law has resulted in a wide ranging and effective 
privacy laws. The laws are designed and implemented to protect the dignitary aspects of an individual rather 
than to be an additional way for a celebrity to protect their commercial value. The law has not yet examined 
the potential extension of the privacy laws to account for publicity aspects or how these would need to be 
balanced in conjunction with the freedom of the press. 
In order to protect publicity or personality issues the tort of appropriation of personality is the most common 
cause of action cited. However, commentators1002 believe that the courts must address important issues 
within this tort, such as how to balance this tort with the public interest in publication and free expression, as 
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999 Ibid at 243-6; R. Howell above n.962 at 190-92 (noting British Columbia to be the only jurisdiction that 
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well as the descendibility of personality rights. It is expected that as the tort will develop and take on more 
similarities with the US right of publicity. 
A grey area with the tort is whether it will in addition apply to privacy cases.1003 Carty argued1004 that the tort 
is further complicated by uncertainty surrounding a public interest defence and the apparent widening of the 
scope of the tort of passing off in more recent cases such as Pepsi-Cola Canada.1005 Where passing off was 
made out where the unauthorised use indicated the product was approved, authorised or endorsed by the 
celebrity, a much wider view of the tort than that accepted in Krouse or Athans. Such a development, she 
argued, calls into question the very purpose of the tort of appropriation of personality.1006 
2.8 Overall Conclusion of common law jurisdictions 
The common law countries examined above all offer extensive protections against invasions of privacy and 
publicity but each seeks to protect these rights in a different way. The US has created three main 
protections, namely the right to privacy, right to publicity and the Lanham Act. The scope of these rights is 
significant, as exemplified in the Vanna White decision discussed above. The remedies available are also 
more effective than those available in Australia or Canada due to the availability of compensatory or punitive 
damages. The protection under freedom of expression is significant within all three countries but is more 
prominent in the US due to the greater case law concerning the issue. 
Australia has sought to rely on similar actions to the UK, with the exception of the TPA, and has shown a 
greater willingness to develop this actions more quickly than in the UK as shown in passing off. The 
Australian courts have like the UK not yet awarded compensatory damages preferring to rely upon a lost 
licence fee valuation for passing off and damages for mental distress under breach of confidence actions. 
Canada has adopted the a specific tort of appropriation in order to protect personality rights but there is still 
a significant debate as to whether the courts have yet fully decided if privacy issues will also fall under the 
tort. The extent of the tort as to whether it covers endorsement, a similar question as faced the UK courts in 
Irvine, has yet to be conclusive decided. The tort will continue to develop and the balancing act between 
protection and the public interest is one which the courts will be faced with on a case by case basis. Like the 
personality rights in the UK and US the protections afforded by the tort are descendible. 
CHAPTER 3 
3 Examination of civil law jurisdictions 
The paper will now examine the protections available under three civil law jurisdictions, France, Italy and 
Germany. This will enable an analysis of different legal jurisdictions approach to the protection of 
personality. 
3.1 France 
(a) Introduction and rationale behind existing laws 
The paper examines the sources and rationale behind the existing privacy and publicity laws within France 
before highlighting issues such as the availability of damages and defences. The section on France then 
examines questions concerning the descendibility and transferability of the privacy and publicity rights. 
                                                   
1003 R. Howell above n.955 at 238 (videotape of unemployed men discussing employment). 
1004 H. Carty above n.12 at 209 
1005 National Hockey above n.971 at 401 
 
1006 R. Howell above n.959 at 501: "if the passing off tort in Canada evolves to encompass the Australian 
Hogan test [on which see below] in the area of character merchandising, the scope and purpose of the tort 
of appropriation of personality would need to be considered". 
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Within France there has been a resistance to adopting a right of publicity such as is present in the US, and 
what little effort there has been has been the result of the judiciary rather than the politicians. The courts 
have however through the 'droit a l'image' (right of image) turned what was initially a negative right, i.e. 
enabling prohibition of unauthorised uses, into a positive right enabling the recovery of damages. The 
content of personality rights under French law, are generally considered in a negative light, i.e. the right to 
prohibit the production and distribution of an individual's likeness without the subject's consent, the 
jurisprudence has nevertheless exposed several exceptions to the exercise of this right. 
Prior to the twentieth century French law had seen the right of image as one of a bundle of rights normally 
described as 'personality rights,'1007 which traditionally in France have been viewed as an extension of a 
one's personality.1008 The right of image was initially seen as a minor personality right and was treated as a 
spin off of, the right of privacy. This changed in the twentieth century with the adoption of international rules 
and standards, which placed a greater focus on an individual's protection of privacy and dignity.1009 
There are two theories as to why the French right of image has developed as it has, the first is the protection 
from unwanted exposure embodies a privacy interest. This has been called the right to image, and flows 
from the difficulty in placing a value on a personal right, but also recognises the importance of non alienation 
of a personal attribute or the ex-patrimonial nature of the right.1010 The opposing argument is that the right 
also embodies the protection of a marketable asset, in order to enable compensation to be paid for its use 
and has been called the right of image.1011 It is these conflicting interests that have been a key factor in the 
resistance in France of the recognition of such a right.1012 Traditionally the right of image and right to image 
have been seen as part of a number of "personality rights" in France along with the moral rights of authors 
and the right to protect one's honour and reputation.1013 The right of image was at least initially treated as an 
off shoot from the right of privacy, as was the case in the United States. 
The battle between the two viewpoints, the wider concept of right of image and the right to image, was 
brought before the courts in Les Editions du Sand & Pascuito v Kantor (1996)1014 where the court held that 
the right of image is a personality right that entitles the holder to oppose a dissemination and use of their 
image without prior consent. The violation of this right may cause moral and economic damage when the 
holder conferred commercial value to their image as a result their notoriety. Traditionally the decisions on a 
right of image have involved celebrities for whom their image is an essential feature of their career. Although 
the courts have failed to award substantial damages in any of these cases.1015 Logeais highlighted that 
                                                   
1007 J. Hauch, ‘Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis Tort Is Alive and Well and 
Flourishing in Paris,’ 68 TUL.L.REV. 1219, (1994) 
1008 Ibid at 1228-9 
1009 Two prominent examples are; Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Human Being and the Citizen 
1948 Art 12; European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Art 8 
1010 This view is discussed in length in B. Edelman, ‘Sketch of a Subject’s Theory, Man and his Image,’ 
D.1970, Chron. 120; E. Gaillard, ‘The Dual Nature of the Right of Image and the consequences on French 
Positive Rights’, D. 1984, Chron. 161 
1011 The alternative view is discussed in D. Acquarone, ‘The Ambiguity of the Right of Image’, D. 1985, 
Chron. 129; M. Serna, ‘The images of people and goods’, D. 1997, Chron. 100 
1012 E. Logeais & J. Schroeder, ‘The French Right of Image: An ambiguous concept protecting the human 
persona’, 18 Loy. L.A. Ent L.J. 1998, 511 at 512 
1013 J. Hauch above n.1007 at 1228 
1014 Les Editions du Sand & Pascuito v Kantor, CA Paris, Sept. 10, 1996, R.D.P.I., n.68 
1015 E. Logeais above n.1012 at 517  
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personality rights' are, under French law, fundamental rights attached to the persona of the human being, 
intended to protect non-patrimonial attributes or manifestations of the person.1016 
(b) Sources of protection and rights under French law 
Predominately statutory protection, for unauthorised use of one's image, is found under the French Civil and 
Penal Codes. However, it is only in very rare circumstances that the misappropriation of an image will be an 
action brought before the criminal courts. Although not used as often as civil actions there is protection 
under the Criminal Code and most notably under art.226(1), which states that there is the possibility of 
punishment on anyone who intrudes on the intimacy of another's private life by either: 
1 capturing, recording or transmitting words pronounced in private or in confidence without the 
author's consent; or 
2 fixing, recording or transmitting, through any device, the image of a person in a private place, 
without consent 
Further protection is available under art.L226(8) which criminalises the printing of knowingly false stories or 
the printing of manipulated images of a person without the person's consent, whenever the false nature is 
not obvious or clearly indicated in the publication.1017 In order to pursue an action under the Criminal Code 
the action must be brought within three years; the following must also be proved: 
1 an intent to take or to disseminate the image, although a showing of wilful indiscretion is not 
required; and 
2 that the image was taken on private property.1018 
(c) Privacy1019 
The right of privacy was not explicitly included in the French Constitution of 1958. Although privacy actions 
have been available since 19th Century, courts have taken a strict approach to invasion of privacy rights.1020 
The privacy tort is well established in French law and is contained within art.9 of the Civil Code.1021 
Traditionally, according to Picard1022 the courts have tried to avoid allowing every aspect of public figures to 
                                                   
1016 E. Logeais, ‘The French Right to One’s image – A Legal Lure’, Ent L.R. 1994, 163  
1017 Prince Rainier III v Voici, T.G.I. Paris, 17e ch., Correct., Mar. 6, 1997,  
1018 Ibid although French case law is littered with examples that appear to complicate the definition such as 
Foulon Pigianiol, where a beach with private and paying access was held to be a public place CA Paris, 
Mar. 11, 1971, D. 1971, 71 
1019 H. Delany and C. Murphy, ‘Towards common principles relating to the protection of privacy rights? An 
analysis of recent developments in England and France and before the European Court of Human Rights’ 
E.H.R.L.R 2007, 568 
1020 Therond. Cass. Crim., October 20, 1998, note of Pelletier (Semaine Juridique II 1999 p.474); Decision of 
the Cour D'Appel of Paris, February 27, 1967 involving Brigitte Bardot in which the judge stated that “the 
rights an individual has over his own image must not exclude show business artists or public figures”. 
In Société Mail Newspapers Plc v Prince X, Cass. Civ., October 3, 1990, it was reiterated that “[e]ach and 
every person, irrespective of rank, birth, wealth, current or future position, has a right to privacy. 
1021 Introduced by The Law of July 17, 1970 Law No. 70-643  
1022 Picard, ‘The Right to Privacy in French Law’, in Markesinis (ed) Protecting Privacy (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 
49 at 54 
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be open to the public.1023 Privacy law within France applies to the same extent to both individual's and public 
persons and celebrities. 
The ECHR was ratified in France in 1974,1024 although the courts have traditionally been reluctant to refer to 
the Convention in their judgements, although this is now changing. This can be seen through recent case 
law in particular Editions Plon v France (2006),1025 Fressoz v France (2001)1026 and Prisma Presse v France 
(2003).1027 
In 1995 the Constitutional Court ruled that the right of privacy was implicit in the Constitution,1028  by stating 
that the freedom proclaimed in art.2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 17891029 implies 
the respect of privacy.1030 The tort of privacy was first recognised in France as far back as 18581031 and was 
added to the Civil Code in 1970.1032 In France, personality rights are based on dignitary rather than 
commercial concerns although the exercise of the rights can have commercial implications. An invasion of 
privacy would violate art.9 of the Civil Code1033 which states: 
 "Everyone has a right to respect for his personal life. In addition to the awarding of 
damages, orders such as sequestration and attachment can be granted, to prevent or stop 
an invasion of privacy."1034 
The right to privacy entitles anyone, irrespective of rank, birth, fortune or present or future office, to oppose 
the dissemination of their picture without their express permission. This ensures that everyone enjoys an 
exclusive right to their image, as being a feature of their personality, whereby they may agree or not to the 
reproduction of the said image and refuse its dissemination, the same applies to their surname, forename or 
signature. 
While France began with a strong right to privacy, created through legislation and case law the ECHR has 
caused a lessening of these protections in favour of an increase to the protection of freedom of 
                                                   
1023 H. Delany above n.1019 
1024 France ratified the ECHR in 1974 (Law No. 73-1227 authorising the ratification of the ECHR and 
additional protocols 1, 3, 4 and 5, December 31, 1973, Official Journal January 3, 1974, published pursuant 
to Decree No. 74-360, Official Journal May 4, 1974), Blackburn and Polakiewicz (eds),Fundamental Rights 
in Europe: The European Convention on Human Rights and its Member States 1950-2000 (Oxford: OUP, 
2000), Ch.13. 
1025 Editions Plon v France (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 36. 
1026 Fressoz v France (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 2. 
1027 Pisma Presse v France (Application No.71612/01), decision of July 1, 2003. 
1028 Décision 94-352DC du Conseil constitutionnel du 18 Janvier 1995. available at <http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1994/94352dc.htm>. 
1029 Declaration des droits l’homme et du citoyen de 1789 
1030 Décision 99-416DC du Conseil constitutionnel 23 July 1999. http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/1999/99416/index.htm 
1031 The Rachel affaire. Judgment of June 16, 1858, Trib. pr. inst. de la Seine, 1858 D.P. III 62; above 
n.1026 
1032 Civil Code, Article 9, Statute No. 70-643, 17 July 1970 
1033 Article 22 of the Statute of July 17, 1970 incorporated into Article 9 of the French Civil Code this right 
1034 Civil Code (1977), Article 9, speaks of an "atteinte à l'intimité de la vie privée" which translates as an 
"attack on the intimacy of one's private life"  
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expression.1035 The most high profile case was Editions Plan, which related to an injunction restraining the 
distribution of a book concerning the health of Francois Mitterand entitled 'Le Grand Secret.' The court ruled 
that the more time that had passed the greater emphasis would be placed on public interest than protection 
of privacy and medical confidentiality. Therefore the injunction constituted a violation of freedom of 
expression under art.10 of the ECHR.1036 
The French courts have recently placed greater emphasis on art.101037 rights although this evolution has 
been more gradual than in the UK. The Thonon des Bains1038 case shows the more balanced views of the 
court between art.10 of the ECHR and Art.9 of the Civil Code.1039 The case related to the now President 
Nicolas Sarkozy and articles published in Le Matin concerning his martial difficulties. The court found that 
the couple had previously courted public interest and thus the articles in part formed the object of legitimate 
public interest. The court however found that information such as details of the separation, the extra-martial 
affairs of Cecilia Sarkozy had no public value and were protected under art.9, the couple were awarded 
nominal damages for this. 
Dupré argues that art.8 of the ECHR inspired art.9 of the Civil Code although it is difficult to assess the 
impact of the ECHR on French privacy law as the courts rarely distinguish the two. Usually the courts focus 
on the balancing act between art.9 of the Civil Code and art.10 of the ECHR. The result of the ECHR has 
been to strengthen the use of art.10 and places the French privacy laws closer to the UK position.1040 
In addition to the Civil Code protections there are also protections under the Criminal Code specifically 
arts.226-1 and -8. Article 226-1 covers intrusions on the intimacy of an individual's private life by either 
capturing, recording, transmitting words pronounced in private or in confidence with consent in addition to 
fixing, recording or transmitting, through any device the image of an individual in a private place without 
consent.1041 As well as being subject to a fine an individual or a corporate entity who are found guilty of 
breaching the article can be imprisoned for up to one year. 
Article 226-8 criminalises the publication of a knowingly false story or manipulated images (where the 
falsehood is not obvious or clearly indicated) without consent. Any criminal action must be brought within 
three years and prove that there was an intent to take or disseminate the image and that the image was 
taken on private property. 
(d) Publicity 
The right of image (also referred to in articles as the right on one's image) was originally established by case 
law to prevent an unauthorised fixation or reproduction of an image, relying on invasion of privacy or 
damage to one's honour or reputation.1042 The right of image has since the latter half of the previous century 
                                                   
1035 K. Deringer, ‘Privacy and the Press: The convergence of British and French law in accordance with the 
European Convention of Human rights’, 22 Penn. St. Int’l L.R. 191, 2003 
1036 Contrast Plon above n.1025 with the admissibility decision in Prisma Presse above n.1027 
1037 Sté Cogedipresse et al. v Mme Marchand, Vve Erignac et al. Cass. Civ., December 20, 2000. 
1038 Although The Tribunal de Grande Instance is a Court of First Instance, inferior to the Cour d'Appel and 
the Cour de Cassation. 
1039 Nicolas S. v Journal Le Matin TGI Thonon des Bains, December 22, 2006 
1040 H. Delany above n.1019 at 578 
1041 Prince Rainier above n.1017 
1042 J. Hauch above n.1007 at 1237 
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emerged from being an off shoot of the right of privacy (right to image) into an independent right as 
illustrated in the case of Papillon, a case concerning a book recording a former criminal's life.1043 
The right of image is traditionally found in the French Civil Code, and particularly in art.1382 from which four 
principles have been extracted through case law: 
1 the medium which is used to reproduce or disseminate a person's image is not relevant;1044 
2 the court's have condemned the unauthorised use of a performing artist's fictitious name that reflects 
their personality;1045 
3 the person(s) must be recognisable in the reproduction of his or her image;1046 and 
4 consent must be clearly expressed for both the taking and the subsequent usage of a person's 
image.1047 
The principles show that the protections are wide in scope due to the fact that the medium used to 'exploit' 
the persona is not relevant. This offers protections over photographs, newspaper articles, books and film to 
name a few. The identities of persona that are covered include fictitious names and nicknames which shows 
the extent to which the scope of the rights that are held by an individual. The main requirement to bring a 
successful action under the Civil Code is that the individual must be recognisable in the image. There has 
not been enough case law to fully examine the lengths that the courts will be willing to accept whether an 
individual is recognisable. For example in Germany, Oliver Khan a famous German goalkeeper was found to 
be recognisable from a picture of his back, whether the courts in France would be as willing to accept such a 
decision is unclear. 
The requirement for consent both for the initial publication and for subsequent dissemination offers a 
stronger protection than is found under UK laws. Therefore even where an individual was willing to allow 
their image to be used in a certain way earlier in their career they could in theory prevent the republishing of 
the image once they had become more successful, and therefore maintain the 'market value'. 
If an obviously commercial value to an image exists, then economic damage may arise. However, in the 
absence of this, the pre-existing privacy based personality right is still available to individuals and criminal 
sanctions can apply where the person's image is captured in a private setting.1048 
Article 9 Criminal Code also protects the commercial interests of celebrities,1049 as shown in case of Fabien 
Barthez who used the clause to claim damages for the reproduction of his name and likeness on 
                                                   
1043 T.G.I. Paris, ord. ref., Feb 27, 1970, II, 16293, note Lindon 
1044 For example a figurine doll in CA Versailles, June 30, 1994, D. 1995, 645, note Ravanas; and a cartoon 
character in a video game as in Phillippe Le Gallou v Fode Sylla, Jeu National Multimedia and the Front 
National, CA Versailles, Mar. 8, 1996, Gaz. Pal. 1996, 213  
1045 WS v Jourdain, Cass. 1e civ., Feb. 19, 1975, Ann. 199, 153, though protection may not extend to 
nicknames which are given by others, whereas fictitious names are usually unique and chosen by the 
person 
1046 Epoux Lavergne v R. Doisneau and Francois Bornet v R. Doisneau (Hotel de Ville case) T.G.I. Paris, 1 e 
ch., June 2 1993, Gaz. Pal. 1994, 16; also commented above n.1033; In well known persons it can be 
enough that their image is invoked or conjured up as shown in Pieplu v. Regie Francaise de Publicite, T.G.I. 
Paris, Dec 3, 1975, D. 1977, 211  
1047 Beatrice Dalle v RCS France, T.G.I. Paris, Mar. 6, 1996 
1048 The relatives of Francois Mitterand objected to photographs being taken without their knowledge, and 
subsequently published in a major magazine, of the recently deceased President at home, in bed; CA Paris, 
11e ch., July 2, 1997, D.1997, 596 
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underpants.1050 The availability of protections under the Criminal Code offers a stronger deterrent against 
unauthorised exploitation of an individual's persona, due to the remedies that are available to the court. For 
example under art.226 of the code the court can impose a custodial sentence on an infringer. 
The principles described above show how French publicity protection has developed through both case law 
and legislation. As stated above the medium used in reproducing the image is not relevant as shown 
through case law covering dolls and cartoon characters. The simplicity of the wording "any person who 
performs an act that harms another person must compensate the other for the harm caused by that act", 
grants the courts the power to use a wide range of protections, which can be updated as new situations 
arise. For example the increased media interest on the internet of famous sporting and political celebrities 
was not an area that the code was drafted to protect but the fundamental intention of the article was to grant 
protections for acts both within and outside of the immediate contemplation at its creation. 
If within France there was to be a recognition of a subjective dualist right enabling control of the use of 
one's image then there would be certain advantages.1051 
1 it would facilitate and make more secure contractual deals involving someone's image; 
2 the victim would more easily prove infringement of his right to exploit his image, with no need to 
claim invasion of privacy as well; 
3 it would account for existing case law on celebrities' images and for the status of professional 
models; and 
4 the law governing international disputes arising out of the right to the image would be determined as 
for copyright.1052 
In support of his theory, Gaillard1053 relied upon a similar precedent construction which is the "droit d'auteur' 
which, under French law, enjoys a moral and patrimonial dimension. Likewise, according to him, the right to 
the image is dual and its enforcement by French case law reveals striking similarities with the "droit 
d'auteur'. 
This approach parallels the views of McCarthy,1054 who stated that undoubtedly, the law today would be 
more coherent if it had developed in such a way that the courts could recognise a sui generis legal right 
similar to a "right of identity' with damages measured by both mental distress and commercial loss. 
As discussed below there are safeguards to the protections granted, which are more wide ranging than in 
the UK e.g. the level of consent required. Additional defences are similar to those available within the UK 
such as freedom of speech and newsworthiness. There is no doubt now that under French law there is an 
exclusive right to protect their image from unauthorised use or dissemination, but although initially conceived 
as a spin off from privacy rights there is now a right of image enabling an individual to profit on the image 
itself. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
1049 Brigitte Bardot v Beaverbrook Ltd, Semaine Juridique 1966, No. 14521; Catherine Deneuve, D. 1976, 
291 (14.5.1975) 
1050 F. Ponthieu, ‘France: Sport – Right to protection of your own image’, (2001) 12(6) Ent L.R. 59  
1051 E. Gaillard, above n.1029 
1052 Berne Convention 
1053 Gaillard, above n.1010 
 
1054 J. McCarthy above n.587 at 1.11, quoted by O. Goodenough, in ‘Pointillism, Copyright and the Droit 
d'Auteur: Time to See a Bigger Picture', [1994] 2 Ent. L.R. 
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(e) Defences and damages 
(i) Consent 
The necessary consent mentioned above must take place prior to the taking of a picture if in a private 
context, and prior to the disclosure of the image to the public, 1055 even when taken in a public setting.1056 
The consent must come from the subject of the photograph, unless they are a minor in which case the 
consent must be from a parental authority.1057 In respect of prior consent for the subsequent use of an image 
that has previously been reproduced, the courts rely on the circumstances to infer a kindred personal right to 
protect,1058 as well as utilising the questionable distinction between private and public places, which is 
discussed in greater detail below. 
Even when the individual is a public figure consent is still required subject to the newsworthiness exception 
below. Where the exception is not proven then prior consent is also required where the enforcement of the 
individual's personality rights outweighs the public interest.1059 The scope of any publicity campaign must be 
known and the person must consent to the extent of which the image will be used in the said campaign.1060 
The French courts have asserted that a general waiver of the right of image for future use is not inferred 
from previous tolerations of past use of one's image.1061 Although, despite this the courts may be more 
reluctant to order seizure or enjoin publication where the claimant has had a nonchalant attitude to the 
publication of their image.1062 Though the claimant can still seek and recover damages for this unauthorised 
use. 
(ii) Likeness 
Physical likeness receives protection, in addition to photographic image. This was shown in Depardieu v 
Suchard (1984)1063 where Gerard Depardieu won his action against a well-known chocolate manufacturer 
which used a British actor, who physically resembled the star, as a look alike in their advert without his 
consent.1064 However the likeness must be to the person themselves and not a character they have 
portraying, unlike in Australia as shown in the Crocodile Dundee cases. Catherine Deneuve posed as 
"Marianne", the symbol of the French Revolution, for a sculptor. A photograph of the bust accompanied an 
advert for unconnected goods. She failed in her action because the court considered that the advert 
reproduced "Marianne", as inspired by the actress' face but not Ms Deneuve's herself. Consequently, the 
public could not have been confused into thinking she had endorsed the goods.1065 
                                                   
1055 [Valery Giscard] d’Estaing v M.Ways, T.G.I. Nancy, October 22, 1976, JCP 1977, II, 18526, where the 
President prevented the sale of a card game in which he was depicted as the King. 
1056 Daniel Ducruet v Prisma Presse, T.G.I. Nanterre, ord. ref., Aug. 24, 1996 
1057 T.P.I. Poitiers, Oct 21, 1935, D.H. 1936, 45 
1058 Serge July, Ste Nvelle de Presse et Communication v Amar Tamarat, CA Paris, May 3, 1989, C.D.A., 
273 
1059 Ste de Presse Jours de France v L’imperatrice Farah Diba, Civ. 1ere, Apr. 13, 1988, J.C.P. 1989, 21219 
1060 D. Bedingfield above n.674 
1061 Soc. Presse Office v Sachs, Civ. 2e, Jan. 1971, D. 1971, 263 
1062 T.G.I. Paris, May 8, 1974, D. 1974, 530 
1063 [Gerard] Depardieu v Suchard T.G.I. Paris, October 17, 1984, D.1985, Somm. 324 
1064 Ibid 
1065 Deneuve, above n.1049 
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The claimant must be identifiable and must be recognisable. A model who appeared in Doisneau's famous 
photograph 'The Kiss of the Hotel de Ville' was unable to sue over reproduction of the image in a magazine, 
because her the photograph largely concealed her face.1066 It appears that French law requires use of the 
image or voice itself or a confusingly similar imitation, on the likely assumption that, in order to have 
misappropriation of the commercial value of a celebrity's image, the public must identify the celebrity and be 
misled as to his consent to the contentious commercial use of his image.1067 
The cause of action is not just limited to commercial exploitation of physical appearance. The human voice 
for instance falls within this protection. Unauthorised recordings of Maria Callas rehearsing in private were 
actionable,1068 as was the use of a sound alike of an actor's distinctive voice.1069 In relation to pseudonyms 
they are only protected against unlawful appropriation provided the person laying claim to such name can 
show both a continuous and well-known use in the same sector of activity and the existence of a risk of 
confusion liable to cause prejudice to him.1070 
(iii) Photographs taken in a public place 
Individuals are not just protected within enclosed spaces, but also against the intrusive nature of long-lens 
photography such as that employed in Bardot1071 and Schneider.1072 The French High Court defined a public 
place as being "a place which anybody can have access to without special authorisation, regardless of 
whether access is subject to some specific conditions, timetables or reasons."1073 If the subject of the image 
is taken in a public place then no prior express consent is required if: 
1 the photograph or other form of image does not focus on, or single out, the individual or individuals 
claiming the right of image; and 
2 the photographs must show the photographed person or persons engaged in public, rather than 
private activities.1074 
The defence that the photograph was taken in a public place is invalid if commercial use is made of the 
photographs rather than for newsworthy reasons. This is shown by the court's rationale in Rapho v UFC 
(1988)1075 when the court held that: 
"In such cases of publication, the photographed person is entitled to compensation only if their 
image is reproduced in an attempt to ridicule them or the caption of the photograph is 
                                                   
1066 Françoise Bornet v R. Doisneau GP 15 February 1994, 16. 
1067 E. Logeais above n.1012 
1068 T.G.I. Paris, 1982, D. 1983, 147 
1069 Epoux Above n.1046 
1070 Donia Trade Mark (Unreported) (Trib Comm (Paris)) (France);  Nomos (Paris), ‘France: Trade and 
Service Marks – Music – Stage names in the face of the Law of Trade Marks and Personality Rights in the 
Music Business’, Ent.L.R. 2003, 14(6), 66 
1071 Bardot, above n.1049 
1072 Rosa Biasini (Romy Schneider) v Societe Union des Editions modernes and Daniel Angeli, CA Paris, 
Semaine Juridique 1980, No. 19343 
1073 G. Levasseur, ‘Protection of the Person, the Image, and the Private Life (the Criminal Law)’, Gaz. Pal. 
996 (1994)  
1074 Paris, Feb. 27, 1981, Gaz. Pal. 1981. 
1075 Rapho v UFC, CA Paris, 1e ch. A, Sept. 27, 1988, Gaz. Pal. 1989 
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unpleasant or their features are used for commercial purposes from which it can be inferred 
that the person endorsed, for free or for a fee, the advertising use of their image."1076 
(iv) Damages1077 
Under French law exemplary damages are unknown, although the Civil Code allows recovery of damages, 
for physical or intangible loss (dommages moraux), on the basis of fault. In cases where damages are 
awarded, the defendant's fault may be taken into account in assessment of damages, and there are 
suggestions from academic commentators that dommages moraux can be justified on the basis of the 
punishment of the defendant.1078 
When concerned with the publication or distribution of the likeness of public figures, the judge may refer to a 
'going rate' award on the basis of lost earnings the same licence fee test used in the UK for passing off. At 
most this is the equivalent sum to what could have been paid contractually, in accordance with the principles 
of the allocation of damages by virtue of arts.1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code.1079 
Article 226-1 of the French Criminal Code allows in addition to an imprisonment of one year a fine of 
300,000 francs (approximately 45,000 euros) if there was a violation of an individual's privacy through 
"fixing, recording or transmitting, through any device, the image of person in a private place, without their 
consent." 
In addition to damages the Courts can and have awarded injunctions to prohibit the publication of 
unauthorised photographs,1080 as well as having the power to award delivery up of the offending 
photographs.1081 
(v) Freedom of speech and right to provide news information 
Article 10 of the ECHR establishes and promotes the freedom of speech and information.1082 The French 
Law on the Liberty of the Press, which is the backbone of the legal regulation of the press also provides for 
such freedoms.1083 
An individual who participates in events that are likely to fall under the legitimate public interest falls under 
the realm of public information, and therefore lose protection over their image, provided that privacy is still 
respected.1084 For the exception to take place, the photograph must be taken in circumstances directly linked 
to the events at stake or their factual consequences.1085 The use of the information therefore must be for 
                                                   
1076 Ibid 
1077 H. Trouille, ‘Private life and Public image: Privacy legislation in France’, 49 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 2000, 199 
1078 English Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 132, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary 
Damages, (1993) at para.4.19. See also R. David, English Law and French Law  (London: Stevens 1980) 
p.166: “the Courts will inevitably take into account the gravity of the fault committed, although French law 
professes to ignore the concept of vindictive or exemplary damages...” 
1079 M. Henry above n.889 at para. 11.123 
1080 Claire Chazal v Ste Angeli, SNC Prisma Press T.G.I. Nanterre, ord. ref., Aug 2, 1996 
1081 French Civil Procedure Code Article 145 N.C.P.C. 
1082 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
1083 Law on the Liberty of the Press, Law of July 29, 1881, art. 38, D.P.IV, 1881 
1084 T.G.I. Paris, Sept. 10, 1996, D. 1997, 
1085 T.G.I. Paris, July. 3, 1974, II, 17873. 
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genuine information purposes, and commercial use of the image will preclude the newsworthiness 
exemption,1086 although the Strasbourg Court did acknowledge the concept of commercial speech was 
protected under art.10.1087 
The Law of September 30, 1986 may legitimise restriction even where there is a public interest in the right to 
publish. The Law, which regulates audiovisual communication, expressly provides for the respect of human 
dignity.1088 While art.10(2) of the ECHR permits restrictions on free speech, which are "necessary in a 
democratic society ... for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence...." French case law 
such as the Bones of Dionysis, (1989)1089 recognised that art.10 places limits on protecting privacy 
interests.1090 
The French doctrine "finalité" places restrictions on the presses ability to publish images of individuals. 
Freedom of expression is enshrined in art.11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen - part 
of the corpus of constitutional law and in the ECHR. Publicly known facts and images of public figures are 
not generally protected,1091 although the use of an individual's image or personal history has been held 
actionable under French law,1092 as shown by the book Le Grand Secret about Francois Mitterand.1093 
(vi) Parody 
French case law is clear that no prior consent is required when using a person's image for parody,1094 and it 
is not for the court to determine whether the parody is in good taste or not. The courts have reasoned by 
analogy to the parody exception expressly provided under Copyright law1095 that a parody of a copyrighted 
work is a non-infringing use.1096 
Parody is a method of expressing and exercising one's freedom of speech and is seen as essential in a 
democratic society.1097 By its definition a parody is not a depiction of truth or reality,1098 and in order to 
qualify a parody must have a humorous,1099 non-offensive,1100 and informative purpose.1101 The parody 
exception does not extend to mocking of a person or persons associated with a trademark.1102 
                                                   
1086 Noah v Soc. Frse de Revues Team T.G.I. Paris, Dec 21, 1983, D. 1984, Somm. 331  
1087 Cour Europeenne des Droits de l’Homme (CEDH) Makt. Inter Verlag 1989; CEDH Feb 24, 1994, Casado 
Coca, Serie A No. 285 
1088 Law No. 86-1067, Sept. 30, 1986, as amended, J.O. art. 1 (Freedom of communication) 
1089 Judgment of Jan 31, 1989, Cass. Civ. 1re, LEXIS Pourvoi No. 87-15.139 
1090 J. Hauch above n.1007 at 1228 
1091 J. Robert & J. Duffar, ‘Droits De L’Homme et libertes fondamentales’, ch. V (La Vie Privée) (5th ed. 
1994). In Infringement of Privacy, Lord Chancellor's Department, Scottish  Office (1993) a patient gave 
confidential information to his physician who disclosed it to a small local newspaper which published it. The 
story was then taken up by the national press. The patient's suit to restrain publication was unsuccessful. 
1092 Fressoz above n.1026 
1093 T.G.I.Paris, 1st ch., Oct. 23, 1996., although in this case unsuccessfully 
1094 CA Paris, Mar. 11, 1991, Feb. 18, 1992, available in Legipresse no. 95, 112 
1095 Droit d’auteur 
1096 C. Civ. Art. L 122-5-4 (Fr.) Listing parody as one exception to the author’s exclusive right to reproduction 
1097 E. Logeais above n.1012 at 531 
1098 C. Civ Art. L 122-5-4 (Fr.) 
1099 CA Paris, Mar. 11, 1991, Feb. 18, 1992, available in Legipresse no. 95, 112 
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(f) Transferability and Descendibility 
(i) Transferability 
The right of image prohibits unauthorised uses of a person's image which fails to respect his privacy. 
Consent is a prerequisite for the use of a person's image, therefore anybody can give their consent for free 
or bargain for compensation in exchange for it.1103 
The silence within the law reflects the ambiguous nature of the right of image, which has not yet been 
expressly incorporated into statutory law, as occurred with privacy under art.9 of the Civil Code. This 
cautious approach has not prevented the courts from protecting the goodwill attached to professionals. 
"In the artistic field, fame stems from talent, work and lengthy, painstaking efforts along one's 
career, the person enjoying it is the only one to decide how and when to exploit it. Everybody 
is entitled to oppose any impairment of his or her persona, any prejudice to the representation 
which he or she may legitimately expect that people or the public will have of them."1104 
Under French contract law, consent can be contractually granted, which has allowed the development of 
image licensing and marketing. However, contracts that are against public policy and morality standards are 
null and void. In addition due to the fact that the right of image is a personality right, a general and perpetual 
waiver or transfer could be successfully challenged in the courts. 
Paradoxically present case law has, in respect to damages for unauthorised commercial uses of an image, 
awarded lower damages to well known personalities who have previously commercially exploited their image 
than to those who have yet to exploit their image.1105 
(ii) Descendibility 
Descendibility of the right of image depends directly on the characterisation of the right. If the right is based 
as an extension of privacy (extra-patrimonial) then the right will not be descendible, however if the right is 
classed as an economic right (patrimonial) then the right is descendible.1106 
Under the majority of case law the right is not descendible to heirs,1107 as illustrated with the case of French 
singer Claude Francois.1108 Although the right is not descendible to heirs the courts have stated that heirs do 
have a right to object to the use of their father's image, if that image would be offensive to his memory, but 
this right is not assignable to third parties. The traditional rationale for denying descendibility is that the right 
of image belongs solely to the living person, as confirmed in the case of Paris Match and photographs of 
President Mitterand. The case affirmed that "the right of privacy only belongs to living persons and can not 
                                                                                                                                                                        
1100 CA Paris, 4e ch. B, Nov. 22, 1984, D. 1985, I.R. 165. 
1101 T.G.I. Nancy, Oct. 22, 1976, JCP 1977, II, 18526 note Lindon 
1102 Civ. 2e, Apr. 2, 1997, D. 1977-411, note Edelman 
1103 J. Ghestin & G. Goubeaux, ‘Treatise on Civil Rights: Individuals’, L.G.D.J. 292, 1989, at 315 
1104 Christian Alers v Pierre unia, T.G.I. Paris, 1e ch., Apr. 20, 1977, D. 1977, 610 note R. Lindon 
1105 SEDEP v Drucker, CA Paris, 1e ch., May 20, 1987, D. 1987, Somm. 384, note Lindon & Amson 
1106 E. Logeais above n.1016 
1107 Cass. Civ. 1e ch., Oct.10, 1995, JCP 1997, II, 22765, note Ravanas 
1108 Societe Bonnet v Societe Cashart United Diffusion Moderne, CA Paris, 4e ch., June 7, 1983, Gaz. Pal. 
1984, 2, 258, note Pochon & Lamoureux 
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be passed onto heirs."1109 Nonetheless it has been accepted that the heirs can claim their own personality 
rights. 
This idea was first seen in 19881110 where the court stated that "the use of an actor's image for advertising 
purpose is not offensive, yet it was subject to his heirs' authorisation for she could have derived profit from 
such use according to the law of demand on the advertising market."1111 
This position was confirmed in the decision of Les Editions Sand & M. Pascuito v M. Kantor, Mme Colucii 
(1996),1112 which stated: 
"Whereas heirs may seek relief for the harm caused by such violation only if the selection and 
display of the image is likely to impair the perception that the public may have of the deceased 
artist, they are entitled to full compensation of the economic damage stemming from said 
violation."1113 
Statutory protection also exists to protect the right of performing artists to have their name passed on to their 
heirs, through art.L212(2) of the French Intellectual Property Code. A case utilised this article to enable 
descendibility in 1997,1114 suggesting that the courts are willing to adjust a previously firm held belief that 
there was no descendibility in relation to the right of image. The courts have begun to seek an alternative 
justification for an argument concerning descendibility based upon protections of a commercial nature rather 
than the traditionally privacy based nature. 
However, later in the judgment the court went on to make a strict interpretation of the article stating that "the 
descendibility of the right of respect of the performance and memory of the artist is based on the principle of 
a continuation of the defunct. Therefore, an heir may not exercise such right in his personal interest in an 
attempt to protect the image which he wants people to have of himself; he may only exercise this right in the 
sole interest of the deceased artist."1115 
(g) Conclusion 
The two separate rights although initially having been created from the same right have come to have 
separate values. The right to image is embodied in protecting a privacy interest and has granted an 
individual the exclusive right to their own image in order to oppose any unauthorised use or dissemination, 
and covers the extrapatrimonial aspects of the right.1116 The right of image consequently cover the 
patrimonial aspects, which are the right to protect the marketable nature of such an image.1117 Together the 
two rights cover both the negative subjective right to prohibit use and a positive economic right to 
commercially utilise or exploit such a right.1118 
                                                   
1109 CA Paris, 11e ch., July 2, 1997, D. 1997, 596 
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The result of these protections is, according to Logeais,1119 that no sooner has the French right of image 
gained a life of its own than new evolutions have threatened its boundaries. On the one hand, the protection 
of the image of a person's belonging is more frequently claimed on traditional property rights grounds. 
However, the right is no longer the privilege of the sole individual, it becomes more difficult to assess its core 
nature.1120 The French right to the image appears to remain in a somewhat schizophrenic state, with both 
extra-patrimonial and patrimonial aspects to it. He argues that the laws are unsatisfactory as they currently 
stands in relation to celebrities and highlights the copyright system introduced by the 1985 as an example. 
He believes that the law created second class moral rights and exploitation rights to performing artists but 
the scope is too narrow to include public servants, models and sportsmen. The result is that the image or 
persona of a celebrity is not perceived as a creative contribution in itself no matter how famous, 
sophisticated or unique, and they receive only specific rights through achievements materialised in works of 
authorship or performances.1121 
Specific provisions are dealt with adequately but the constitutional protection of personality with its dignitary 
and commercial aspects has caused difficulties in case law, with Dietrich decision being an important new 
stage. Although referred to this discussion could be reduced and more focused to highlight the tension in 
these developments (pg232-5) 
3.2 Germany 
(a) Background 
German law like the UK does not offer a right of publicity for the commercial value of a person's individual 
characteristics, such as name and image.1122 Instead the legal protections against unauthorised 
appropriation of a persona are found in the General Right of Personality,1123 first developed by the Federal 
Supreme court in 1954. The Court stated that the "general right of personality" must be regarded as a 
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right based on arts.1 and 2 of the German Constitution of 1949 
(“GG”).1124In addition to these protections  additional protections are afforded under s. 22 of the Copyright in 
Works and Art and Photography Act 1907 (“KUG”),1125 granting protection against the distribution/exhibition 
of a person's image. Alternatively s.12 of the Civil Code (“BGB”)1126 grants protection over the individual's 
Right of Name." 
The courts have developed the general right of personality, into a series of protection against unauthorized 
exploitation of commercial value and defamation.1127 Initially the authors of BGB rejected proposals from 
leading scholars to create a comprehensive right of personality.1128 The legislature decided to protect only 
                                                   
1119 Ibid at 542 
1120 Ibid 
1121 E. Logeais above n.1016 
1122 A. Jooss, ‘Life after death? Post mortem protection of name, image and likeness under German law,’ Ent 
L.R. 2001, 12(5), 141 
1123 Allegemeines Personlickhkeitsrecht 
1124 Grundgesetz 1949 also known as the Basic Law 
1125 Kunstrurhebergesetz 1907 
1126 Bugerliches Gesetzbuch 
1127 S. Bergmann, ‘Publicity rights in the United States and Germany: A comparative analysis,’ 19 Loyola Ent 
L.J. 1999, 479 
1128 J. Simon, ‘The general right of personality and its commercial forms’, Loyola Ent L.J. 1981, 189; H. 
Gotting, ‘From the right of privacy to the right of publicity’, G.R.U.R. Int. 1996, 656 
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certain specific interests under the general provision of the German law of torts and under the right of name. 
In 1907, the legislature created the "right to one's image"1129 under ss.22 and 23 of KUG. The courts 
extended the "right to one's image" to protect other aspects of an individual's personality where the 
defendant acted against good morals.1130Like the UK, trademark and copyright law are available but offer 
limited protection under German law. Germany has created alternative protections under through the Artistic 
Authors Rights Act1131 (“AARA”) and the German Constitution.1132 
(b) Privacy 
The German constitutional court has expressly embraced the jurisprudence of the ECHR, rejecting the 
traditionally held belief that the court's judgments were not binding upon domestic courts.1133 This was re-
emphasised under art.46(1) of the ECHR which requires all state organs to abide by the judgments of the 
court. This is not only applicable to past violations but continues to have practical significance for any 
ongoing or future cases.1134 
As mentioned previously in the paper the Von Hannover case established that the German Courts had not 
given enough protection to art.8 of the ECHR in relation to art.10,1135 in relation to the press coverage of 
celebrities, who are not undertaking public activities. The ECtHR held that the criteria of a 'figure of 
contemporary society par excellence' was too narrowly defined by the German courts.1136 
The definition of such a figure is now, a figure who independently of singular events attracts public interest 
owing to his status and relevance. s.23 of the Copyright (Arts Domain) Act classifies the existence of 
intimate company of a 'figure of contemporary history par excellence' as an event of contemporary history, 
and they therefore would not obtain privacy protections as such. The German courts have emphasised that 
it is not only politicians and public servants who are of public interest,1137 but also includes persons within 
fields such as of art, economics and sport. 
Article 5(1) of the GG explicitly states that 'entertainment' media is covered by the right to freedom of the 
press.1138 The freedom of speech is a fundamental provision within the GG, under art.5(1) there is a 
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1133 F.Hoffmeister, ‘Case comment Germany: Status of European Convention on Human Rights in domestic 
law’, I.J.C.L (2006) 722 
1134 Ibid 
1135 H. Rosler, ‘Caricatures and satires in art law: the German approach in comparison with the United 
States, England and the Human Convention on Human Rights’, E.H.R.L.R (2008) 463 
1136 B. Muller & H. Munz, ‘The protection of privacy in Germany: has anything changed since the Von 
Hannover v Germany decision?’ Comms. L. (2005) 205  
1137 Reference to the opinions of the judges at the ECtHR - Barreto and Zupancic. 
1138 B. Muller above n.1136 
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guarantee for freedom of expression for individuals,1139 the press and broadcasters. Freedom of speech is 
limited when the statement contains contemptuous critique or contains a defamation.1140 
In addition to the ECHR rights , domestic law also protects certain core human rights, including right to 
privacy under the GG and more specifically under art.1(2).1141 Further domestic protection is available for the 
right to respect for one's family life under art.6 of GG.1142 
(c) Right to one's Image 
As discussed below ss.22 and 23 of the AARA provide a right to control the publication of their picture. The 
interpretation of a picture is wide and includes likenesses to the person,1143 even to the extent of the back of 
a goalkeeper.1144 However, once the person becomes part of public life the protections are more limited for 
e.g. the exemption for personalities of history.1145 The economic rights are retained when the personality is 
exploited in the field of advertisement or merchandising.1146 In addition the German Parliament has passed a 
law to prohibit the paparazzi when in secluded places and their actions can now be a criminal offence under 
the German Criminal Code s.201(a). 
The right grants individuals the exclusive right to determine whether to display and distribute their likeness. 
An unauthorised public distribution of the likeness is expressly prohibited under s.22 of KUG. However, 
there is an exception under s.23 for the publication of newsworthy events and likeness of "persons of 
contemporary history."1147 Even where the subject is in the public eye they do not have to accept distribution 
of their image without prior consent,1148 where the distribution is deemed to violate their justified interests.1149 
These justified interests include use of photographs for commercial gain, such as in advertising campaigns 
without the individual's consent, photographing them in their home or garden or in a secluded place, or in 
embarrassing situations.1150 In addition to the German statutes, the ECHR is applicable as shown in Von 
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1149 § 23(2) KUG; See A. Vahrenwald, ‘Germany: Personality rights – Computer game FIFA Soccer 
Championships 2004’, Ent L.R. 2004, 15(5), 41 
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Hannover 1151, where it was held that Germany had breached Princess Caroline of Monaco's art.8 rights in 
permitting publication in the German press of various anodyne photographs taken in public places.1152 
German courts have exempted most commercial use of portrait rights from the defences available under 
s.23 KUG.1153 Advertising1154 and merchandising of memorabilia,1155 for example in general, require a 
licence, whereas edited journal articles1156 and pieces of art, do not even where they pursue a commercial 
aim at the same time.1157 
The concept of likeness under German law is broad and the form and medium of publication is immaterial, 
with the determining factor being whether the person is recognisable. It is sufficient for the reason for being 
recognised to be the result of clothing, gestures or hair-style, and it is even sufficient if only a limited group 
of persons knew who was being depicted.1158 
The use of a look-alike does not fall under the scope of s.22 KUG as the confusion created falls under the 
protections granted by the general right of personality, discussed below. In addition if the use of the image is 
in a parody, there is only protection when there is danger of confusion or in situations where the parody 
amounts to defamation.1159 
Klink1160 believes that although the protections under the right to one's image happen to, in part, substitute 
for a publicity right this is not by design and has arisen as the right has grown from the protection against 
dishonourable public exposure to cover economic benefits of commercialised popularity.1161 Klink also 
believes that as the right is an imprint of a constitutional human right its main difficulty is that it can be 
neither waived nor transferred.1162 However in situations where the likeness of a person who has been 
deceased for under ten years is used then consent of the next of kin is required, this in the opinion of 
Bergmann is a quasi inheritable right that could form the basis of a more substantial and permanent right.1163 
In the aftermath of Von Hannover concerning Princess Caroline, her husband brought an action against 
three newspapers, claiming they infringed inter alia other things his right to control his image.1164 The case 
                                                   
1151 Application no 59320/00 
1152 L Skinner, ‘You’re a celebrity, madam. So do we have a right to share your privacy in a public place?’ 
Comms L., 2004, 4, 118 
1153 O. Weber, ‘Human Dignity and the Commercial Appropriation of Personality: Towards a Cosmopolitan 
Consensus in Publicity Rights?’ (2004) 1:1 SCRIPTed  
1154 Bundesgerichtshof, Fuchsberger, (1992) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2084 
1155 Bundesgerichtshof, Nena, (1987) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift RR 231 
1156 Bundesgerichtshof, Kundenzeitschrift, (1995) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift RR 789 
1157 Bundesgerichtshof, Marlene Dietrich, (1999) BGHZ 143 at 214 
1158 G. Schricker & E. Gerstenberg, ‘Copyright law,’ §60/§ 22 KUG, no.2 (1987), using the example of 
Charlie Chaplin being recognisable by his moustache, bowler hat and walking stick. 
1159 H. Rosler above n.1135 
1160 J. Klink above n.351 
1161 Caroline of Monaco (2002) I.I.C. 33, BVerfG at 104-6 
1162 G. Schricker above n.1158 at no.6; Dietrich see above n.1143; Blauer above n.1146 
1163 S. Bergmann above n.1127 at 495 
1164 BGH U. v. 15.11.2005, VI ZR 286/04, VI ZR 287/04, VI ZR 288/04, not yet 
published, www.bundesgerichtshof.de (accessed 6 December 2005). 
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involved Prince Ernst driving at excessive speed in France, where he spent the majority of his time. The 
incident was widely covered by the German press who published articles about the incident and attached 
context neutral pictures to accompany the article. He claimed an injunction against further publication of the 
articles as the incident was not newsworthy and thus not covered under freedom of the press exception.1165 
The court held that the newspapers had not infringed his right to control image under s.22 of the Copyright 
(Arts Domain Act)1166 and his personality rights protected under s.823 and s.1004 of the BGB in conjunction 
with arts.1(1) and 2(1) of the GG.1167 Although the court felt his personality right was infringed it was justified 
through the interests of the press outweighing his interests. The pictures that accompanied didn't pass on 
any protectable information, as they were unrelated to the incident itself, and therefore were allowed. 
Amongst the courts reasoning was that persons, particularly those in the public light must accept publication 
of objectively true facts, even if this affects their reputation. The incident had taken place in the 'social 
sphere' which is seen as an area where that person has acted publicly or contributed to social affairs.1168 
(d) Right of name 
There is separate protection for the right of name, under s.12 of BGB, which protects the unauthorised 
appropriation of a name, with the likelihood of confusion being the determining factor within the meaning of 
the provision.1169 The use of a name in public and in adverts is lawful unless there is an appropriation or 
defamation of the name.1170 
The name of a person is the simplest and most elemental way to distinguish its holder and subsequently 
their personality. This is highlighted by saying that personal names may be called "trade marks of 
personality"1171 in today's business of heightened commercialised popularity. Within s.12 BGB there is a 
much stronger control over the use of a name than is available under UK law.1172 The BGB grants an 
absolute right to people to use their name and to restrict others from using it without consent. The provision 
                                                   
1165 B. Muller above n.1136 at 205 
1166 Section 22(1) provides that images can only be disseminated with the express approval of the person 
concerned. Section 23(1), No 1 provides for exceptions to that rule, particularly where the images portray an 
aspect of contemporary society, on condition that publication does not interfere with a legitimate interest of 
the person concerned (s 23(2)). 
1167 For a reference in German, see www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gg/index.html (accessed 6 
December 2005):‘Article 1(1) - Protection of the Dignity of Man The dignity of human beings is inviolable. All 
public authorities have a duty to respect and protect it. ‘Article 2(1) - Freedom of Personal Liberty Everyone 
shall have the right to the free development of their personality provided that they do not interfere with the 
rights of others or violate the constitutional order or moral law.’ 
1168 B. Muller above n.1136 
1169 Palandt & Heinrichs, Commentary to the BGB, no.20 (56th ed. 1997) §12 
1170 Catarina Valente (1959) G.R.U.R. 430, B.G.H.; Rennsportgmeinschaft (1981) G.R.U.R. 846, B.G.H. at 
848 
1171 H. Gotting, ‘From the right of privacy to the right of publicity’, G.R.U.R. Int. 1996, 656, at 71 
1172 J. Klink above n.351 at 377 
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applies to any sign capable of distinguishing one name holder from another, first names,1173 surnames,1174 
name abbreviations,1175 artist names,1176 nicknames, titles, seals,1177 and picture signs1178 are covered. 
A case that was decided in favour of the claimant was in Khan v Electronic Arts (2002),1179 where Oliver 
Khan claimed that the right to his name and the right to his image, were being appropriated for use in a 
computer game. The court decided that even though the game had already begun to be sold within 
Germany, Khan's claims were justified as he never belong to the federations whose rights to names and 
images had been purchased by the defendant.1180 
Thus when the German protection is stretched to its maximum it offers protection on almost all forms of 
unauthorised use of popular names from t-shirts,1181 on book and film titles1182 to fictional characters.1183 
(e) Right to personality 
The rights mentioned above in AARA are complemented by the statutory rights that protect the rights to 
one's name and picture and a general personality right that is based on arts.1 and 2 of GG. In reality this 
protection works as a safety net to cover all aspects of personality that have not been included in specific 
statutes. Article 1 states that the dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect it shall be the duty of all state 
authority. Whilst art.2 says that everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality in so 
far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code. 
Although art.2 appears to be a broad provision,1184 it is made less effective within Germany as s.253 BGB 
states that damages can only be awarded for damage to material assets, meaning that it is very difficult to 
successfully claim damages for the appropriation of personality features.1185 
The German Federal Supreme Court has recognised, since 1954,1186 the commercial interests in 
personality,1187 and has called it a right of economic self determination.1188 The following decade saw the 
consolidation and expansion of the right in various areas of protection for example the protection against 
                                                   
1173 Romy (1960) N.J.W. 869 CA (OLG) Munich; Uwe (1983) N.J.W. 1185 B.G.H. 
1174 Vogeler (1960) G.R.U.R. 490, B.G.H. 
1175 J.W. 21, 248 CA (KG) Berlin 
1176 Valente, above n.1170; Heino (1987) N.J.W. 1413 District Court (LG) Dusseldorf  
1177 B.G.H. 119, 237  
1178 Red Cross (Rotes Kreuz) B.G.H. 126, 291; Salamander German Reichsgericht (RG) 171, 155; 
Zwillingszeichen (1957) G.R.U.R. 288, B.G.H. 
 
1179 Kahn v Electronic Arts GmbH (Unreported, January 13, 2004) (OLG (Hamburg)) 
1180 S. Smith, above n.313 
1181 Boris Becker (1990) N.J.W. 1106, B.G.H. 
1182 Romy, above n.1173 
1183 Mephisto B.G.H. 50, 133 
1184 S. Bains above n.2 at 164 
1185 Dahlke above n.1147 
1186 Leserbrief [1954] N.J.W. 1404, B.G.H. 
1187 Mephisto above n.1183 
1188 Rennsportgmeinschaft, above n.1170 
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invasion of privacy, the right to object against publication of intimate, offensive or libellous information or 
statements and of information suitable of harming a person's reputation, image or social standing.1189 
Although the rights now cover economic aspects of the right to personality this was not the intention at their 
creation. The intention of the rights was to ensure that personal freedoms specifically privacy were 
guaranteed. The extension of the rights to cover the commercial aspects of the development of one's 
personality, has caused a number of difficulties within German case law.1190  This is exemplified below and 
specifically with the important new stage of the law introduced by the decision in Dietrich. 
(f) Transferability and Descendibility 
The German "general right of personality" has been considered a personal right since its creation,1191 and 
therefore transfer of ownership is not permissible,1192 additionally the right is not descendible.1193 By doctrine 
human rights, can not be objects of commerce. No one can sell, buy, or waive human rights. Consequently, 
the name right might not be waived, transferred or inherited.1194 However, as discussed previously, the 
consent of the next of kin must be sought and gained if used within ten years of the person's death. During 
this period the kin have the authority to demand licensing fees and monetary compensation.1195 
The landmark decision of Marlene Dietrich constituted a departure by the Federal Supreme Civil Court with 
its traditional views by awarding monetary compensation for post-mortem violations of personality rights. 
The case was a significant extension of the law as it recognised the inheritability of "patrimonial" elements 
of the "general right of personality". The significance of this decision was that previously the courts had 
denied the possibility of the right being passed onto the individual's heirs as by its apparent nature it was a 
purely "personal" right, and therefore tied to its individual bearer without the capacity to be inherited.1196 
In respect of how other aspects of personality are concerned, the state of the law is not clear.1197 Due to an 
absence of any specific statutory provision, it was again fell to the Federal Supreme Court to develop 
rules.1198 The court have repeatedly stated that the legal protection of personality accorded by art.1 GG does 
not end at death.1199 The general right to dignity and integrity survives, so that the image of the deceased 
continues to be protected, at least from gross injuries to their honour and reputation.1200This right to 
protection can be claimed by the decedent's next of kin within the meaning of s.22 KUG. 
                                                   
1189 A. Jooss above n.1122 
1190 W. Van Carnegem above n.650 at 452 
1191 Dasch, Consent to the interference with the right to one’s image, 35 (1990) cited in 19 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 
479 (1999) at 513 
1192 J. Helle above n.1130 at 5 
1193 Gotting, above n.1171; Palandt above n.1169 
1194 Dietrich above n.1143 
1195 Ibid 
1196 A. Jooss above n.1122 
1197 J. Hennigan, ‘Altered image rights,’ Ent L.R. 2003, 14(7), 161 
1198 S. Bergmann above n.1127 
1199 Mephisto above n.1183 at 137; Frischzellen-Kosmetik B.G.H. 1984, 681, 426 
1200 Ibid; Emil Nolde [1990] Z.U.M. 180, B.G.H. 
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The court considered the protection of likeness in s.22 KUG, and held that it would be unacceptable, in light 
of the GG, if the personality of the artist could be freely imitated immediately after his death.1201 This 
decision shows that posthumous protection can last as long as thirty years,1202 whilst the protection lasts 
heirs can waive their right to protection and allow commercial use. The courts have now tried to establish 
that the rights to both privacy and publicity can in at least some circumstances be passed onto the 
individual's heirs. Klink however argues1203 that the development of the case law in this way could result in 
a significant erosion of the separation between dignitary and economic rights.  He argues that this dilution  
in addition to creating confusion about the extent to which a human right should be stretched to keep up 
with a publicity right, will more than likely result in the creation of a weaker personality right and an 
ineffective sort of quasi personality-publicity right. 
(g) Conclusion 
The protections available under German law are wide and numerous, however they are predominately 
personal rights that offer only limited economic protection especially post mortem. There is no doubt that 
Germany is still a far cry away from joining the US and Italy in recognising a commercial right of publicity.1204 
In addition the German rights confuse the distinction between a human right and a property right under their 
existing protections as shown in Dietrich.1205 
The perceived standpoint of German law was discussed in the aftermath of Von Hannover1206 where 
submissions were made on behalf of the Association of Editors of German Magazines, who argued that the 
existing laws placed Germany in a 'half-way' house between UK and French law. They believed that the 
existing laws were adequate and fair in terms of the rights of protection, specifically privacy rights, and 
freedoms of the press.1207 
In reality as highlighted by Carty1208 and Van Caenegem,1209 the rights available under German law are a 
mixture of tort, copyright, human rights and restitution, with the exact protection depending on the 
characteristics of the case. Bergmann has stated that "step by step the right to one's image has moved away 





                                                   
1201 OLG Hamburg G.R.U.R. 1989, 666 
1202 H. Gotting, above n.1171 at 71 (suggesting a post mortem right of 70 years); H. Schack, ‘The right of 
personality of the creators and the performing artists after death’, G.R.U.R. 1985, 352 at 359 
1203 J. Klink above n.351 at 381 
1204 A. Jooss above n.1122 at 147 
 
1205 S. Bains above n.2; T. Lauterbach, “US-style ‘personality’ right in the UK--en route from Strasbourg?”, 
20th BILETA Conference: Over-commoditised; Over-Centralised; Over-Observed: The New Digital Legal 
World? April 2005, Queen's University of Belfast  
1206 Von Hannover above n.140 
1207 L. Skinner above n.1152 
1208 H. Carty above n.288 
1209 W. Van Caenegam above n. at 650 





Italian law does not expressly provide protection for the right of publicity1211 unlike the US through statute 
and common law.1212 However, it protects the prevention of unauthorised commercial exploitation by utilising 
statutory enactments which protect individual privacy, one's image, one's name and to a smaller extent 
copyright. In addition Italian judges are authorised by statute to reason by analogy a process known as 
analogia iuris and analogia legis, which enables the judges to apply existing statutory rules on similar 
subjects. The Italian right of publicity owes much of its creation and continuing viability to this process.1213 
This is however one of the main obstacles to securing effective protection for the right of publicity, as it is not 
expressly enumerated by statute. Rather, the right of publicity exists as a result of the Italian Civil Code's1214 
empowerment of the courts to use the processes of analogia iuris and analogia legis. 
(b) Statutory Protection for name, pseudonym, image and copyright 
Article 6 of the Italian Civil Code provides a right to protect the integrity of one's name from improper or 
unauthorised use. Every person has a right to the name given according to law. The name includes the 
given name and surname. No changes, additions, or corrections of names are permitted, except in the 
cases and subject to the formalities indicated by law.1215 
Article 7 offers additionally  judicial remedies for violation of the right to name. Pseudonyms are covered 
under the protections from arts.6 and 7 where they are used by a person in such a manner as to have 
acquired the importance of a name.1216A person whose right to the use of his name is contested or who may 
be prejudiced by the use made of it by others, can judicially request that the injurious practice be terminated, 
without prejudice to the right to damages. The court can order that the decision be published in one or more 
newspapers.1217 
The right of image, provides the ability to prohibit the use of one's photograph or likeness without 
authorisation. Article 10 provides that whenever the likeness of a person, or of his parent, spouse or child, 
has been exhibited or published in cases other than those in which such exhibition or publication is 
permitted by law, or in a manner prejudicial to the dignity or reputation of such person or relative, the court, 
upon request of the interested party, can order the termination of the abuse without prejudice to the right to 
damages.1218 
                                                   
1211 H. Carty above n.12 
1212 S. Gatti, ‘The “right” to the commercial exploitation of one’s own popularity’, Commercial Law Review, 
1988, 355; R. Hoffman, ‘The right of publicity – Heir’s right, advertiser’s windfall, or court’s nightmare?’ 31 
DePaul L.R. 1, 1981, 1  
1213 S. Martuccelli, ‘The right of publicity under Italian civil law’, 18 Loy. L.A. Ent L.J. 1998, 543 
1214 Codice civile (now merged with the Commercial code) 
1215 Ibid [Person and the Family] art.6, translated in 1 Italian Civil Code and Complementary Legislation bk.3, 
tit. I, art.6 
1216 Ibid at art.9 
1217 Ibid at art.7 
1218 Ibid at art.10,  
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Italian copyright laws and specifically art.96 of the Copyright Law 1941, which provides that the portrait of a 
person may not be displayed, reproduced or commercially distributed without the consent of such 
person.1219 
Consent of the subject is not required where the reproduction of the portrait is justified by his notoriety or his 
holding of public office, or by the needs of justice or the police, or for scientific, didactic, or cultural reasons, 
or when reproduction is associated with facts, events and ceremonies which are of public interest or have 
taken place in public. The portrait may not, however, be displayed or commercially distributed when its 
display or commercial distribution would prejudice the honour, reputation or dignity of the person 
portrayed.1220 
(c) Judicial creation of the Italian Right of Publicity 
The expansion of the right of image to the right of publicity began in Dalla v Autovox SpA (1984).1221 
Although the right of publicity is a judicial creation, its legitimacy and viability are nonetheless supported by 
the Civil Code.1222 The Dalla case was unique as the claimant's claim was not an infringement of his right to 
name under art.6 or 7 of the Civil Code, nor of his right of image or portrait under art.10 of the Civil Code or 
even art.96 of the Copyright law.1223 This was because neither his name nor his image, face, features or 
picture had been used in the advert. Prior to Dalla most commentators believed that the misrepresentation 
of one's persona for commercial purposes occurred only with the unauthorised use of the celebrity's actual 
name or image. The use of this wider celebrity persona increases the purchasing public's desire.1224 
Dalla argued that the use of the cap and glasses constituted a misappropriation of his persona because they 
created an immediate association of between himself and Autovox.1225 In addition it was alleged that the 
advertisement damaged his reputation because consumers were likely to believe that he endorsed 
Autovox's products, despite the fact that he had previously consistently refused to appear in 
commercials.1226 
The court held that the misappropriation of Dalla's persona had been accomplished not through the use of 
his name or likeness, but through the use of other indicia of his identity, namely the cap and glasses. Thus 
the infringement was not one of the right of image itself, but of the yet unrecognised right to publicity. The 
court recognised that the infringement of the right of publicity was derived from the appropriation of the 
singer's personal identity and had been used for purposes of trade, not for purposes of public interest in 
information. The judge granted Dalla's claim by relying on three main factors: 
1 his constant use of the wool cap; 
2 his degree of fame and notoriety as a musician; and 
                                                   
1219 Law No. 633 of April 22, 1941, art.96, translated in 2 UNESCO, Copyright laws and treaties of the World 
ch. VI. § II, art.96 (1956) 
1220 Ibid at art.97 
1221 Dalla v Autovox SpA. Pret. Di Roma, 18 Apr. 1984, Foro It. 1984, I, 2030  
1222 S. Martuccelli, ‘An up and coming – the right of publicity: Its birth in Italy and its consideration in the 
United States’, Ent L.R. 1993, 4(4), 109 
1223 B. Bettelli, ‘Italy: copyright – photograph’, Ent. L.R. 2006, 17(5), N44 
1224 S. Gatti above n.1212 at 1 




3 the graphic character of the advertisement.1227 
A significant post Dalla case was Baglioni v Eretel Srl and Disco Spring (1986),1228 which upheld the use of 
the right of publicity to enjoin commercial appropriation of one's persona. In Baglioni, the court held that the 
unauthorised reproduction of a popular singer's image and signature in the pages of a calendar constituted 
an infringement of his right to publicity.1229 The court found that the misappropriation of the popular Italian 
singer Baglioni's persona could damage him in three ways: 
1 by impairing his popularity and reputation; 
2 by failing to adequately compensate him; and 
3 by leading to the loss of control over the singer's own persona.1230 
Another post Dalla case was Vitti v Doimo SpA (1987),1231 where the court held that the unauthorised use of 
a look-alike of an Italian actress in an advertisement for a magazine misappropriated her persona for 
commercial purposes.1232 The magazine had used a photograph of Vitti on the cover and an article with a 
section of her biography.1233 The court found that this use of a look-alike was sufficient to violate Vitti's right 
of publicity.1234 
The case law has shown that protection for misappropriation is available, if the misappropriation does not 
occur through the use of the person's name or likeness but rather through the use of elements and 
accessories which are identifiable by the public with a particular person. This view recognises that the 
persona of a public figure may have resulted from the cultivation of their public identity through artistic and 
professional work. 
(d) Elements of a cause of action 
The case law since Dalla has created, prima facie, four elements that are necessary for a right of publicity 
violation.1235 
1 must be a public figure, not simply an ordinary person; 
2 the defendant has used distinguishing characters of the celebrity; 
3 unauthorised use of his popularity is for a commercial purpose, to convince the public that he 
endorses or sponsors the product; and 
4 the unauthorised use of the celebrity persona caused immediate damage 
                                                   
1227 Ibid at 2032-3 
1228 Bagliono v Eretel Srl, Pret. Di Roma, 18 Feb. 1986, Il diritto di autore 1986, 215 
1229 Ibid 
1230 Ibid 




1235 In civil law systems such as Italy, the concept of judicially created law and stare decisis do not ordinarily 
exist. Though each court can interpret the law independent of and, also in contrast to, prior rulings of higher 
courts in the same jurisdiction 
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The right of publicity prevents the misappropriation of the commercial value of the persona. The right does 
not prevent the diffusion of information concerning their private life,1236 but rather the use of the persona in 
relation to unauthorised endorsements. Thus one must be a public figure, who has a quantifiable value 
attached to their persona to utilise the right of publicity in Italy.1237 
Use of a distinguishing characteristic of the celebrity is a necessity for a cause of action, the characteristic 
does not have to be a physical attribute. Usually this is accomplished through the use of a statutory 
protected element such as the name, nickname or professional name of the celebrity.1238 In addition the use 
of a likeness such as a photograph, drawing or videotape1239 satisfies this requirement. The use of other 
distinguishing characteristics can also infringe the right of publicity as occurred in Dalla.1240 
The use of the persona must be for commercial purposes, and the claimant must show that their attributes 
have been used in a similar manner. The Italian courts have used similar definitions to the US courts when 
determining what is commercial and what is non-commercial. Commercial areas include using 
characteristics such as likeness, name or distinguishing characteristics to advertise goods or services. Non 
commercial areas include using a person's identity in news reports, fictional or non fictional works. 
It is a prerequisite that the claimant can prove that the use of their image has caused them damage. The 
damage that is caused must also be immediate in its nature.1241 In assessing damages the court calculates 
the economic advantage gained by the defendant or the loss suffered by the claimant.1242 The court can 
determine the "fair market value" of the persona, taking the degree of popularity and reputation of the 
celebrity in public.1243 
(e) Rationale for protection 
Although the courts pre-empted the scholars in terms of pushing for the right of publicity, there has still been 
discussion by Italian scholars as to the right of publicity.1244 These have created four main rationale for the 
new right of publicity. 
1 as a result of judicial interpretation of the right to image, the right of publicity protects individual's 
interests in personal dignity and autonomy; 
                                                   
1236 The right of privacy includes the right to avoid unauthorised and unjustified intrusions into one’s private 
life that could cause embarrassment and humiliation or distress 
1237 Dalla above n.1221 at 2032-4 
1238 Codice civile [Person and the Family] art.6, 7 and 9, translated in 1 Italian Civil Code and 
Complementary Legislation bk.3, tit. I, art.6, 7 and 9 
1239 Ibid at art.10, 
1240 Dalla above n.1221 at 2033 
1241 A. Barenghi. ‘The price of (missed) consent: The damage of image exploitation and its liquidation’, Riv. 
Dir. Inf. 1992, 565 
1242 App. Milano, 9 apr. 1976, Trib. Torino, 15 Jan. 1994, Dir. Inol. 1994, 223 (so called price of consent) 
1243 S. Gatti, above n.1212 at 362 
1244 Garutti, ‘Combination of the image of a well known personality to the aim of differentiation’, Diritto Dell 
‘Informazione E Dell’Informat 560 (1990); A. Marini, ‘From Sophie Loren to Stefania Sandrelli: Evolution or 
Involution of the Jurisprudence?’ Giust Civ. 1990, 2371; V. Metafora, ‘The myth of Narciso and the 
jurisprudence: About the right to own one’s portrait’, Riv. Crit. Dir. Priv. 1990, 867; M. Ricolfi, ‘Issues about 
the legal system of the commercial exploitation of the image’, Nuova Giur. Civ. Comm. 1992, I, 44 
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2 the right secures the commercial value attached to a public figure's persona and prevents unjust 
enrichment1245 of those who have misappropriated it;1246 
3 prevention of harmful or excessive use of the persona that may damage or dilute the commercial 
value of the identity; and 
4 although proof of deception or confusion is not a prerequisite of a cause of action, the right indirectly 
prevents customers from false suggestions of endorsement.1247 
(f) Right to Publicity for Foreigners 
Under the rule of mutuality a foreigner can profit from the civil rights, as the civil law recognises that 
foreigners have the right to initiate legal proceedings which are available to Italian citizens in order to protect 
the enjoyment and exploitation of one's rights. 
However, the right of publicity includes protection provided for the right of image, which is a right of 
personality. Under Italian law personality laws are determined by the state of where the claimant is 
domiciled.1248 Thus the court would need to judge in a case of right of publicity, whether or not the state law 
of the foreigner recognises the right of publicity. 
(g) Transferability and Descendibility1249 
The distinctive characteristics that are covered under the protection granted by the right of publicity can be 
separated from the celebrity for commercial purposes. Thus enabling the rights attached to one's persona to 
be theoretically transferable to third parties.1250 In relation to descendibility there are varying views in relation 
to whether it exists under the Italian right of publicity,1251 therefore the situation is as yet unresolved in Italy. 
The courts have continued to follow the lead from the US, namely that exploitation of a persona's image will 
be protected, however this right is more likely to be protected if the person it was exploited during the 
celebrity's lifetime.1252 
(h) Conclusion 
In conclusion there is no doubt that a right of publicity now exists in Italy, and the right that has been created 
is similar to the rights existing in the US. Although judicially created rights are uncommon in civil law 
jurisdictions, Italian courts are authorised by statute to "reason by analogy" and apply provisions that 
regulate similar cases or analogous matters.1253 
The protection of publicity rights of celebrities allows them to take advantage of the benefits of their efforts. 
This protection will also ensure the avoidance of unjust enrichment that can be created by the unauthorised 
                                                   
1245 l’arricchimento senza causa; Codice civile [Obligations] art.2041-2, translated in 1 Italian Civil Code and 
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1246 T. Watkin, The Italian Legal Tradition, Ashgate Publishing Group, 1997 
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(see also “The survivability issue”, at 994). 
1252 Lugosi above n.602 
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exploitation of a celebrity's popularity. Italian courts use the interpretation of the statutes to protect the 
publicity rights, in order to recognise the social and economic value of providing the protection.1254 
CHAPTER 4 
4 Analysis and Cross comparison of Privacy and Personality Rights 
4.1 Privacy 
The privacy rights examined within this paper are doctrinally different but are based upon similar protections 
and theories, as shown by the development of breach of confidence and passing off actions in the UK and 
Australia. The similarities for bringing an action are exemplified with the removal of the requirement of a 
confidential relationship as shown in Lenah. Although there are significant similarities the actions do not 
have the same scope within all the examined countries as shown by the narrower interpretation of 
confidence within  Australia as shown by the need for the information to have been removed within 
surreptitious means. 
The US right of privacy stemmed from the UK case of Prince Albert. The case was influential in both 
jurisdictions, with the result in the US being the beginning of a tort of invasion of privacy, which has 
subsequently been adopted in numerous states in various guises. The result of the case within the UK was 
to start the gradual progression of breach of confidence. The US system of privacy is more definitive in 
relation to the extent of the privacy action, for example in Florida both the false light invasion of privacy and 
public disclosure of private facts are covered, creating a greater certainty of the scope of the act than were 
previously available in the UK. 
The privacy protections had developed both prior to and post the enactment of the HRA and now covers a 
wide range of situations than its initial intention. Within all of the examined countries there are exceptions to 
the right of privacy, as discussed below. 
(a) Defences including freedom of speech1255 
The ECHR has brought to the forefront the issue of freedom of speech and the press and the protection of 
privacy. The UK has seemingly given greater protection recently to art.8 than art.10 in case law. This has not 
traditionally been the case within Germany who in the case of Von Hannover were found to have given too 
wide protection to freedom of speech which is a fundamental protection under art.5 GG. The court found that 
Germany needed to give greater protection to celebrities and public persons even when in a public place. 
In contrast France has undergone a different path with an increase in protection of freedom of speech in 
relation to privacy protections post ECHR.1256 The more gradual development is in comparison to the 
development of freedom of expression in the UK. The Sarkozy case has shown that the courts are now 
prepared to allow the public interest test greater flexibility in situations where information was not trivial or 
very private. This is also being tested in relation to public persons being in public at the time of an event. 
France has additional protections than those granted under the ECHR for freedom of speech as covered in 
the French Law on the Liberty of the Press. Assuming that basic dignity and privacy are not infringed1257 
then the French laws allow publication where the event or information would be of legitimate public interest. 
In Italy the public interest defence is encapsulated within art.97 of the Copyright Law, which allows the 
reproduction of a portrait, and presumably names, where it is justified by their notoriety or public office and is 
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1255 J. Craig above n.940 at 174 
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associated with the facts or events which are of public interest. This defence has not yet been tested in the 
aftermath of Von Hannover which may curtail the wide interpretation of this article. 
Common law countries such as US and Canada also hold freedom of speech as a fundamental right, 
requiring strong rationale to restrain them. Within the US the First Amendment crystalises the freedom of 
expression protections. The first amendment allows discussion and legitimate commentary of public persons 
lives. There is strong protection for entertainment purposes, stronger than within the UK where there seems 
to be a requirement to prove art.10 of the ECHR whereas in US the emphasis is more on proving privacy 
that the freedom of expression. 
Within Canada freedom of expression is granted the same weight as the of right of as privacy. For example 
within Quebec both are covered under s.2(b) of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedom, which  
guarantees "freedom of ... expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication". 
This places the protections on a similar level to the UK, where both rights are part of the ECHR enacted in 
the HRA. The Canadian privacy laws, in relation to freedom of expression, appear stronger than those 
currently applied within the UK, as shown in Aubry1258 where publication of a photograph without consent 
was held to violate the right to private life. Although the courts maintain that each right is treated equally. In 
Canada, unlike in the UK, unintentional infringement is no defence, thus placing even stronger protection on 
the privacy right.1259 
(b) Descendible/Transferability 
Two similarities between all of the privacy actions,  discussed in this paper, are that  privacy is treated as a 
human right and doctrinally is non-transferable or descendible, and thus can not be directly enforced by the 
family of an individual. An exception to this is a provision within the US protections is where a family member 
can claim if the infringement directly affects their privacy rights at the same time,1260 as claimed in Tyne. The 
right to name and right to image can indirectly be protected within Germany under s.22 KUG. Although the 
courts have seen this as an extension for protections to publicity or personality rights rather than in relation 
to privacy rights. The availability of this provision is due to the fact that under German laws privacy is 
protected both as a human right and a proprietary right.1261 The courts rationale is that it would be abhorrent 
for image of a deceased person to become free property which could be caused gross injury to their honour 
and reputation. 
A second similarity is the availability of remedies for invasion of privacy, as shown earlier in the paper, 
common law damages for breach of confidence in the UK had been more restrictive prior to Mosley than 
were available in other jurisdictions. The value of damages awarded under the US protections has 
traditionally been higher and based upon the mental distress that was caused as a direct consequence of 
the intrusion.1262 Within Canadian provincial law there is the possibility of damages to be awarded for the 
unauthorised appropriation of name or portrait even if there was no damage caused. In addition to damages 
all of the countries examined offer injunctions to prohibit further publication or restrain the initial publication. 
In France there is an additional protection available to be award sequestration of the offending materials.1263 
All of the countries examined above have awarded their courts the power to impose damages for any mental 
distress suffered by the claimant, although not all jurisdictions specify a separate award for this, in some 
jurisdictions this is contained within a single award for breach of privacy. Additionally all of the countries 
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discussed can award an injunction preventing either the initial publication of the offending action i.e. 
photographs, newspaper article or advertisement or a follow up publication if further damage would be 
suffered. Each country weighs up the availability of an injunction with the respective public interest tests. An 
alternative remedy available within the UK is an award of delivery up of the offending materials e.g. under 
the TMA. 
4.2 Personality rights 
(a) Style and setup of the personality rights 
As discussed previously the UK rights are contained within a number of actions that have been developed to 
cover personality rights. The most common protection that is claimed within the UK for this kind of action is 
passing off which has moved on to such an extent that it now incorporates aspects of misappropriation from 
its original protection of misrepresentation.1264 
The protections offered in the UK are mirrored by those in Australia, although passing off has been adapted 
earlier and more broadly than in the UK.1265 The protections within Australia are described as right to 
merchandise.1266 Additional protection is given under the Trade Practices Act which does not require 
reputation or need to prove damage, which shows an extension of passing off that is currently unavailable 
with the UK. 
Canada offers a specific tort of appropriation of personality that covers gaps left by the passing off 
protections,1267 although it contains aspects of passing off, such as the public confusion requirement in effect 
its  a hybrid of the UK and US rights. Germany and France like the UK rely upon various separate rights 
rather than a specific right of publicity. The German Constitution (GG) under arts.1 and 2 in addition to the 
right of name under s.12 BGB and s.22 KUG provide much broader protections than are currently available 
within the UK.  Although the French rights were created through existing privacy rights as in the US, they 
protect rights in various ways through personality rights both civil and criminal in nature.1268 Protections for 
likeness to a person are available but not if they are 'in character' as is the case with voice protection. 
As shown above the US and Italy have chosen to adopt a full right of publicity,1269 the US system is a state 
based system is based upon misappropriation rather than misrepresentation as occurred in UK passing off. 
The areas covered by the right are the same as those covered under passing off namely name and image in 
addition catch phrases and voice is also covered. The right of publicity unlike the UK does not require any 
previous use of personality or goodwill. In addition to the right of publicity there are additional protections 
within copyright and the Lanham Act, offering superior protections to those available within the UK.  The 
second country that has adopted a right of publicity was Italy, which was created through the Civil Code, 
protection for the right of name and image  under arts.6 and 10 of the Civil Code are complemented through 
art.96(1) of the Copyright law. As with the US system it is based upon misappropriation rather than 
misrepresentation. Lookalikes are also covered under the protections.1270 The US right of publicity is 
available to all citizens whereas the Italian rights are only available to public persons. 
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The UK like Canada, US and Australia does not allow unintentional infringement as a legitimate defence to 
appropriation of personality rights. Further similarities between the protections of both civil and common law 
countries also include the public interest tests and the importance attached to the freedom of the press. 
The UK balances the rights of privacy with freedom of expression under art.10 of the ECHR, with 
established case law granting guidance as to how the court's will balance the individual rights. Where the 
individual is engaging in a private family or personal act the courts had leaned towards granting protection, 
but have been less inclined to grant the same protection to matters involving sexual acts or where the 
individual has previously lied about the situation, such as in Campbell. 
The US has freedom of expression protections enshrined within the First Amendment, which ensures that 
where the persona is being used for legitimate news stories or public commentary then the right of publicity 
is not infringed. Within Canada a similar test applies which results in the defence not being available for 
commercial or merchandise use, but is applicable in newsworthy scenarios. 
The civil law countries are all ruled by art.10 of the ECHR, which covers freedom of expression and ensures 
that newsworthy stories and genuine public interest protections are upheld. In addition each have their own 
domestic protections for example in Germany s.23 of KUG, which has a more generous public interest test 
for public persons, particular when it comes to reporting true facts. In France the fact the image for example 
occurs in public is no defence  when the image is used for commercial purposes.1271 In France unlike in the 
UK a defence of parody is also available in addition to the other protections available in the UK. 
(c) Damages 
All the domestic courts discussed above retain the power to award damages but each have different 
methods of quantification. The UK and Italy both have a requirement that damages must be proven, for 
example that the trade or goodwill held by the individual has been diminished by the defendant's action. 
The damages awarded in the UK for endorsement cases are considerably lower than those awarded in the 
US and  are quantified on a 'lost licence fee' basis. In the US for example Waits1272 was awarded $2.5m in 
1992 whereas the highest compensation awarded to a celebrity in the UK is Irvine who was awarded 
£25,000 in 2003. The lost licence fee test is also available within Australia, Canada, France and Italy.1273 A 
problem with the lost licence fee test is that it only takes regard of the current value of an individual, 
therefore an individual who has deliberately sought to exploit his persona to maximise the revenue that it 
can command. 
In addition to the lost licence fee other tests include an award of the claimant's pecuniary loss or the 
defendant's pecuniary gain which are available in both the US and Italy but not in the UK. An account of 
profits is a third alternative within the US, which also retains unlike the UK, the possibility of punitive 
damages. 
The Civil law systems have a different approach to the US and Canada when it comes to quantifying 
damages and have traditionally been more similar to the UK in awarding lower levels of damages.1274 The 
civil law countries have sought to quantify the awards of damages on a compensatory basis rather than 
seeking to punish a defendant through punitive damages where they have committed an intentional offence. 
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The UK allows personality rights to be transferred as shown by Trade Marks and Copyright Act, the situation 
under passing off is more debatably however as it is unproven at the highest courts but as current academic 
thinking says the right is classified as a proprietary right rather than a human or dignitary right it is like to be 
both transferable and descendible. 
The UK has not established a precedent in relation to the descendibility of rights under passing off.  The US 
has however established the length of post mortem protections, which varies between the separate states 
vary from no post mortem protection to 100 years. It is likely however that if the UK courts award post 
mortem protection they would not the Washington state system, which currently awards different protections 
for personalities and individuals. The UK courts would more likely focus on the question of whether the 
individual has the prerequisite goodwill as without it there would be nothing to protect. 
Italy has shown that rights are transferable for commercial reasons but the descendibility question has yet to 
be conclusively answered, although the indications are that the Italian courts would follow the lead of the US 
courts and grant descendibility to one level or another.1275 Wider protections are available in Australia in the 
UK, although Australia has also faced a similar question in regards to the availability of post mortem 
protections under passing off and the TPA.1276  The tort of appropriation in Canada has not set a fixed time 
limit for protection preferring to examine each case individually on the subject of the facts. There is however 
a  strict newsworthiness and public interest test, which is taken into consideration when deciding whether or 
not to grant the post mortem right. 
The situation within Germany and France is however very difficult due to the dual nature of personality 
rights, which have two distinct aspects the patrimonial (privacy based) and the extra-patrimonial (economic). 
The result is that the economic aspects are transferable and descendible, e.g. for 30 years under s.22 
KUG.1277 The privacy rights are 'human rights' however and thus are not inheritable or transferable. An 
exception is however available in France where family members can protect the reputation of a deceased 
person for ten years. 
4.3 Overall Conclusion 
This paper has outlined the piecemeal protections available to individual's within the UK to protect their 
privacy and personality from unauthorised appropriation. The UK law has developed slowly through a 
mixture of statutory protections and case law, and although there has been much academic commentary, 
this has had notably less influence than in the US. 
With privacy laws in the UK,  the most important and cited action has been  breach of confidence, which has 
evolved from protection of commercial relationships to protection of personal information. The action has 
undoubtedly become wider than it was initially envisaged for and has been increasingly used since the 
inception of the HRA and now has two distinct strands of protection.. The action appears to now be at a 
situation where there is increasing certainty over what is covered and how strictly the public interest test 
applied. Mosley showed that  the trend for stronger privacy controls has continued to an extent under which 
it appears that extra-marital affairs, at least photographs or film and probably written descriptions, are 
covered under art.8 of the ECHR as the right to respect for one's private and family life. The strict test for 
freedom of expression has re-emphasised that what interests the public is not necessarily in the public 
interest. 
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Although as shown earlier within the paper there has been a push for a specific and explicit invasion of 
privacy tort or right to privacy, it appears unlikely that there will be any such significant shift towards a 
system similar to the US in the near future. The current protections although created through doctrinally 
inappropriate circumstances are now such as to be recognised as offering wide and satisfactory protections 
for privacy. The enactment of the HRA has undoubtedly been a strong factor in the increase in privacy 
protections within the UK as has been exemplified in Campbell and Douglas. 
In relation to the personality rights available within the UK the paper has shown that they are still in a state of 
slight confusion. This is particularly shown with passing off which has continued to develop away from its 
original creation. The removal of the requirement for a common field of activity and the progression from 
being misrepresentation based to increasing incorporating misappropriation has shown the flexibility of the 
cause of action. This flexibility however can create confusion and uncertainty as to the exact limits of the 
action. 
In addition the damages available under passing off although increasing, notably in Irvine, are still extremely 
limited and in reality in an era of multi million pound advertising budgets are hardly an effect deterrent. If the 
UK were to follow the course taken by Canada's tort of appropriation of personality this would ensure that a 
number of gaps that are not currently covered by passing off were removed and this would additionally avoid 
stretching passing off even further beyond its initial remit. The UK continues to not recognise punitive 
damages at common law, such an extension of damages to include the pecuniary gain of the defendant, 
pecuniary loss of the claimant or an account of profits would present a more significant deterrent. The courts 
would be able to enforce the different damage awards in different circumstances such as a lost licence fee 
where the infringement was genuinely unintentional, whereas flagrant disregard for the action could be 
punished through an account of profits. The action is currently in my opinion reactive to problems that have 
occurred rather than looking to be a preventative measure. 
The other protections available for protections for personality are limited in their effectiveness within the UK, 
there have been numerous unsuccessful applications of Trade marks. This area therefore offers complicated 
and often expensive protection that may be ineffective as the trade mark can still be used in circumstances 
where the image is being used to describe characteristics of a good or service. The trade mark system was 
not designed to protect marks for mere licensing or merchandising purposes. 
Copyright protection also has a limited applicability with regards to protection of an individual's privacy or 
persona. This is due to the fact that where a  photographic image is taken, unless commissioned, the 
copyright resides with the photographer rather than the subject. This is in comparison to the significantly 
tougher laws described above that are enforced in France and Italy, where the subject must give permission 
for their image to be used when not related to newsworthy events. 
Malicious falsehood is a cause of action that had little use within the UK and could offer greater persona 
protection than has been currently tested within the UK.1278  Malicious falsehood like passing off and breach 
of confidence has been developed from its original intention, it does however, retain strong relevance to 
comparative advertising cases and inaccurate but not defamatory commercial speech. Despite this it is likely 
to be mostly utilised as one of a number of separate actions claimed. 
In conclusion the protections available for UK celebrities and public persons are satisfactory without being 
as comprehensive or as complete as they could be. The tradition of adapting causes of action to fit current 
requirements shows no sign of stopping or being replaced with a purpose made right of privacy or right to 
publicity. The UK legislature has allowed and indeed encouraged the common law to develop in line with 
new issues as and when they occurred rather than trying to pre-empt potential issues. The enactment of the 
HRA is the single most significant single development upon privacy laws within the UK, although there had 
also been a continuing development of breach of confidence prior to the HRA. The courts apparent 
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happiness to horizontally apply the ECHR through s.6 of the HRA has resulted in a large increase in the 
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